Foreword

Dear Readers,

Welcome to this second edition of CPG’s online Magazine (COM) in 2017. I hope that all our partners, stakeholders and friends have had an equally positive and exciting start to 2017 as our team here at CPG.

This issue of COM begins with a brief report on an event CPG has organised with its partners in Thailand and Germany on Compliance and Anti-Corruption across Asia earlier in January this year continuing especially our fruitful cooperation with the Viadrina Compliance Center.

The subsequent section leads with an article by CPG Senior Research Fellow Paul Chambers on Foreign Penetration in ASEAN’s CLMV States and what costs and benefits this might have for the region. In a second article, Georg Huber shares his research on European Border Surveillance sketching out a way to formulate an academically sound, theoretical approach to this highly controversial as well as technical field.

Our expert opinions in this issue reflect on the Golden Jubilee of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which turns 50 in August this year. We are pleased to offer six short commentaries to our readers on what has been achieved and what is to be expected in future as ASEAN passes this symbolic milestone.

COM 2 furthermore contains an expert interview with distinguished Harvard Professor of Social Sciences at the Department of Anthropology Michael Herzfeld on the ongoing struggle of Bangkok’s Pom Mahakan community, who have been facing possible eviction for more than two decades. Herzfeld explains their struggle with the BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Authority) and illustrates what lies ahead.

Before our regular announcements on selected past and future events, scholarship opportunities and a relevant job market section, our lifestyle section offers ideas on either spending a fun day in Bangkok or leaving the city behind for a paradise-island weekend getaway.

I wish all our readers and all who were involved in CPG’s work over the past couple of month well and do hope you enjoy this issue of COM.

Henning Glaser
Director of German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG), Faculty of Law, Thammasat University

Table of Contents

CPG Events January-February 2017................................................................. 4
“Asian Compliance and Anti-Corruption Summit – Compliance Across Asia”......... 5

Article..................................................................................................................10
Foreign Penetration in the CLMV Benefits and Costs
Paul Chambers.....................................................................................................11
Integrating technology: The first step towards theorizing the role of border surveillance in
the European Border Regime, and its relationship to European Integration Theory
Georg Huber....................................................................................................13

Expert opinions on ASEAN.............................................................................18

Interview..............................................................................................................31
with Professor Michael Herzfeld........................................................................32

Lifestyle..............................................................................................................44

Announcements..................................................................................................47
Past events ........................................................................................................48
Upcoming events ..............................................................................................51
Scholarship opportunities..................................................................................54

CPG Job Market...............................................................................................56

Impressum.........................................................................................................64
“Asian Compliance and Anti-Corruption Summit – Compliance Across Asia”
11-12 January, Holiday Inn, Bangkok

On 11 and 12 January 2017, CPG in cooperation with the Viadrina Compliance Center, European University Frankfurt (Oder), the Alliance for Integrity and Hanns Seidel Foundation hosted the “Asian Compliance and Anti-Corruption Summit – Compliance Across Asia” at Holiday Inn Bangkok Sukhumvit.

The first conference day was opened with a panel on “Cross Cultural Compliance and Communication”.

Ms. Christin Grothaus, Lecturer, Mahidol University Bangkok, gave a presentation on the psychological factors influencing cross-cultural communication in professional environments. She was followed by Mr. Vincent Yambao, Sub-Regional Compliance Officer, Merck Group, who outlined topics and challenges related to the work of a compliance office in an internationally operating corporation. Mr. Will Phua, Regional Compliance Officer Asia Pacific, ThyssenKrupp, provided practical insights into the ways how conflicts between a company’s global compliance standards and regional customs and practices can be solved. Subsequently, Mr. Noor Naqschandi, Director, Alliance for Integrity, emphasised that there is no one-size-fits-all model for compliance structures in companies, while also highlighting certain aspects that can be fulfilled even by small companies in order to move towards a culture of compliance. Prof. Dr. Peter Fissenewert, Partner, Busche Heberer Fromm, then presented insights into the practice of designing and implementing compliance management systems, with a particular focus on small and medium-sized companies. The panel was moderated by Prof. Dr. Bartosz Makowicz, Viadrina Compliance Center, European University Frankfurt (Oder).

The following panel dealt with issues related to “Cross Border Controls, Customs and Integrity”. First, Mr. Promchai Snitwongse, Expert on Investigation and Suppression, and Mr. Kansakol Indrasawat, Se-
Senior Customs Officer, Customs Department Thailand, provided an overview of customs-related topics related to compliance and anti-corruption. Prof. Dr. Wiesław Czyżowicz, Secretary of the State of the Republic of Poland (ret.), Warsaw University of Economics, then particularly focused on the challenges for compliance posed by globalization as well as competing regulatory frameworks. Mr. Lino Arboleda, Export Control Specialist, GE Global Operations, Legal Shared Services Singapore, outlined international and domestic legal frameworks related to export control, highlighting the trade with dual-use goods. Finally, Mr. Thomas Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, ASEAN CSR Network, presented fundamental concepts and current developments of corporate social responsibility and its relevance for compliance and anti-corruption. The panel was moderated by Mr. Henning Glaser, Director, CPG.

The third panel of the first conference day was titled “Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Programs”. Ms. Elodie Beth, Regional Anti-Corruption Advisor, UNDP, Regional Asia Pacific Office Bangkok, introduced the audience to UNDP’s work related to the regional development and promotion of anti-corruption programs. Dr. Sirilaksana Khoman, Chair, Economic Sector Corruption Prevention, National Anti-Corruption Commission Thailand, then provided insights into the work of an anti-corruption officer and the particular challenges related to anti-corruption in the private sector. Ms. Christine Uriarte, Senior Legal Expert, OECD Anti-Corruption Division, outlined current international approaches to anti-corruption, highlighting the importance of international standards as laid down in conventions, agreements and common norms. Mr. Leas Bachatene, Chief Executive Officer, ethiXbase, gave a presentation on the practical challenges and solutions for businesses in the field of anti-corruption compliance with a particular highlight on cost-efficiency considerations. He was followed by Ms. Cynthia Gabriel, Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4), who presented current issues related to governmental and political corruption from a Malaysian perspective. The panel was moderated by Mr. Noor Naqshbandi, Director, Alliance for Integrity.

The second conference day hosted a panel on “Compliance Third Party Due Diligence”. The first speaker, Ms. Ng Lee Meng, Chief Legal and Compliance, Allianz Indonesia, presented fundamental issues and lessons learned related to third-party due diligence in an international company. Mr. Ronald Goon, Senior Director Business Practices & Compliance, Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals, provided practical insights and challenges of continuous third party diligence with a particular focus on decentralized distribution schemes. Subsequently, Mr. Leas Bachatene, Chief Executive Director, ethiXbase, introduced different levels of third party scrutiny as well as questions related to the cost efficiency of third party due diligence. Finally, Ms. Michelle Juan, Business Development Consultant, Asia Pacific, Trace International, outlined best practices in third party diligence with a focus on risk assessment, the notion of “red flags” and the proper management of third parties. The panel was moderated by Dr. Lasse Schuldt, CPG.

All panel presentations were followed by questions and answers as well as lively discussions between the speakers and the audience. The conference ended with a joint round of all speakers discussing the most important or controversial issues with the participants and the audience.
Foreign Penetration in the CLMV: Benefits and Costs

Paul Chambers is a CPG Senior Research Fellow and a Lecturer at the College of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand.

March 2017 witnessed the seventh annual CLMV Summit among the ASEAN states of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The meeting stressed the need for the four countries to accelerate regional economic integration and work together to diminish the gap between CLMV members and other ASEAN states. CLMV itself has been said to represent a positive trend in that the most impoverished ASEAN states seek to unite toward development, especially since these countries have historically suffered from civil war driven by foreign intervention.

Today, foreign interests are still focused on the four countries, although a military motive has been replaced with a desire to “cash in” across the CLMV. United States interest in the Mekong region (enormous during the Cold War), rapidly diminished after 1991, and continue today in terms of more modest programs such as Operation Cobra Gold and the 2009 Lower Mekong Initiative. The vacuum left by Washington’s departure has been filled by Asian “donor” countries. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Japan, Thailand and China have successively established strategies to promote “development” and tap economic resources in the CLMV. In addition, South Korea, Singapore and India are increasing investments in Southeast Asia. The interests in CLMV by these countries all demonstrate that the four states are an increasingly popular center for foreign investment, trade, development assistance and linkages with international business groups.

The earliest Asian “donor” was Japan. The 1985 Plaza Accords stimulated Tokyo to search for cheap labor and resources in Southeast Asia. The 1991 end of the Cold War turned the CLMV conflict zone into economic opportunity and larger amounts of Japanese investment flowed into the region. In 1992, Japan indirectly created the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). The GMS was formally initiated by the ADB (Asian Development Bank), itself dominated by Japanese finance. It represents an economic area comprising Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam, as well as China’s Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The program assists in implementing sub-regional projects in transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, human resource development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. Implementation of projects is mostly undertaken by Japanese firms. More recently, under the Shinzo Abe government, Japanese companies have rapidly increased investments in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam because of low-cost labor, abundant cheap natural resources, and a desire to tap new markets. In Myanmar, Japan is especially interested in Thilawa, the Japan-financed Special Economic Zone. At the same time, Japanese ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) to CLMV countries has consistently been the highest of any external donor. Japan has established a “Thailand-Plus-One” system whereby companies shift their activities to low-cost production sites of CLMV while maintaining operations in Thailand as a regional production center. The growth of FDI to CLMV has led to expanded Japanese imports from CLMV which has contributed to greater economic development in CLMV.
Though unable to compete with Japan, Thailand has also sought to expand economic operations into CLMV. In 2003, Thailand implemented a plan to connect the five economies of mainland Southeast Asia under a Bangkok-financed investment/development program—ACMECS (Arrewaddy-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy). Since then, Thailand has sponsored numerous ACMECS projects in Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam. ACMECS is a sub-regional version of the GMS: recipient countries must accept Thai firms to implement ACMECS projects. Among ACMECS’ latest projects is the construction of a railway bridge linking Poipet, Cambodia with Aranyaprathet, Thailand. Thailand is among the top three investors in Myanmar and Lao PDR, while in Cambodia and Vietnam it is among the top 10. Meanwhile, Thai trade with CLMV countries has more than doubled since 2010, and in 2016 accounted for 10.4 percent of Thailand’s total exports. The Prayuth Chan-ocha regime is pushing for the establishment of border economic zones designed to boost even more trade and investment with CLMV.

The entrenchment of such economic asymmetry could cause more burdens for mostly marginal states and the building of greater numbers of dams. Ultimately, where CLMV may superficially appear as a mere grouping of poor, neighboring countries seeking a common voice, it represents, at the same time, a regionalized opportunity for more powerful states (and their corporations) to establish an economic footing for purposes of power maximization. The world should be wary of the predictable human security costs which this arrangement could well produce.

***************

Integrating technology: The first step towards theorizing the role of border surveillance in the European Border Regime, and its relationship to European Integration Theory

Georg Huber, Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis- Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

European Integration Theory has long been an established sub-field in the field of European Studies. However, the role of technology as an element of the policy has not been very prominent. This article is a very first step in an attempt to change this, taking the policy domain of European Justice and Home Affairs and the issue of surveillance technology in border protection as an example. It should be the beginning of an endeavor to better understand the role of technology in European policy making in general and in European Justice and Home Affairs policies and border management in particular, taking a theoretical angle at the issue.

Since its inception, the European Union has been a fascinating subject for political scientists and in particular for scholars of theory in the field of Political Science. Its extraordinary degree of regional integration and its unique political and juridical structure, entailing both intergovernmental and supranational elements, often characterized as a sui generis case, led to the creation of a new kind of polity, which can be neither characterized as sovereign state nor an international organization. Right from the inception of the European integration process, theories of European integration, were they normative, descriptive or analytic, played an important role in the academic discourse on European integration (Wiener, A., Diez, Th., 2009, pp.1-22). This is unsurprising as the European Union is a particularly interesting subject for theorizing as its unique governance structure forbids a simple transfer of theory based on national states and their relations to each other to its case. Consequently, it posed a challenge to many tenets of political and International Relations theory.

In response to this challenge, scholars from these fields created a competing set of theories in order to analytically grasp the nature of this emerging, consolidating and now established polity. These theories were designed to forecast its development, and theorists changed and adapted their theories throughout the history of the Union. The questions asked by European Integration Theory are touching on core aspects of political theory, on the nature of sovereignty and the national state. Is the Union primarily a vehicle for cooperation among sovereign states, driven predominantly by their preferences and interest? What importance should be assigned to the supranational institutions
such as the Commission, the Parliament and (I would add) the Court of Justice? Will the European Union develop into a full-blown federation, even a unified European state?

This is particularly true in one area of policy making in the European Union that is the policy domain (the area of policy making) of Justice and Home Affairs (also known under the term of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice). It is a particularly interesting subject as it regulates areas which are considered to be core tasks of sovereign statehood, such as the protection of borders or internal security. Thus, it is remarkable that there is any cooperation between member states at all, and so it is worth a deeper analytical and theoretical look.

In this short contribution, I am not going to make an attempt to create a “Theory of European Integration in the field of Justice and Home Affairs” which would indeed be a somewhat overambitious exercise. Instead, I focus on a very specific aspect of European Justice and Home Affairs and approach it from a particular angle: I formulate, as a first step for theorizing it, the issues that a theory of this specific issue has to grasp. I will leave the next step, formulating such a theory or choosing one out of the existing set of theories, to future efforts.

Specifically, I start creating a theoretical framework concerning the issue of the protection of the Schengen borders, and the particular angle I take is the use of technology (more precisely, surveillance technology) in the European Border Regime.

In recent years, there has been an increase of databases, interconnection of databases data retention and surveillance policies which are intimately linked to more general aspects of migration policy. This has formed a fascinating techno-political assemblage: besides its fascinating “empirical” (that is legal political and technological) properties, it is also worth to theoretically examine the role and function of technology in European policy making, which ideally might relate to other technological policies in the EU.

Before I lay out the aspects of the field that a theory of surveillance technology in European border management has to grasp, I will quickly recapitulate the history of the field and the issue.

Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs began as informal cooperation against terrorism among European law enforcement agencies in the 1970s. For a long time, the field retained its informal and intergovernmental character, even after it was institutionalized into European primary law through the introduction of the third pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. The intergovernmental character was maintained as the European Parliament had limited decision-making powers and the Court of Justice had only limited jurisdiction in the third pillar. Furthermore, the decision-making process in the Council strongly displayed its intergovernmental character (decisions by unanimity).

Only 2009, with the Lisbon treaty entering into force (which abolished the pillar structure) were the decision-making processes normalized, the normal legislative procedure (meaning full co-decision powers for the EP and the power to veto legislation) extended to all areas of Justice and Home Affairs policy, and the jurisdiction of Court fully extended (Craig, P., De Burca, G., 2015, pp. 964-967).

From 1999 to 2014, policy making was framed by European policy programs for the field, the respective Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programme, (European Council 1999, 2005, 2010) were initiated by the European Council. This again shows a certain dominance of intergovernmental modes of decision making. By formulating these policy programs, the European Union’s member states national governments not only made Justice and Home Affairs policy a priority, they also gave a certain policy consistency to the field. On the level of politics (i.e. the procedural and institutional level) they also, by using the forum of the European Council, retained control over the long-term policy framing in the field vis-à-vis the more intergovernmental institutions of the EU.

On a policy level within the EU, two developments shaped the policy agenda: The creation of the Schengen Area, and the subsequent development of a common system of migration management and border protection. Another major development, this one external, also shaped it: The Global War on Terror resulting from the terror attack in the U.S. of September 11, 2001.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of these driving factors, as many of the relevant policies were introduced with either one, or both in mind.

The former led to the creation of the common asylum system (regulated by the Dublin Regulation), which in turn led to the creation of the Eurodac database for the fingerprints of asylum seekers, in order to prevent “asylum hopping”. Another database related to the European border regime (yet under another legal regime) is the Visa Information System containing the biometric data of those third-country nationals entering the Schengen Area with a visa. The planned Entry-Exit System would contain the entry date and the exit date as well as the biometric data of all short time (less than 180 Days) visa-holding third country nationals, while the planned ETIAS system (comparable to the US ESTA system) would contain the data of those not needing a visa.

Furthermore, there are plans to unify these databases (plus probably the ECRIS database containing crime related data) or at least make their data accessible together, all of which contain biometric data, to one biometric “core database” (Monroy, M.2016).

The upcoming retention of Passenger Name Records needs to be added to this list of border related data bases. And last but not least, there is the Schengen Information System II, the central database for European border protection.

Not a database but rather a massive surveillance system is the multi-platform, multi-technology border surveillance meta-system Europol, run by Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard). The fight against terrorism (and crime in general) further initialized a huge range of measures from the (annulled) data retention directive, to the European Arrest Warrant.

It would, of course, be unfair to portray EU Justice and Home Affairs policy simply as a collection of rather “repressive” measures focusing on the fight against crime and terrorism. Thus, even though they are not the focus of this article, other very important measures in the field of Justice and Home Affairs policy (such as the foundation of the Fundamental Rights Agency, and important developments in European family law, or in the field of data protection with the General Data Protection Regulation as the most important measure) deserve to be mentioned. The latter will update, unify and strengthen the European Union’s Data protection regime and replace Directive 95/46/EC.

The deployment of surveillance technologies in the European border regime is a political act, and it forms part of a more general policy concerning migration and border control. Thus, such a theory must be able to grasp the policy (of employing surveillance technology in in the European border regime) in the field (European Union Justice and Home Affairs) and the polity (the EU) where it takes place.

Considering this history and this admittedly incomplete list of measures, I now will formulate the following conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to theorize the deployment of surveillance technologies in European border management.
The national and European levels of policy-making

As in almost any EU policy field, it is necessary to reflect on both levels of policy making, the domestic and the European arena. This is even more the case in Justice and Home Affairs policy as the issues dealt with in the field are of highly sensitive nature, crucial for sovereignty and identity of the member states. They are election-relevant hot topics in national arenas and thus unlikely to be fully transferred to European level. Thus, the multi-level nature of European policy making needs to be reflected in the theory.

The institutional set-up of the EU institutions

As in other fields of European policy making, any theory of Justice and Home Affairs policy making needs to reflect on the institutional set up of the EU and its particularities and the effect which differing modalities of the institutional architecture has on policy making. This is particularly true for Justice and Home Affairs policies as a field where the institutional set-up differed substantially from other areas for a comparatively long period time of time.

The complexity of the issue

In Justice and Home Affairs policy in general and in migration and border protection policy in particular, there is not only a national and a European dimension but also an external dimension that is expressed in agreements with third states and in the European Neighborhood Policy which also (inter alia) aims at controlling migration. The usage of surveillance technology in the European border regime has to be contextualized in this complex policy environment.

The role of agencies

The diverse surveillance technologies are run by EU agencies such as the EU large scale IT Systems agency eu-LISA or Frontex. Many pilot projects are run by national police agencies. All these agencies have their own interests at stake when surveillance-technology-based policies are introduced. These interests might also influence technology implementation. The agencies' role as policy agents in their own rights should not be underestimated; especially in a field such as Justice and Home Affairs that has its roots in the cooperation of (national police) agencies.

The role of non-state actors

When dealing with surveillance technologies in the field, there are several actors that are not part of a state nor of the EU institutions that need to be taken into account. There are the producers of the technologies which, of course, have a stake in their development. There is also the scientific community and the importance of science policy in developing these technologies. Arguably, the scientific community is not exactly a non-state actor, but it must be added to this list as it is neither a classical political actor, nor an agency. Further, there is the very vocal and well organized European civil society in the more general field of civil liberties and digital rights, which is concerned with these issues as well. Finally, there are the travelers, refugees, and migrants themselves who are the subjects of control and registration through these technologies.

The role of technology itself

Surveillance technologies have what can be called "political agency". They shape policies by the fact that technological choices (such as what data to include) have a direct effect on policies and their implementation. Furthermore, the mere existence of surveillance technologies often creates the desire for using more such technologies on the side of states and their agencies. It suggests itself to states, and agencies of the state, to extend their usage, open up access of their data to new agencies, or interconnect databases or surveillance measures. Thus, their existence could influence future policy development.

These are the very basic specific historical developments of the field, and are the most basic specific particularities of the usage of surveillance technology in the field of European border protection that the theory of that topic would need to grasp.

Obviously, this very short attempt only scratches the surface and further work is needed, especially for next step: the formulation of the theory itself.

References:


Expert opinions on ASEAN

H.E. Kasit Piromya, National Reform Steering Assembly, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand

My concern for ASEAN at Fifty and the years to come in the near future is the lack of vision and determination on the part of its political leadership.

The leaders somehow seem to continue paying lip services to the centrality role of ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific region and to its viable and pivotal role in the international arena. Their decision-making and professed common stand on global issues and on immediate undertakings of ASEAN Community based on the ASEAN Charter and Roadmaps continues to rely on the workings and recommendations of the bureaucrats. Political initiatives and drive have not been forthcoming.

The political leaders seem to be more parochial and domestic-oriented. They seem to be taking the concerns and the posturing of outside powers more into consideration than the genuine and legitimate interests of the ASEAN Community as a whole.

ASEAN’s wellbeing and progress seem to be taking a back-seat to national agendas and external influences.

It is about time, hopefully, that over the course of the year 2017, the ASEAN leaders will meet as often as possible to take stock, to build further on the past achievements and to hasten the completion of outstanding issues and tasks as well as to have a common stand on various regional and international issues of vital importance to ASEAN cohesion, integration, credibility and respectability.

A case in point, for example, is the facilitation of all cross-border activities to ensure smooth-flow of capital, services, products and citizens.

Another important issue is the harmonization of laws and rules pertaining to taxes and documentation.

ASEAN also needs to develop a programme for migrant-workers and hasten the coverage of mutual recognition and acceptance of professional certifications and standards.

A region-wide dissemination of knowledge about the ASEAN Community and opportunities therein, continues to be a very urgent and important task.

There should also be an ASEAN Master Plan for environmental protection and assessment as well as a Master Plan for disaster prevention, relief and rehabilitation.

In all of these issues, ASEAN need not to start from point-zero, there are international and regional organizations as well as civil-society organization that are more than willing to assist and to cooperate.

In short, there is the need for a sense of purpose and urgency. There must be political will and the genuine belief in the common value and in the sanctity of ASEAN.
ASEAN at 50

Pamela Sodhy, Adjunct Associate Professor – Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University

On its 50th birthday, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has much to celebrate. One reason for celebration is that it has lasted for half a century, despite skepticism that first surrounded its establishment in August 1967 to “accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region” and to “promote regional peace and stability”. Another reason for celebration is its doubling of membership, from five members to ten. ASEAN began with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines but has grown to include Brunei in 1984; Vietnam in 1995; Laos and Myanmar in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999. Although its members have humble beginnings and only Thailand escaped colonialism, one of them, Singapore, has attained first-world status since the mid-1990s. Another cause for celebration is no outbreak of war between the ASEAN members for fifty years since its formation, a remarkable feat in light of traditional hostility between some of them, such as Thailand and Burma, and Laos and Thailand.

There are other reasons to celebrate this milestone birthday. For instance, ASEAN continues to enjoy collective clout, even though some states are tiny, like Singapore and Brunei, because together ASEAN covers a huge land and sea area and a combined population of over 630 million, a figure exceeding that of the European Union (EU) or the United States (US). ASEAN also continues to possess abundant economic resources, like forest products; marine resources; minerals; spices; plantation crops; and oil. Its present economic growth rate at around 4.5% is higher than that of the EU and the US. Moreover, it enjoys a favorable geographical position between India and China, and has several strategic sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits, and the Lombok Straits. In addition, ASEAN provides a forum for its ten members to meet regularly at summits and other meetings to discuss issues concerning them. It also has its Dialogue Partner System since 1976, whereby it meets with its major trading partners to deal with common matters on a wide range of issues.

Over the years, ASEAN has also been able to present a united front when faced with challenges threatening the peace and security of Southeast Asia. One such challenge was the large influx of Indochinese refugees in 1975, following communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The ASEAN states responded by spearheading the 1979 United Nations (UN) Conference on Indochinese Refugees, held in Geneva, which stemmed the flow of Indochinese refugees to Southeast Asia and speeded up the process for their resettlement elsewhere. Another challenge which led the ASEAN states to combine forces for a united front was the Third Indochina War, which started in December 1978 when Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia. Throughout this ten-year war, ASEAN led a diplomatic offensive against Vietnam. Its actions included non-recognition of Vietnam’s puppet regime in Cambodia, yearly U.N. resolutions calling for Vietnam to withdraw its military forces; and support for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea against Vietnam. ASEAN’s actions helped to end that war in 1989. A more recent example of a united front by ASEAN against a common challenge is its present concerted and collective fight against terrorism.

ASEAN can also be proud of its ability to adapt to new circumstances, as clearly seen in how it has chosen to work closely with former enemies. In this connection, it has allowed Vietnam, its enemy during the Third Indochina War, to join its regional association, enabling Vietnam to become a valued partner. Likewise, ASEAN has welcomed European nations that formerly colonized Southeast Asia to join its Dialogue Partner System (DSP) and its Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It now enjoys cordial relations with all of them, an admirable achievement.

At the same time, however, ASEAN has some tasks to complete. For example, ASEAN needs to resolve some territorial disputes between members, such as the Sabah claim, raised by the Philippines against Malaysia in 1963. To the Philippines, Sabah was leased to the British North Borneo Chartered Company in 1878 by the Sultan of Sulu, and thus still belongs to the Philippines. To Malaysia, however, Sabah was ceded in perpetuity to the Company, fell under British rule after WWI, and became part of Malaysia in 1963. So far, ASEAN has shelved the Sabah claim, not resolved it. ASEAN also needs to bridge the economic gap between its richer and poorer members as some observers see a two-tiered ASEAN, with the older members in a better position than the newer ones, in particular Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Yet another problem is the inherent rivalry between some members, which can sometimes flare up, as in the case of Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple in Cambodia. There is also the need to increase intra-ASEAN trade which is low at 25% of total trade in spite of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) reducing tariffs to 0-5 percent. In addition, ASEAN needs to rethink its adherence to a policy of non-interference and non-intervention between members, as keeping quiet is allowing contentious policies to persist, such as Myanmar’s discrimination against the Rohingyas and the Philippines’ harsh handling of the drug problem under President Rodrigo Duterte. With Donald Trump as the new US president, ASEAN now has the challenge of raising its profile, so that he can appreciate ASEAN’s importance, especially on the trade and security fronts.

As for ASEAN’s prospects for the future, one prospect is more members, as Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste have expressed interest in joining as full members. A second prospect is that the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), launched in late 2015, may succeed in improving intra-ASEAN trade and in lessening the economic gap between the ASEAN states. A third prospect is more division among the ASEAN members over China, which is taking an aggressive stance in the region, especially over its claims in the South China Sea. Cambodia has become closest to China through aid and trade, and sided with China on the South China Sea issue at an ASEAN summit. Thus, at 50, ASEAN can acknowledge that it is still a work in progress, with many achievements under its belt but with also more work to do in order to be more effective as a regional organization in handling present and future challenges.
ASEAN’S DISAPPOINTING 50th

Bernard K. Gordon, Professor Emeritus at the University of New Hampshire

ASEAN’s origins and goals from its very beginnings were entirely political, rather than economic, cultural, or social. Those political roots, in an era when the Vietnam war was entering a more intense phase, stemmed from deep and real concerns about national security, and from a sense that somehow, greater cohesion among ASEAN’s several very disparate nations would promote each nation’s security. In today’s terms ASEAN resulted from a multiplier effect, one that might allow the mostly small nations of Southeast Asia to punch above their weight.

Two efforts that preceded ASEAN, now largely forgotten, reflected that search for cohesion. One was “ASA,” a short-lived grouping in 1961 of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, and the other was “Maphilindo,” an attempt at cooperation dating from 1963 among the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. ASA was largely promoted by Thailand’s impressive Foreign Minister at the time, Thanat Khoman. It got nowhere because it lacked the heft that would later come from Indonesia, the region’s largest and most populous nation. The second effort, “Maphilindo,” founded because Indonesia’s President at the time, Sukarno, had embarked on an anti-colonial effort known as “Konfrontasi.”

Several statesmen were key to ASEAN’s eventual formation in 1967: Adam Malik, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister; Thanat Khoman, his counterpart in Bangkok; Ghazali bin Schafie, the permanent secretary to Malaysia’s Prime Minister; and Singapore’s Foreign Minister Rajaratnam. They were accomplished leaders, each of whom I interviewed several times, and they all recognized that what later would become a complaint about ASEAN—that it was no more than a Foreign Minister’s “talking shop”—was in fact its greatest virtue. That virtue was based on a commonly held sense of values, the most prominent of which was each nation’s commitment to genuine independence, meaning quite literally non-dependence on any of the major powers who were and are active in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the 50 years since its beginnings, ASEAN has registered a few successes and several important mis-steps. Among the positive but modest developments were two efforts to incorporate the roles of non-ASEAN members in support of ASEAN: the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (or ARF), and the TAC, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Some observers also count as a positive development ASEAN’s involvement in the Cambodian conflict, followed by Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN. Yet Cambodian developments since then do not appear to support that view, and aside from Vietnam, the enlargement of ASEAN to include the former French Indochinese territories has not on balance represented a positive outcome.

ASEAN’s largest mis-step has stemmed from a conceptual flaw widely held in the years just before ASEAN’s creation: the view that regional economic cooperation is essential to regional political cooperation. That view grew from Europe’s experience, especially the 1957 Treaty of Rome which ultimately led to the European Union. But in fact, as Adenauer and others of the EU Founders stated at the time, they all knew that the impetus for what they were creating was political, and that whatever economic cooperation steps were also taken were ancillary to the fundamental political goal.

Southeast Asia’s political and economic conditions were fundamentally different from those in Europe. While Europe’s economies in many respects lent themselves to regional economic cooperation—the European coal and steel community most obviously—none of those preconditions characterized Southeast Asia. The region’s factor endowments, Singapore aside, have been too similar and redundant to provide a genuine base for regional economic cooperation. Yet in spite of that evidence, and the fact that present-day intra-regional trade patterns reveal precious little change from the 1960’s, ASEAN’s history has been regularly characterized by a vain search to promote regional economic cooperation. A prime example was the asserted establishment in 2015 of the “ASEAN Economic Community”, whose non-consequence has led some to conclude that in the absence of such “hard” evidence, ASEAN has done little of practical meaning.

Of course that misses the main point—that in a region that might otherwise have witnessed much conflict, ASEAN continues to exist and that is no small thing. But is it enough? Leaders among the ASEAN members and others who presume to speak for ASEAN appear to think otherwise, because in recent years they have begun to insist on the mythological notion of ”ASEAN Centrality.” Several of the outside major powers, most notably China and the United States, have sought to flatter ASEAN by seeming to endorse that concept, but it strains credulity to believe that Beijing takes the notion seriously. Yet the opposite is suggested by Washington, which has gone to far as to create an ”ASEAN Ambassador.”

A reasonable conclusion is that when measured across the international politics spectrum of the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN is neither irrelevant nor central, though its recent inability to speak with a single voice regarding China’s hard-edged ambitions in the South China Sea flirts dangerously with the former. That message was implicitly conveyed at a recent meeting in Washington where Michael Auslin discussed his new book The End of the Asian Century. For more than an hour, he dealt with the security issues of the region, as they involved China, Japan, Russia, the Korean peninsula, and the United States. Yet not once, not even for a moment, was ASEAN even glancingly mentioned--and that absence suggests the new realities ASEAN now faces.
ASEAN faces many of the same political, social, economic and environmental challenges affecting many of the world’s developing and middle income nations in the world. However, relative to many nations in the world, ASEAN has more of a foundation to build on and windows of opportunity to take advantage of.

It is the author’s hope that the current era of global uncertainty will serve as a catalyst for action & unity, as opposed to inaction & division, by ASEAN’s member nations both individually and collectively.

50 years and none the wiser? A (flexible) Westphalia in Southeast Asia

Frederick Kliem, Programme Officer Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia and the Pacific, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation

At first sight, it may seem strange to connect a small, beautiful forestry region in western Germany to Southeast Asia. For me, being a Westphalian by birth, it is a doubly peculiar exercise to write in a political sense on the Westphalian condition of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This year, on August 8 2017 to be precise, the Association celebrates its 50th anniversary and although celebrations are unfortunately likely to take place somewhat under the radar of most people, including Southeast Asians, there is much to celebrate; not least ASEAN’s distinctive Westphalian character.

It has been a remarkable journey. What began as rudimentary economic and security cooperation among, to put it smoothly, mutually suspicious nation states, eventually attained a level of regional integration second only to the European Union (EU). Unlike Europe, Southeast Asia is arguably not a “natural” region, lacking many of Europe’s binding religious, sociocultural or political elements. Nor has there been a long tradition of elite exchange and mutual identification as was the case in pre-1789 Europe among aristocracy and bourgeoisie, fostering a kinship and mutual understanding between European elites. ASEAN comprises a region larger than the EU in both population and area and consists of currently ten sovereign nation states each with their very distinctive character and history. One finds almost all types of government known to political science, including absolutist, authoritarian, semi-democratic, or democratic regime types. ASEAN Member States (AMS) range from secular to rigidly religious, Buddhist, Islamic, Christian; and while some are ethnically homogenous with a clear majority, in other AMS the largest ethnic group accounts for less than half the population. The socio-economic development gap between the richest and poorest is humongous.

Marc Mealy, Vice President-Policy of the US-ASEAN Business Council.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the policy or positions of the US-ASEAN Business Council or its members.

On August 8, 2017, ten Southeast Asian nations of various cultures, religions, forms of government and stages of economic development will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Anniversaries offer opportunities to take stock of the past and assess the current situation, to better visualize pathways towards the future.

Since its inception, the vision of ASEAN was primarily driven by a value of developing closer ties between a grouping of five nations to help prevent cross border conflicts. While facing a myriad of developmental, institutional and structural challenges no major wars have occurred, an ASEAN Secretariat was created and the group has expanded to ten nations. While often characterized as a “talk shop” with a maddening operational construct known as the “ASEAN way”, the nations of ASEAN can take pride in a foundation of socioeconomic developmental accomplishments during its history.

As a region of 630 million people, the ten countries have combined GDP of $2.4 trillion and an average regional growth rate of 5% per year. Over a period of several decades, ASEAN economies once known for producing commodities and low value manufactured goods are now home to a $19 billion semi-conductor sector producing 80% of the world’s hard drives and an auto sector which is the 7th largest producer of cars, trucks and buses in the world. Registration of patents in ASEAN has increased by 40% since 2014 and ASEAN’s innovation led startup communities have helped produce seven “Unicorns” (startups with valuations exceeding $1 billion). Given its six FTA’s with Asia’s leading economies and rankings as the 3rd and 4th largest trade partners with China and America respectively in the world, ASEAN has become Asia’s leading regional economic hub.

Against this backdrop of historical success ASEAN formally launched the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. It constitutes a uniquely ASEAN vision of regional economic integration, not like the European Union, and has been shaped by painful lessons learned from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It reflects a sense that ASEAN’s successful economic development paradigms of the 20th century are exhausted and no longer capable of producing the similar sustainable economic results in the 21st century, because of the many ways the global economy has evolved and the emergence of China and India.

For ASEAN to reach its full potential, the clarity of vision must be matched by the commitments and actions of its member states, regional institutions and civil societies to make the necessary investments and policy reforms to create a more deeply integrated and globally connected region. ASEAN’s current challenges include several politically distracted national governments, insufficiently mandated and resourced regional institutions, and processes which are not adequately driven from the bottom up. All of them represent temporal realities, which if addressed could help set the tone for ASEAN’s direction in the years ahead.

United States - ASEAN footer
Making matters worse is the oftentimes complicated relationship among many AMS. Communist consolidation in Vietnam was one of the main threats against which background ASEAN came into being in the first place. Expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia was only the beginning of what to this day continues to be a complicated, acrimonious relationship. Historic animosities between Cambodia and Vietnam or Cambodia and Thailand still linger and Sukarno’s Konfrontasi mostly on the island of Borneo is still in living memory. In fact, apart from the capricious fate of geography, AMS have very little in common. Perhaps the only sustainable links for most AMS are comparable patterns of migration, i.e. ethnic Chinese immigration, and a shared colonial experience.¹

Considering this extraordinarily heterogeneous and complex membership and problematic historical intra-regional relations, ASEAN is one of the most remarkable cooperative organisations in contemporary international relations. Against all odds ASEAN has not only survived, but flourished and continuously expanded. Following the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, ASEAN rhetoric focussed more profoundly on deeper regional integration and institutionalisation in both the political, socio-cultural, and economic domain. Calls for deeper integration were provided with a clear agenda with the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) and reaffirmed in 2011 with the Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community (AC) in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord III). Based on those documents ASEAN embarked on a hitherto uncharacteristic community building project by specifying an institutional and ideological framework for deeper regional integration somewhat similar to the European pre-Lisbon Treaty pillar architecture. As of December 2015, the AC is comprised of a three-pillar organisational architecture with the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The three pillars collectively represent the AC and are concurrent and mutually reinforcing, each defined by respective blueprints.²

Enabling such wide-ranging and institutionalised cooperation and regional integration in spite of aforementioned heterogeneity and confrontational and competitive past, is not least a unique and rather peculiar, seemingly contradictory way of regional governance, colloquially called the ASEAN way. This ASEAN way consists of several core principles and practices such as sovereign equality, mutual respect for territorial integrity, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs both bilaterally as well as via ASEAN. The realisation of this set of principles in the day-to-day routine of ASEAN politics is the backbone of a mutual appreciation by all AMS of the intergovernmental architecture of Southeast Asian regionalism. The ASEAN way has a mixed record in general, enabling cooperation in a diverse region where otherwise there could have been none, but at the same time inhibiting affirmative action in cases of disagreement.

When in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia was concluded following one of the bloodiest conflicts in

---

¹ Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia not to be officially colonialised. But even Siam and later Thailand experienced the vulnerability resulting from colonial power and it took great diplomatic efforts, painful concessions, and a great deal of luck to remain an independent nation.


European history, the Thirty Years’ War, none of the representatives would have imagined that they were to create not only a modus vivendi for a Europe torn by a Catholic-Protestant conflict, royal turf wars and shifting alliances. They would also produce one of the most stable and peaceful periods in European history and at the same time the most enduring system of international relations to date. Against the backdrop of total human devastation and near self-destruction, European elites agreed on a set of practical measures that would represent a unique and novel system of regional order, attempting a degree of diplomatic stability and civility among conflicting parties where neither was present or expected. What delegates conceived in the small Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück would become generally accepted concepts of international order that persist to this day and in fact create the contemporary understanding of statehood and sovereignty. The agreements of the Peace of Westphalia institutionalised absolute equality of all independent nation states, reigning without outside interference over what would be accepted by all as their respective sovereign territory. Equality of and respect for all attributes of independent, sovereign statehood regardless of individual power, size, or domestic system of governance became the fundamental pillars of the international order and coexistence. Hitherto, the legal concept of state, not individuals, dynasties, religions, or ideologies, would be the main reference unit of international relations. Religious or Royal affiliation, divine ruling rights, and absolutist demands ought to take a backseat and unconditional acceptance of heterogeneity and respect for whatever differences there were would form the basic principles of order.

More than three centuries later, on August 8th 1967 the leaders of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines took their own multiplicity and difference as a starting point and signed the Bangkok Declaration, giving birth to ASEAN. The ASEAN way and with it the constitution of ASEAN is the embodiment of the Westphalian spirit and the preservation thereof became the raison d’État of AMS, embodied in the ASEAN way. Nowadays, those originally European principles and the spirit of Westphalia are perhaps nowhere quite as quintessentially obvious and as institutionalised as in Southeast Asia. Although the Europeans had long left the spirit of Westphalia behind after Louis XIV of France, Napoleon, and Frederick the Great and the colonisers of the 19th and 20th century certainly did not even think of applying Westphalian rules to their Southeast Asian dominions, their “subjects” used the Wilsonian right to self-determination of all peoples and national sovereignty in the spirit of Westphalia as arguments in favour of their independence movements. Nationalist demands of Westphalian conditions in the face of devastation and conflict is the most significant consequence of the anti-imperialist struggle of Aung, Ho, Sukarno and others against colonialism. In 1967, all of this eventually led to a distinctively non-European, soft, or even weak institutionalism. While ASEAN does not lack bureaucratic bodies, it shuns supranationalism and administrative authority beyond the nation state in its most Westphalian interpretation. ASEAN elites continue to this day to prioritise intergovernmental, informal consensus seeking under the – at least officially and publically – utmost respect for equality for the nation state; be it Indonesia or Laos. ASEAN’s founders and subsequent leaders, just like the delegates in Münster and Osnabrück, created a regional
architecture that prioritised problem avoidance and allowed the system to be just strong enough to facilitate cooperation in order to maintain regional stability but not as strong as to threaten absolute national sovereignty. ASEAN critics, of which there are many, often point to the fact that under such preconditions of problem avoidance, institutionalisation in ASEAN cannot be more than a “talking shop”, unable to proceed from problem avoidance to resolution in case of inevitable dispute. Effective regional governance cannot possibly be achieved under stewardship of institutions and regimes so profoundly lacking teeth.

Such criticism is certainly justified and ASEAN itself provided impetus for greater demand placed upon it. In the process of conceiving the AC and its pillars, ASEAN leaders broke with the Westphalian spirit and enshrined wide ranging universal norms and principle, such as human rights, into their every document. Such ambitions however were not backed up with the necessary institutional reform and ASEAN remains a paper tiger in terms of executive compliance enforcement. Its obvious inability to deliver on their promises was brutally exposed during instances such as the early responses to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 or the 2015 and ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis. What good is an association that promises to bring relief to its people but is unable to take action? The answer is that, despite its many flaws, the Westphalian character of the ASEAN way has allowed competitive nations and peoples to live under precisely this stability ASEAN’s founders set out to achieve. In Southeast Asia ASEAN’s inauguration has led to one of the most stable periods in the region’s history, just like the Peace of Westphalia did in Europe.

Despite its many flaws, on 08.08.2017 all peace loving people ought to raise their glass in honour of ASEAN’s 50th. Perhaps, after 50 years of largely cordial cooperation, ASEAN and its members may allow a certain degree of reform and flexibility. ASEAN and its leaders most recent interference in what Myanmar considers a domestic affair, the maltreatment of the Rohingya minority, allows for some hope on that front. How better to celebrate a jubilee as to develop their very own Westphalianism? There is no need to upset an established order, no need for a Louis XIV or a French Revolution. Just a little tweak here and there to safeguard not only basic traditional security, but also its most vulnerable people. This would be a worthy jubilee birthday present from a truly remarkable organisation to itself. After all, at 50 anyone can grow up.

Against the odds. ASEAN turns 50.

Jan Kliem, Program Officer, CPG, Bangkok

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has from the outset been an unlikely project. Its two short-lived regional predecessors, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo did certainly nothing to instil confidence in the regional integration project that was to follow. Notwithstanding, the efforts of five states to come together in one Association in a region that could hardly be any more diverse (including diversity on regime types, economic development, religion, ethnic homogeneity and even geography), culminated in the founding of ASEAN on August 8, 1967. The Association, now grown from the original five to ten member states, will celebrate its 50th birthday on precisely that day, August 8, 2017.

A birthday, especially a big one marking the golden anniversary of ASEAN, offers ample opportunity to reflect, assess and take stock. Taking stock in ASEAN’s case is bound to be a joyful exercise for much has been achieved. Among the achievements, most obviously, is the fact that no major war has occurred between any of the member states of ASEAN over the past 50 years of its existence. This alone is a notable achievement in a region where there has historically been plenty of animosity between countries. Whilst there have been severe ‘border skirmishes’ between for instance Thailand and Cambodia during the ‘Preah Vihear’ temple dispute, major conflict has by and large been avoided. Secondly, ASEAN has managed to put itself on the diplomatic map, engaging in numerous meetings, forums and summits not only within ASEAN, but importantly across the world, staging regular ASEAN Plus meetings and even having been invited to Sunnylands by former US President Obama in early 2016 (arguably, this newly attained attention may very well fade under new President Trump). Thirdly, ASEAN’s overall average GDP growth rate (around 5% since 2000) is another positive to be noted. Despite the fact that countries within ASEAN hugely differ in terms of economic growths, this has to be welcomed by all members. ASEAN is already forming an impressive economic bloc and if the cards are played wisely, this can and will benefit all member states.

ASEAN has displayed some impressive progress and to this day, even if comparison may end right there, its development has not been unlike the one laid out by some referring to the European Union, using the image of a bicycle as a metaphor for its integration – you have got to keep moving or else you fall over. Whilst in ASEAN’s case enlargement has clear geographical boundaries – the only conceivable further members at this stage would be East Timor, Papua New Guinea and under very specific circumstances maybe West Papua, the Association has moved on with and deepened its integration. Its most recent step in this direction was the inauguration of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015, as it was laid out first in 2003.

Overall, ASEAN’s development, particularly when judged based on ASEAN paperwork, i.e. its contracts, statutes, blueprints and especially the 2007 Charter, looks nothing but impressive. The
Association regularly speaks not only of common economic goals and political interests, but of a common identity, ASEAN centrality, ASEAN’s purpose to strengthen democracy and human rights in the region and equality for all its citizens regardless of for instance race, religion, gender or language. Unfortunately, it does not take much digging to see that there are some tensions between stipulated principles and goals on the one, and realities on the other hand.

To no small extent, many observers attribute this to the particularities of the ‘ASEAN way’, or the absolute respect for each members’ national sovereignty, unanimous decision making and strict non-interference in domestic affairs by ASEAN. They see ASEAN as the prime example of a paper tiger or a talk-shop with much talk and little action, which results in ASEAN’s inability to enforce any of its principles upon deviating members. And there is a lot of merit to this argument. With regards to human rights violations for example, ASEAN’s unanimity principle clearly obstructs progress. To many, it would make sense to use something like ASEAN minus 1 decisions in case one member state is allegedly violating human rights ASEAN supposedly defends. This way, the country in question would not be able to block ASEAN action by merely not voting against itself after an alleged violation has occurred. But exactly that is the case. Unsurprisingly and not due to lack of need, to date, ASEAN’s own commission on human rights, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has not been taking any significant action on any issue since its inception in 2009.

As much as it is evident from the above that ASEAN has problems it needs to address, and there are many, observers must not forget where the association has come from and ask what it does for the region and its people, rather than what it fails to do. Much of the failures look devastating in the light of the expectations surrounding ASEAN. Some of these expectations are external, for example the expectation by some that ASEAN can play a salutary role and somehow be substantial to ‘solving’ the conflict in the South China Sea, and some are homemade such as being the upholder of human rights in Southeast Asia. It would do the Association good not to fuel overly high expectations with bloomy rhetoric on things it finds difficult to achieve at this point in time. For its birthday, it should focus on what it has already achieved, and then, keep working tirelessly so it can one day be what it already claims it is. But by all means, celebrate!
“A microcosm of the country, an example for the world” An Interview with Professor Michael Herzfeld

For more than two decades, the people living in Bangkok’s Pom Mahakan community have been facing possible eviction. In recent weeks, a deadline set by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) expired and the first wooden houses have been torn down. Michael Herzfeld, Ernest E. Monrad Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, has written a book about the community and its continuous struggle (“Siege of the Spirits. Community and Polity in Bangkok”, University of Chicago Press, 2016). We have interviewed Professor Herzfeld who, besides numerous other affiliations, is currently also an Honorary Fellow at the Center for Contemporary Social and Cultural Studies, Thammasat University.

Professor Herzfeld, the most recent deadline set by the BMA demanding the residents of Pom Mahakan to give up and leave their homes has expired. Which actions did the BMA take as a consequence?

The BMA came in on 6 March and destroyed four houses, one of which had been specially marked by the residents as being of historical interest, and another of which was a new house constructed with funds brought together through the rotating credit system created by the community itself. They basically destroyed on the one hand a piece of old Bangkok and, on the other hand, a rather remarkable monument of a social movement that endeavoured to address the question of housing at a time when there is in fact housing shortage.

You mentioned that the residents marked some of their houses as historic. Can you describe this process?

The residents have been working very closely with a range of people, including professional architects and lawyers as well as students, including students from Thammasat University and elsewhere. They developed a very good historical knowledge of the architecture and labelled those houses according to the particular reign or royal period to which they date. That knowledge has been part of what they used to protect themselves. They argued that at least those old houses, including some that were built during the reign of Rama IX, should be preserved. Their conception of history is very different from that of the officials. They see history as something that continues up to the present time. They see history as something that includes their own experiences. Some of them are descendants of people who lived on the site for at least three generations. Some are people who have come relatively recently to the site. So, I would argue that they are right, that a realistic understanding of history would in fact permit recognition of this involvement.

What are the BMA’s plans? How shall this piece of land be used in the future according to these plans?

It is very interesting because it is not clear what their plans are. There are two public announcements in form of posters that they have put up. One of them essentially shows an empty lawn with some decorative material and the other shows a few houses being preserved. I think the first one is the original plan and the one they are probably aiming at. But perhaps they hope, as someone suggested, that the architects who have sided with the community will be content if a few of the old houses are preserved. Our argument is that there is no point in preserving them if there are no people who take care of them. These are wooden houses, and they would decay very quickly in any case if they were not properly conserved.

The evidence is that the BMA would not really be able to protect the site and keep it in good shape. If you look at the front area that has been under their control for thirteen years now, it is a disgrace to the city and to the country. It is full of garbage. In the rainy season, the lawn fills up very quickly with puddles; the concrete pathway that they constructed is cracked and broken in several places. The place is used for unknown purposes in the night-time. It appears that some people go there to sleep. When I recently asked a functionary at the BMA why the BMA did not at least try to make an effort to clean that area up and make it look like how they want the rest of the place to look, he responded: “Our people are frightened to go in there”. That answer speaks for itself. If the BMA cannot do better than that, they would be better off handing it over to people who really love the place, identify with it, feel as though it is their place and who are willing to serve as functionaries to the BMA in exchange for the right to live there.

The BMA’s concept is that of a monumental park with very little in it and certainly without any people in it. At one point, the BMA made the legalistic argument that there could not be a set of private residences in a public park, that this would constitute a conflict of definitions. The reality is that the law that governs the situation could in fact be amended, and the residents did at one point show how that could be done. During the time of Governor Samak, the residents constructed a garden. In Thai, there is no distinction between garden and park. “Suan satharana” (สวนสาธารณะ) can mean both. The residents took it to mean that it would be a garden also in honour of Her Majesty the Queen, because that was the original plan for that park. Governor Samak then sent in truckloads of garbage, left over from cleaning up the APEC meetings. He had the garbage dumped on top of the garden. At that point, the residents decided that they would dig the garbage into the ground and use it as fertilizer. But then soldiers came and cleared them out and that was the end of that. I find it, also historically, extraordinary that the present BMA seems to be continuing such policies.

Moreover, there is a determination on the part of the BMA not to listen to the opinions of foreigners. The result is that they are repeating many of the mistakes that were made in the West. We need to ask two questions: First, what do we mean by “making the place beautiful”? In other words, beauty in whose eyes? Second, what does cleanliness mean in this context? Anthropologists, ever since Mary Douglas wrote her famous book called Purity and Danger, talked about cleanliness not as a matter of hygiene but as a matter of symbolism, in which dirt is basically about things that do not fit in. In the middle-class view of Bangkok,
which is a very Western-leaning view even if it claims to be basically Thai, street markets, street vendors and something like Pom Mahakan represent a violation of that sense of order. We need to ask very carefully what people here understand by order and whether in fact everybody agrees. There are certainly people in Bangkok who agree with the BMA’s policy. This is partly because the BMA has been successful at bad-mouthing the community. It is also partly because the community represents something that maybe some middle-class people would rather forget because it is, in many cases, also part of their own origins.

The case of Pom Mahakan actually offers the opportunity to show the world that Thailand has an exportable model for how to deal with inhabited historic sites and, especially, an example of self-governance by a community that, in my international experience, is — if not unique — very unusual. And it is in certain respects very Thai. So why destroy such a precious resource when in fact you could use it to foreground some of the country’s achievements? Some of these achievements are brought about by ordinary people.

What could be the motive behind the BMA’s approach? Could it be money? Is this a case of gentrification?

That does not seem to be the case. Of course, one can wonder who might profit from constructing the garden. It is not really a case of gentrification because gentrification involves residential buildings and that is exactly what they are trying to get rid of. On the other hand, from the perspective of the Crown Property Bureau, for example, I would be very concerned about what the BMA is doing. One should ask the Crown Property Bureau what they think of it. Because, if the BMA clears out, that space in the night-time could very easily become a place for drug dealers or pushers. That would cause the value of the neighbouring land to go down. Who wants to live in an area with something like an intensified version of New York Central Park right in the middle?

There has been a lack of coordination among the various players here. The BMA used to allege, and still sometimes apparently alleges, that the residents are a bunch of drug addicts, prostitutes and crooks. Nothing could be further from the truth. The residents actually dealt with what had been a drug problem many years ago in cooperation with the national police. The police helped them to create a community police force that was given the right to arrest people whom they found were using drugs. These community police, however, went above their work, not to the extent of Thaksin’s war on drugs, but by going to the family members of the drug users, telling them to put pressure on their relatives, especially the women, because otherwise they would be forced to leave the community. Aside from a couple of very old people, who I think were just allowed to die quietly because they were at the end of their lives anyway, they ended up with no one using drugs in their community. And I am morally certain that you will not find any drug users there. Of course, I cannot swear that there is not a single person there who uses them, but I have no evidence of any.

What is the legal status of the residents and what legal arguments are put forward by the BMA?

The legal situation is formally on the side of the BMA. I do not want to pretend otherwise. Formal decisions have been made by courts of law in the Thai justice system that have made it very clear that the residents are in formal violation of the law. The question is whether the law could be changed. It is a special law regarding the Rattanakosin Island development. That part of it that concerns Pom Mahakan basically says that it is a public park and the courts handed out the decision that private residences are not permitted in a public park. At this point, a number of the supporters of the community, including people with legal backgrounds and legal experience, came forward to say that the law itself could actually be changed.

The residents’ argument is that, if there is some way of reinterpreting the law, then that should be tried. Even in the most positivistic framework, law always does involve some recognition of precedent. Also, law has to be interpreted. There is no such thing as a literal or bedrock meaning of a law. Bureaucrats in general are trained essentially to act as though the law always has an exact and literal meaning while in practice managing it through selective interpretation. It seems to me that it has much more to do with a change of attitude than with any radical change in the law. Yes, there are legal impediments to allowing the community to stay. I do not dispute the BMA’s official statements about this. What I dispute is the idea that that situation cannot be reversed. If the central government intervened, it could actually bring that situation about and the BMA would then be forced to comply.

In talking to any level of government about this, I would like to make the following point. You want to create a clean city, which is always a good idea at least in terms of hygiene. You also want to create a usable city. Go and see the mess that the BMA has controlled for thirteen years in the front part and go and see the extraordinary, beautiful and ordered place that the community has created on the inside of the area. That difference will give you all the answers you want about who is more capable of maintaining cleanliness and order in a more literal sense.

Can you tell us more about the history of that community? When was it founded and where did former and current residents come from?

The original community was founded by King Rama III in the early 19th century. He gave that strip of land to a group of Palace bureaucrats. Those people and their descendants gradually moved away so that the majority of the people currently living there are people who have come over the last forty or fifty years. Some of them have come relatively recently, although there are several families who claim to descend from earlier inhabitants. The argument that the people have come more recently and are therefore not part of the history of the site is nonsense. They are a particular part of that history. They are representatives of a phenomenon that we have seen in Bangkok in many parts of the city, and I believe that they represent a very important part of the city’s history.

The problem is that the official historiography focuses entirely on what one might call its own part of the story, a history that is laid out in terms of the royal reigns and the role of the Buddhist religion, which is perfectly fine, but what is missing is the story of people who came to Bangkok to find a way of life that would be more gentle to them than what they had experienced in the more impoverished parts of the country. By
now, the population has come to reflect in many ways the cultural variety of the country as a whole, and the residents are trying to present themselves as a microcosm of the country.

Who lives at Pom Mahakan today?

All generations are represented. Most of the people who have active work are food vendors. They go out on the streets, they depend on being in that area, because that is where they have established their clientele.

They certainly are all very much versed in the language of central Thailand, the official language of the country. Sometimes, in the past, there were demonstrations by people coming from the North-East, for example. The people in Bangkok made fun of them because they did not really know how to present their ideas in a way that was considered polite in Bangkok. The people who live in Pom Mahakan now have demonstrated an extraordinary command of the rhetoric that is appropriate for the political life here. They compensated for what might be seen as a lack of formal education by educating themselves. They have learned a lot about the history of the site. I can give you one example. There was one man who had been a Palace policeman. He must be very old now. He used to live in another community and he had a collection of old postcards, stamps, clocks and all kinds of things. In this collection, somebody discovered that there was some documentation that showed that Pom Mahakan was the first place in Bangkok where the drama performance “likae” (ลิเก) had been performed. So, the residents then put on a likae performance there. This is an example of the people’s initiative.

From a political perspective, I should add that the majority of the residents in the community are not in any sense associated with opposition to the current government. They are in that sense very law-abiding. They are also somewhat right-leaning. Moreover, they are very proud of the fact that, during the Red-Shirt/Yellow-Shirt confrontations, they had a number of representatives of both groups, but there was never enough tension between them to disrupt the community. That again shows the strength of the community and makes it rather unusual. But again, if it is unusual in this regard, and if it is presenting such a wonderful example of being able to work together, why not showcase this to the world?

The city’s plans to clear out Pom Mahakan date back to the 1990s. How did the residents manage to resist until today? How did they organize themselves?

The most remarkable thing about the community is the unity that they have shown in this. There was a small amount of factionalism in the community, as there is everywhere. But it was very small. The BMA has put so much pressure on them. Even though the community has begun to crack a bit, by and large, they hung together. With some help of NGOs and others, they created a rotating credit fund that involves all the households. I have voluminous notes, recordings and video recordings I took in 16 hours of meetings in which the community was trying to figure out how best to combine their professional needs with the best way of living together. Their approach was very much based on the “Baan Mankong Collective Housing” program.

They have a very strong leadership, democratically elected within the community. The problem is that they kept electing the same people over and over. Some of those people would actually very happily have handed over to others. But there is the traditional Thai attitude that some people are made to be leaders and some people are made to be followers. Overall, however, their leadership was seen as very strong. When Governor Apiwat Kosayodhin was in office, he recognized this and he used to describe the community as resilient. He thought he could rely on them to hang in there while he tried to negotiate a change of the situation. He was the one Governor who, with the help of Professor Chatri Prakitsintathan of Silpakorn University, actually understood the necessity of creating a viable plan that combined the idea of a public park with the people living in the park and having responsibility for its maintenance.

In Thailand as well as in other countries in the region, there are numerous sources of norms besides the law, such as social hierarchy, moral authority or family networks. How do these norms interact and which role do they play in the case of Pom Mahakan?

Southeast Asia in general is characterized by a constant tension between authoritarianism and egalitarianism, which coexist very often in the rhetoric and behavior of the same individual person. The current president of the Pom Mahakan community is a perfect illustration of this. He has a manner that is quite striking at times, but he also uses that to try to encourage people to speak out. I have attended many meetings where that happened.

Obviously, the highest authority in the land is His Majesty and the power that he represents. The Pom Mahakan residents are loyal citizens in their respect for the institutions of monarchy.

Coming to the issue of family: The word “khrop khrua” (ครอบครัว) in Thai actually means “a group of people gathered around the hearth”. In Pom Mahakan, people sometimes come out of their houses and prepare the food together. Especially when there is a visitor, they would bring food to the central area and sit down together for a feast. They talk of themselves as a “khrop khrua”. If we think of the word in its more literal meaning rather than in a Western sense of a family unit or the nuclear family, we can see exactly what the residents’ leadership means when it says: “We are a khrop khrua.” They live like a family in that sense. This is one of the sources of their mutual respect.

As an anthropologist who studies legal issues, I would argue that the institutions of local level government that are part of the Thai tradition are very strong and they have been strengthened while the pressure was put on them by the BMA. The BMA likes to think that this is not a real community. But actually, the BMA turned it into a real community. Now, they are trying to destroy what they created to some extent. The residents themselves will say: “If we had not had this kind of pressure, we would have never come together to the same extent.”

There are many overlapping and sometimes conflicting sources of legitimacy and authority in the Thai society as there are everywhere. We should not forget that some of the models that are prominent in Thailand
are of British and French origin. What I call the crypto-colonial state has continued to exercise a strong influence on the way the people think about these things. For example, the model of “khwaam suay ngaam” (ความสวยงาม), meaning the model of urban beauty or beautification, is based on a middle-class, Western-European model. It is antithetical to what looks like a rather messy arrangement of a community in which economic, religious, social and political activities overlap with each other.

The funny thing is that Westerners like to point to ancient Greece as the model. But some ancient Greek nations, and Athens anyway, were places where these things did also overlap. It is in fact the work of German historians and chronologists of the 18th and 19th century that brought Westerners to think of this separation of functions as a Western ideal. That separation of functions then became an important part of what we now call high modernism of which probably the most egregious example is Brasilia, the capital of Brazil. There, you can find, for example, a tourist agencies sector with 17 travel agencies in the same block. That is fine if you have a car and you are able to get around the city. But the poor people are forced to go very long distances from out of the city where they live. They have to use very bad public transportation. I would hate to see Bangkok ending up the same way.

A city that manages to keep its poorer population in the center is also able to help that population to gentrify itself. I developed a concept of self-gentrification out of something that I saw in Greece in the town of Rethemnos on the island of Crete, which was also the subject of another book of mine called A place in history. Rethemnos was a place where people initially wanted to get rid of their old houses that were built during the Venetian and Ottoman period. In some cases, the houses dated back as far as the 15th and 16th centuries. Most people in the 1960s and 70s who were living there thought that these were uncomfortable houses, not civilized. In 1974, however, the then mayor of Rethemnos and the government, which was also a military government at the time, though very much at its end, slapped a conservation order on the whole town with a population then of about 6,000. The result was that nobody could make any major changes. Over the intervening years, the people came to realize that they had been saved from destroying something very valuable that is now a source of wealth for them in a country that is generally undergoing economic distress. This is one of the few places in Greece that looks prosperous. When I went there the first time at the end of the 1960s, it was one of the poorest places in Greece, which was not a wealthy country back then either.

So there is an example from which the people of the BMA could learn. But they are totally uninterested in hearing what anyone has to say and they do not see why foreign examples should be relevant to the current situation, even though, consciously or otherwise, what they are doing is following bad and outdated foreign models.

Are you worried that Pom Mahakan could become a precedent for Bangkok or Thailand?

I think that is what the BMA is actually afraid of. They fear that if Pom Mahakan does not fall to their desires, they would not be able to control the whole Rachadamnoen area. There are well over twenty communities down Rachadamnoen Road. All of which are terrified of what might happen with Pom Mahakan because they see it as something that will then happen to them as well. Good governance here would mean bringing those communities into a serious discussion of how the policy might be changed, so that the people who live in the communities will become responsible for their maintenance and for something that will certainly attract the intelligent part of the tourist population as well.

This is another interesting point: if they want to develop it as a tourist area and they make the same mistakes that were made in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy in the 1960s and 70s, which is what they seem to be doing, then the country will in fact sustain very serious losses. What the Pom Mahakan people are proposing is in itself a win-win situation. It could indeed then be applied to other cases but that will require a significant change of attitude on the part of the BMA. The onus is on them either to make that change and prove that they can grasp this amazing opportunity, or explain to the world and to history why they failed to do so.

Are there nonetheless any positive trends in global urban planning which draw on lessons-learned, maybe even taking into account anthropological knowledge?

Yes, there are changes beginning to happen. We now see that planners are beginning to learn some anthropology. I actually held a courtesy appointment at our Graduate School of Design at Harvard. Some of our students both in design and in anthropology are learning about each other’s disciplines. There is much more of a conversation going on. This is the way of the future, I hope.

The problem is that most of the precedents are very depressing and mistakes like these have been made over and over again. One of the results of these mistakes is that there are more and more homeless people. I remember that Governor Samak, at the time, described the homeless people being like ‘stray dogs’ which is a very severe insult in Thai culture. That problem has certainly not gone away, quite the opposite. Even though the precedents are not encouraging, we may still hope that Thailand will finally be the country that sets a good example to the world.

On the other hand, I was looking at very similar problems in Italy, right in the heart of Rome, where the convergence of economic interests on the part of developers, the Vatican City, the banks, a few private owners and a population of renters had led to a disastrous situation where now whole areas are completely gentrified and most of the original people have left. Now, there is very little sense of community life because people who live there treat it almost as a dormitory. That is not good for city centers and they eventually get deserted. We know that also from the American case. I recently published an article about urban beautification published in the Journal of Urban Design. There is now an interest in that kind of conversation. I do believe that human beings are capable of learning from their mistakes. One of the lessons we teach our students in anthropology is that fieldwork is all about learning from mistakes.

You have mentioned the community’s unusual and unique character. Was it this uniqueness that caught your attention, or how did you come to work on Pom Mahakan?
Every situation is unique, of course. One of the jobs of an anthropologist is to try to indicate how the uniqueness of a particular situation speaks to a more general picture. I would say that I did not find the community. The community found me: I had done research on historical memory and historic conservation in both Greece and Italy, and I was thinking that, if I wanted to research in Thailand, it would make sense to focus on the same general theme. I chose the Rattanakosin Island as a general area and I thought I would do my work with maybe five or six communities in that area. I very soon found that people were much too busy. Part of the reason was that I was working in a market area. The people there were merchants, and they were busy making money. My Thai at that time was very bad, and they were not interested in talking about history at all. One day, a representative of one of the NGOs said he was going over to Pom Mahakan because there was a protest. He asked if I would like to accompany him. I nearly said no, but I decided after all that I had nothing to lose. As a matter of fact, I was not getting very far with the research I was doing. So, I decided to go and see.

The first thing I heard was: "We are a historically significant community!", and I asked "Why?" They sat up and asked me in a very public way what I would do to help them and I said: "Look, I am not a politician, I am not here to make promises, but if you help me to collect the kind of data that would allow me to understand the situation, then I can tell you if I can give you any help that you ask for. I am not going to inflict it on you." And then we began to know each other and they were very happy to talk to me. They put up with my bad Thai and very quickly improved it by telling me when I made mistakes. They were quite open and forthright, and we developed a very close relationship. That was the beginning, and that enabled me to see things more from their point of view.

The residents were very open, very kind and very patient. They obviously saw me as a resource as well, and I told them that they were welcome to do so, because, after all, one of the features of anthropological research is a kind of reciprocity. Although I am currently not doing any research there, I am obviously still interested in the fate of the community. Moreover, these are my personal friends. But the story that I tell in my book is actually a story of how they came to be using their understanding of history and culture as the strongest argument for continuing to live on the site. I learned a great deal from them about human dignity. In many ways, I feel as though I was the student and they were all my teachers.

I often said that, if I became Governor of Bangkok, my first priority would be to require every bureaucrat in the BMA to spend three months in a slum community. They would end up with a much deeper respect for the sheer humanity and human dignity of people who live under often very difficult conditions as the people from Pom Mahakan have been doing. Many bureaucrats do not really understand the lifestyle of people like those residents.

Your book “Siege of the Spirits: Community and Polity in Bangkok” presents the life of the people in Pom Mahakan and their struggle with the public authorities in a very detailed way. What were major challenges or obstacles in gathering these accounts?

Writing anthropology is always a tough job. The details really count and you have to decide what details are worth mentioning. One problem I had was that there was really no space for me to live in this community. I had to live nearby and keep coming in. This makes it a little bit harder to get some information. Nonetheless, over the years, I managed to do that. I had to improve my knowledge of Thai history, religion and culture, which was a wonderful experience and I had a lot of help from Thai colleagues and friends. I will forever be indebted to them, as I am to the residents as they also helped me to understand a great deal. I rarely ran into a refusal to talk to me. Also the people of the BMA were unfailingly courteous and I almost never had a problem with getting their point of view. It is interesting that the people of the community felt that I should also talk to the BMA. They were not afraid of my going there. The community president said: “You must go and talk to the BMA and hear their point of view”, which I did, and I tried to represent this in my book. Surely, there were times when I did not really understand what was going on and I had to ask a lot of questions which probably tried their patience. That is why these things take a lot of time. What you see in that book is the product of a learning experience.

I previously did a book on reciprocal animal theft in villages on the mountains on West Central Crete. I identified a legal code which does not exist in written form but has certainly existed there for centuries and governs certain practices that the state regards as illegal. I tried to show that there are two kinds of polity that are in some ways working against each other. In the case of Pom Mahakan, there is a formal state, very much modeled on British and French models in the 19th century, in counterpoint with a traditional Siamese model of a city as a mandala. I found a lot of evidence for that in the community and I did not recognize it immediately. That is why you have to wait a long time, look at the evidence you have, read as much as you can, try to understand both from within and from outside.

If I have managed to give a useful account of the community, I would be very happy. I could not have done it without the cooperation of the people there and without the cooperation of the BMA staff members who were willing to let me attend and record public meetings. They were very helpful in facilitating meetings at various times. I just ended up disagreeing more and more with what the BMA actually had to say about what the eventual resolution should be.

You are one of the most prominent advocates of the Pom Mahakan community. What would you respond to critics who demand that academics shall remain neutral and not take sides?

I would respond that the idea of academic neutrality is a myth, especially in the human sciences. One can distance oneself to some extent. I try to understand the dilemma faced by BMA bureaucrats who are really...
because then you cannot observe objectively any more. More recently, the epistemological critique of objec-

tivism has become much stronger, also in anthropology. Lévi-Strauss thought that he had discovered tribes
that never had any contact with Europeans. But if you look at the first photographs that he took of the Nam-

bikwara tribe, there is a jerrycan right in the middle of the photograph. It must have got there before him. So

the idea of a pure and untouched community is itself a myth. What is interesting is that the bureaucrats tend
to frame their attitude in these very positivistic terms. They talk for example about how the residents are not
the original inhabitants, the “khon dang doem” (คนดั้งเดิม) to use the Thai phrase. There is no such thing as
“dang doem”. There is always some earlier phase in which people move from somewhere. Of course, there
was the moment of foundation of that community. But by now the culture has changed a lot anyway. And
that is going to be true anywhere.

We are not talking about a fossil. We are talking about a living community. And living communities also add
people. So, rather than trying to frame this in terms of an objective account, we should frame this as a richly
detailed account and then let people who read it decide how they feel. In the end, our judgment is dependent
on what we know. My goal is to provide as much knowledge of the community and the way it connects with
a lot of history in Thailand as I could.

Did you write the book also to preserve the legacy of Pom Mahakan in case that it might not continue
to exist?

Aside from the academic goals, there were two other goals: One was that I thought, maybe not consciously,
that there should be a record. But there are other records. There was a book written in Thai about the com-

munity and there are certainly lots and lots of other records. The more important motive was that this could
be useful to all the parties concerned in reaching a serious agreement. That is why I am distressed to see
that there is really no interest on the part of the authorities.

Is there going to be a translation into Thai?

I am hoping that it might be translated. I think there is some interest in getting it translated into Thai. I
would very much like to see that happen. I would hope that it would be useful to the BMA as well as to the
community. But if the people at the BMA read it honestly and openly, I also do not see how they could fail
then to see that their current policy is not good for Bangkok and is not good for them.

Thank you for this interview, Professor Herzfeld!

The interview was conducted by Dr. Lasse Schuldt and Jan Kliem, CPG.
Koh Samed - Lovely island close to Bangkok!

Bangkok is not only very close to a lot of historical sights; it is also possible to have a relaxed weekend at the beach without flying to Phuket or Koh Samui... For getting away from the busy and bustling city without taking extra days off, Koh Samed is perfect!

The best way to get there is taking a van from victory monument to Rayong which a town close to Koh Samed. If you are arriving late in the evening the only possibility to reach the island is renting a speedboat which costs about 1700- but it is absolutely worth it. It will bring you directly to your desired beach. Just a few steps then, wading through the warm, clear water at the end of the boat ride and you have arrived. Just great! And after checking in, you can feel your feet in the sand and a cocktail in your hand and forget about daily life.

Prices for food and drink are higher than in Bangkok but still reasonable and the calm beaches on the island are cheaper than others so you can adjust a little according to your budget. Koh Samed offers a good, wide range in terms of accommodation and atmosphere. There are party spots as well as calm beaches. Ao Pudsa is one of the rather calm beaches of the island. It is possible to get a massage at the beach and relax in a sun-lounger. It is also possible to rent a scooter to get around the island on your own. The island is not very big and really worth exploring.

For getting back to Bangkok, there is a ferry which leaves from Nadan pier on the island to piers near Rayong. So with a feeling of sun on your skin and some sand between your toes, you can hop on the next van and then admire the beautiful landscape while going back to Bangkok; relaxed and with new strength for the coming week.
The Bangkok Aquarium

Most of Thailand’s visitors know about the splendid underwater world one can experience by going to the beaches – but not everybody knows that there is also a great opportunity to discover it directly in Bangkok without even getting wet.

*Sea Life Bangkok* is located on the basement floor of Siam Shopping Center and can be easily accessed by BTS - when you get out of the station walk over to the Siam Shopping Mall and look for the escalator.

The entrance fee is around 1,000 Baht, unfortunately there is no student fee. Once you get into the exhibition just follow the arrows which will guide you in order to see everything. But first you should check your watch – there are several feeding shows and other informative lectures. The biggest attraction is the underwater tunnel in which you can walk through the biggest tank while being accompanied by three meter long sharks.

Furthermore you can book a “behind the scenes” tour and a ride with a glass bottom boat – the set price including a Pepsi is around 300 Baht. In fact the beverage is the most useful part of it – the behind the scenes tour will take you on a walk around the biggest basin on some slippery bridge while being told that “we keep the baby fish in some small tank because the shark will bite them” and the glass bottom boat will go for a short spin just on the same basin. Better save your money for some Japanese style “Mos Burger” in Siam Shopping Center afterwards!

Last advice: If you can, go there in the evening or on working days, because *Sea Life* is likely to be very crowded in the afternoon and on the weekends.
Past Events

On 7 January 2017, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation/Thailand in cooperation with the Institute of Public Policy Studies (IPPS) hosted the workshop “Learning Democracy for Paradigm Shift in School”. Aim of this workshop was to inspire and stimulate the participants, especially the students, to become active citizens by preparing them to be willing, able and equipped to participate more in public matters. More information about this event can be found at http://www.kas.de/thailand/en/events/71465/.

On 12 January 2017, the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce in collaboration with the Netherlands, Belgian-Luxembourg, British and France Chambers of Commerce and the European Association for Business and Commerce arranged a Joint Chambers Chiang Mai Networking evening in Chiang Mai. Additional information is available at http://thailand.ahk.de/newsletter-system-gtcnewsletter/gtcnewsletter-en/networking-events/chiang-mai-gtcc-event-joint-chambers-chiang-mai-networking/.


On 24 January 2017, the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia, Mahidol University, Nakhonpathom arranged the 1st Multicultural ASEAN Workshop Talk Series on the topic of Pivot or Peril? Trump’s Presidency and ASEAN Community where CPG Director Hennig Glaser was invited as a speaker to shed light on the uncertainties that surround Donald Trump’s infant presidency.

On 25 January 2017, the Goethe Institute arranged the presentation “The way to Germany” where they informed people who plan to move to Germany about German language requirements as well as about the first steps in Germany. More information at https://www.goethe.de/ins/th/en/ver.cfm?fuseaction=events.detail&event_id=20800882.

From 3 – 6 February 2017, the workshop “Legal Support for Ethnical and Social Minorities in Northern Thailand - Mobile Learning Area for Stateless People in Chiang Mai Province”, which was organized by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, took place in Thailand’s north. In cooperation with the “Bangkok Legal Clinic” they informed stateless people in the border area about their rights and the process to apply for a citizenship. Further information about this project can be found at http://www2.hss.de/southeastasia/en/thailand-laos/news-events/2017/legal-support-for-ethnical-and-social-minorities-in-northern-thailand-mobile-learning-area-for-stateless-people-in-chiang-mai-province.html.

On 4 February 2017, the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce together with the Spouses of Heads of Mission Bangkok (SHOM) hosted the “Charity Dinner: Music for a better world” at the German Ambassador’s Residence. The fundraising event aimed at sponsoring scholarships for talented students from the deprived community of Klong Toey who attended the Immanuel Music School to enable them to continue their music education. Further details about this event at http://thailand.ahk.de/newsletter-system-gtcnewsletter/gtcnewsletter-en/shom-2017-charity-dinner-music-for-a-better-world/.

On 7 February 2017, the seminar “Strengthening and Disseminating Knowledge about the Administrative Justice and Protection of People’s Rights”, co-organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Office of the Administrative Courts of Thailand, took place in the Uthai thani Province. The objective of this event was to provide the platform for legal experts, state officials and administrative judges to exchange ideas on the administrative jurisdiction process. Additional information is available at http://www.kas.de/thailand/en/events/71807/.

On 7 February 2017, the Singapore-Thai Chamber of Commerce hosted the “Chinese New Year Celebration Dinner 2017”. To celebrate the beginning of the year of the rooster they invited to a sumptuous dinner of traditional feasts and flavours joined by the Singapore Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand, H.E. Mrs Chua Siew San. More information can be found at http://www.singaporethaicc.or.th/index.php/booking/onlinereservation/86.

On 9 February 2017, the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce held their first “Stammtisch” of 2017, a German speaking night where German food and drinks were enjoyed. More details at http://thailand.ahk.de/index.php?id=121266.

On 12 – 14 February, the Goethe Institute in cooperation with the German embassy showed the German movie “Verféhlung” as part of their “German Film Series” in the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre. More information about the Film Series and upcoming movies can be found at http://www.bangkok.diplo.de/Vertretung/bangkok/de/__events/2017/01-01-Deutsche-Filmreihe-2017.html?archive=3411592.

On 15 February 2017, the Canadian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, in collaboration with the Chambers of Commerce of the USA, Great Britain, Belgian-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, Sweden and Turkey and the Thailand Achievement Institute hosted the panel discussion “Women in Leadership – Where are we at in 2017?”. For event details see http://www.tccc.or.th/events/women-in-leadership/.


On 17 February 2017, the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce together with partner Chambers of Commerce held the Joint Chambers Eastern Seaboard Seminar “Labour Affairs Matter - How to Avoid Labour Disputes in Thailand” in Pattaya. More information can be found at https://aust-chamthailand.com/widget/event-2452794.
On 22 February 2017, the US Embassy in partnership with the International Republican Institute and US Ambassador H.E. Glyn Davies welcomed young women leaders to the third session of “Young Women Lead!” , an interactive session, where the participants engaged with different female leaders to exchange success stories and lessons learned. Additional information at https://th.usembassy.gov/young-women-lead-022217/.

From 23 – 24 February, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and UN Women in cooperation with the UN Thematic Working Group in Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women hosted the Asia-Pacific Policy Dialogue on “Women’s Economic Empowerment in the Changing World of Work”. Key issues that were discussed were global gender gaps, care economy, paid and unpaid care and domestic work and technological change and its impact on the world of work. Further details at http://www.unescap.org/events/asia-pacific-policy-dialogue-%E2%80%9Cwomen%E2%80%99s-economic-empowerment-changing-world-work%E2%80%9D.

On 23 February 2017, the Embassy of Brunei Darussalam in Bangkok invited to celebrate the “33rd Brunei Darussalam National Day”.

On 28 February 2017, the Eastern Seaboard Seminar “Labour Affairs Matter- How to Avoid Labour Disputes in Thailand” took place, which was organized by different Chambers of Commerce. Thailand’s economic trends, insights into key industry sectors in Thailand, and challenges to face in 2017 was discussed. More information is available at http://thailand.ahk.de/index.php?id=102351.

Upcoming Events

From 6 to 7 March 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will hold the “ICDPhR 2017: 19th International Conference on Death Penalty and Human Right” at Patong Beach Hotel, Kathu, Thailand. More details are accessible at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/03/phuket/ICCSR

From 7 to 9 March 2017, “Teacher Training for Democracy” Training on democracy and the rule of law in cooperation with the Paramadina Institute for Education Reform (PIER)from the University Paramadina at Pontianak, Indonesia. For more information please visit http://www.kas.de/indonesien/en/events/71847/

From 15 to 17 March 2017, “Seminar on professional ethics for Indonesian judges” Seminar on professional ethics for Indonesian judges in cooperation with the Jimly School of Law and Government at Denpasar, Indonesia. More details are accessible at http://www.kas.de/indonesien/en/events/71848/

From 14 to 28 March 2017, “Basic political research methodology for migration, gender and other areas of public policy” Target groups from Mon State and Karen State get to know basic policy research methodology for different policy areas and are able to increase their political potential at Mawlamyine, Myanmar. For further information please go to http://www.kas.de/wf/en/17.72285/

From 23 to 24 March 2017, “3rd International Conference on Government and Politics (ICGP)” is an annual international conference of the College of Government, Rangsit University that aims to bring together researchers, scholars, and students to exchange and share their experiences, new ideas, and research results about all aspects of Government and Politics. For further information please go to http://pskuconferences.wixsite.com/allconferences/icgp

From 27 to 28 March 2017, “5th International Conference On Social Sciences Research 2017 (ICSSSR 2017)” is a research conference which examines local and global issues from the perspectives of scientific social sciences. Through individual or team collaborative research activities, researchers analyze...
perspectives and synthesize positions informed by the scientific social sciences of knowledge; analyze the past, assess the present, and plan for the future with regard to the theme at Berjaya Times Square, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. For further information please go to http://worldconferences.net/icsst/

From 27 to 28 March 2017, “6th International Conference on Education, Humanities and Social Sciences Studies (EHSSS-17)” is for the engineers, practitioners, scientists, researchers, scholars, and students from all around the world and it also includes the industry people to present ongoing research activities, and hence to foster research relations between Academia and industry. The conference is sponsored by Eminent Association of Pioneers (EAP). This conference provides opportunities for the delegates to share new ideas and application experiences face to face, to establish business or research relations and to find global partners for future collaboration. Conference Venue is the ibis Singapore on Bencoolen. For more information please visit http://earhm.org/conference/EHSSS-17


On 29 March 2017, “2nd German-Asian Business Dialogue” The 2nd German-Asian Business Dialogue will provide a platform for German and Asian companies to establish new business ties and to connect with Members of Parliament, government officials, as well as the diplomatic corps. Held at the Allianz Forum Berlin, Germany. For further information please go to http://www.asien-dialog.de/en/

From 29 to 30 March 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will arrange the “ICILR 2017: 19th International Conference on International Law and Relations” at Holiday Inn Singapore. Details are available at: https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/03/singapore/ICILR

From 30 to 31 March 2017, “3rd International Conference on Science, Technology, Management and Humanity (ICSTMH 2017)” will be held in Bangkok, Thailand during March 30-31, 2017. The aim as well as objective of ICSTMH 2017 is to present the latest research and results related to Science, Technology, Management and Humanity topics. For further information please go to http://www.icstmh.com/


From 11 to 12 April 2017, “International Conference on Humanities, Literature, Business and Education” ICHLBE 2017 conference is for those, who are interested in presenting papers in all fields of social science, education, Technology and Art at Furama Hotels & Resorts, Thailand, Bangkok. Details are available at http://americanhealthcare.wixsite.com/thailand-april

On 20 April 2017, “Asian Legal Business (ALB) SE Asia In-House Legal Summit” seeks to arm In-House Counsels with updates, usable take-aways and real life examples to help them tackle pressing legal issues facing their companies today. Now in its 15th year, this event offers an excellent learning and networking experience with peers and legal service providers. Participants return to their workplace with practical and useful advice at TBC, Singapore. Details are available at http://www.legalbusinessonline.com/ibs/seahls2017


From 28 to 29 April 2017, “5th Asia Pacific Conference on Advanced Research (APCAR - APR 2017)” The 5th Asia Pacific Conference on Advanced Research (APCAR- April, 2017) will be held on 28th and 29th of April 2017 in Melbourne, Australia. The main theme of this conference is ‘Strategies for Future’. Accordingly, the conference will cover Business, Social Sciences, Education and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) disciplines. Internationally-recognized scholars will participate in the event to present their latest research and best practices at Hotel Grand Chancellor, Melbourne, Australia. More details are available at http://apcar.org.au/?conference=5th-asia-pacific-conference-on-advanced-research-apcar-april-2017
Scholarship Opportunities

The Royal Society Mobility Grants offers Newton International Exchanges as mobility grants to provide international researchers with funding towards travel, subsistence and research expenses for either a one-off short visit to explore opportunities for building lasting networks or for bilateral visits to strengthen emerging collaborations. For more information: https://royalsociety.org/grants-schemes-awards/grants/newton-mobility-grants/. The deadline is 15 March 2017.

United Kingdom, Royal Society Mobility Grants, this scheme provides established international researchers with an opportunity to develop the research strengths and capabilities of their research group through training, collaboration and reciprocal visits with a partner in the UK. The skills and knowledge gained should lead to changes in the wellbeing of communities and increased economic benefits. For more information: https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/worldwide/asean/science-journalists-apply-falling-walls-fellowship-journalists. The deadline is 15 March 2017.

United Kingdom, Master’s Fellowships in Public Health and Tropical Medicine, this scheme provides junior researchers from and low and, middle income countries with the opportunity to gain research experience and training at Master’s degree level. The scheme aims to support research that will improve public health and tropical medicine at a local, national and global level. For more information: https://wellcome.ac.uk/funding/masters-fellowships-public-health-and-tropical-medicine. The deadline is 29 March 2017.

INCIPIT is a novel international PhD programme, which aims at providing innovative multidisciplinary and intersectoral training in Life and Biomaterial Sciences. It is co-funded by the COFUND scheme (Marie Skłodowska - Curie Actions). This programme pools the different and complementary expertise of 8 research institutes of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), as well as the competencies of 3 Doctoral Schools and several academic, non-profit and industrial Partner Organisations. For more information: https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/worldwide/japan/20-mscs-phd-positions-life-sciences-italy. The deadline is 30 March 2017.

MSCA-RISE aims at international and inter-sector collaboration through promoting research and innovation exchanges of staff. MSCA-RISE will support short-term mobility of research and innovation staff at all career levels, from the most junior (post-graduate) to the most senior (management), including administrative and technical staff. Familiarise yourself with the most important. Watch a webinar with application advice held by the Irish Universities Association http://www.iua.ie/webinar-on-rise-2016-call/ Contact us for more information: asean@euraxess.net. The deadline is 5 April 2017.

The Falling Walls Fellowship for Journalists is aimed at journalists and bloggers with at least three years of experience, and who hope to advance their knowledge in the area of sciences. The Fellows get the opportunity to attend the Falling Walls Labs, Falling Walls Venture, the Falling Walls Conference as well as an additional programme in Berlin around 8 and 9 November 2017. The fellowship includes travel expenses (economy class), accommodation for 3 nights (organised by Falling Walls Foundation), conference fees and meals (breakfast at hotel, catering during the Falling Walls events). For more information: https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/worldwide/asean/science-journalists-apply-falling-walls-fellowship-journalists. The deadline is 25 June 2017.

Students from across Southeast Asia (except Thailand) may apply for DAAD scholarship which covers tuition fee and all living expenses during the first year study at the Thai-German Graduate School in Bangkok and the second year study at RWTH Aachen University in Germany. For more information: http://tggs.kmutnb.ac.th/daad-scholarships-tggs-2017/. The deadline is 15 May 2017.

AgreenSkills+ is an international mobility programme from France co-funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development. The programme is aimed at talented researchers from all over the world holding a PhD with less than 10 years of post-doctoral research experience. Research projects in the fields of agriculture, food, nutrition, environment, animal health and veterinary public health may be supported. For more information: https://www.agreenskills.eu/Applications/Eligibility-requirements. The deadline are 28 April & 13 October 2017.

Training Fellowships in Public Health and Tropical Medicine, this scheme offers research experience and training to early-stage researchers from low and middle-income countries. The scheme aims to support research that will improve public health and tropical medicine at a local, national and global level. Funding for up to 3 years. For more information: https://wellcome.ac.uk/funding/training-fellowships-public-health-and-tropical-medicine. The deadline is May 2017.

The deadline is 25 June 2017.
CPG Job-Market

As a service, CPG provides a regularly updated overview of currently open job offers in fields and from institutions related to CPG’s focal areas of work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Vacant position</th>
<th>Department, Office, Location</th>
<th>Closing Date</th>
<th>Information available at:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malteser International</td>
<td>Return Support Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sariang town, Mae Hong Son Province</td>
<td>23.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hr.msr1@malteser-international.org">hr.msr1@malteser-international.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>24.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Reproductive and Child Health Manager</td>
<td>Mae Sot</td>
<td>24.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPUD</td>
<td>Administration &amp; Finance Assistance</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>25.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:media@anpud.org">media@anpud.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Interpreter Clerk</td>
<td>Mae Hong Son</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:THABAHR@unhcr.org">THABAHR@unhcr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwannimit Foundation</td>
<td>Laboratory Technician</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:HR@suwannimit.org">HR@suwannimit.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Application Date</td>
<td>Email Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwannimit Foundation</td>
<td>Medical Manager</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak Province</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:HR@suwannimit.org">HR@suwannimit.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwannimit Foundation</td>
<td>Nurse Psychologist</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak Province</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:HR@suwannimit.org">HR@suwannimit.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwannimit Foundation</td>
<td>Reproductive and Child Health Midwife</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak Province</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:HR@suwannimit.org">HR@suwannimit.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Environmental Health Vehicle Operator</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>26.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Referral Translation Assistant</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Reproductive and Child Health Midwife</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Senior Health Information System Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Senior Medical Referral Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCOM</td>
<td>Request for Proposal for A PSA Video on Family</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:SafirS@apcom.org">SafirS@apcom.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Associate External Relations Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:THABAHR@unhcr.org">THABAHR@unhcr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ICRC Regional Delegation in Bangkok</td>
<td>VISA Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ban_hr_services@icrc.org">ban_hr_services@icrc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baan Dek Foundation</td>
<td>Employment offer / Social Worker / Training Facilitator</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>30.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:julien@baandekfoundation.org">julien@baandekfoundation.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan International Thailand</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>30.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://th.thaingo.org/?p=">http://th.thaingo.org/?p=</a> jobs&amp;act=detail&amp;id_job=4061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Senior Health Information System Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Senior Medical Referral Officer</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak</td>
<td>27.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Contact Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Transgender Network Foundation</td>
<td>Finance Assistant Bangkok APTN Office</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:apply@weareaptn.org">apply@weareaptn.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Thailand</td>
<td>Corporate Engagement Manager</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wwf.or.th/en/">http://www.wwf.or.th/en/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong Institute</td>
<td>Program Officer Khon Kaen</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:hr@mekonginstitute.org">hr@mekonginstitute.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Thailand</td>
<td>Project Manager IKI Sustainable Consumption and Production Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wwf.or.th/en/">http://www.wwf.or.th/en/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International Thailand</td>
<td>Intern Policy and Advocacy Unit</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:recruit@amnesty.or.th">recruit@amnesty.or.th</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Thailand</td>
<td>Wildlife Crime Policy Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wwf.or.th/en/">http://www.wwf.or.th/en/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Thailand</td>
<td>Marketing Communication Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wwf.or.th/en/">http://www.wwf.or.th/en/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COERR</td>
<td>Information Technology Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:chiranan.l@coerr.org">chiranan.l@coerr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF Thailand</td>
<td>Social Media Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wwf.or.th/en/">http://www.wwf.or.th/en/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Development Center</td>
<td>Partnerships Manager Thailand</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="mailto:COMET_Jobs@edc.org">COMET_Jobs@edc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Human Resources Assistant</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>31.03.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Thailand.HR@rescue.org">Thailand.HR@rescue.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children International</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>03.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hr.thailand@savethechildren.org">hr.thailand@savethechildren.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization/Position</td>
<td>Role/Title</td>
<td>City/Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Email/Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCD Foundation Community Development</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>05.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nongluck@apcdfoundation.org">nongluck@apcdfoundation.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS Data Hub Assistant Data Analyst</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>07.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:wangchumtongn@unaids.org">wangchumtongn@unaids.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency</td>
<td>Regional Senior Midwife Trainer-Advisor</td>
<td>Khammouane, Laos</td>
<td>08.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lao027@luxdev.lu">lao027@luxdev.lu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuit Refugee Service Caseworker</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>14.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:job.urp_caseworker@jrs.or.th">job.urp_caseworker@jrs.or.th</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM Regional Disability Inclusive Development Officer/Advisor</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>15.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Pimpa.molkul@cbm.org">Pimpa.molkul@cbm.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Border Consortium HR &amp; Admin Assistant</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>17.04.2017</td>
<td><a href="http://www.theborderconsortium.org">www.theborderconsortium.org</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Digital Fundraising Manager</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>02.05.2017</td>
<td><a href="https://www.unhcr.or.th/news/jobs">https://www.unhcr.or.th/news/jobs</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Position</th>
<th>Role/Title</th>
<th>City/Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Email/Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Shoklo Malaria Research Unit Logisticiant Assistant</td>
<td>Mae Sot, Tak Province</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="mailto:smru-hr@shoklo-unit.com">smru-hr@shoklo-unit.com</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Regional Donor Contract Management Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="https://jobs.oxfam.org.uk/vacancy/5782/description/">https://jobs.oxfam.org.uk/vacancy/5782/description/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Shoklo Malaria Research Unit Entomology lab assistant</td>
<td>Mae Sot</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="mailto:smru-hr@shoklo-unit.com">smru-hr@shoklo-unit.com</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHI 360 Program Officer Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="https://jobs-fhi360.icims.com/jobs/18360/finance-officer%2c-linkages-project%2c-thailand/job">https://jobs-fhi360.icims.com/jobs/18360/finance-officer%2c-linkages-project%2c-thailand/job</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A21 Foundation Social Worker</td>
<td>Pattaya</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="http://th.thaingo.org/?p=jobs&amp;act=detail&amp;id_job=4062">http://th.thaingo.org/?p=jobs&amp;act=detail&amp;id_job=4062</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHI 360 Administrative Associate</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="https://jobs-fhi360.icims.com/jobs/18362/administrative-associate%2c-linkages-thailand/job">https://jobs-fhi360.icims.com/jobs/18362/administrative-associate%2c-linkages-thailand/job</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPAT International Short Term Consultancy</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="mailto:vacancy@ecpat.net">vacancy@ecpat.net</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Resources Group Administrative Support Specialist</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Until filled</td>
<td><a href="http://th.thaingo.org/?p=jobs&amp;act=detail&amp;id_job=3969">http://th.thaingo.org/?p=jobs&amp;act=detail&amp;id_job=3969</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impressum

© Copyright 2017 by
German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence
for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University
2 Prachan Road
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Phone: +66 2 613 2971
Fax: +66 2 224 8100
Website: www.cpg-online.de
E-mail: contact@cpg-online.de
Facebook: facebook/CPGTU

Responsible for content:  Henning Glaser, Duc Quang Ly, Lasse Schuldt, Jan Kliem

Outline and artwork:  Thansuda Pantusa, Duc Quang Ly

Picture:  Thansuda Pantusa, Pixarbay