**Foreword**

Dear Readers,

Welcome to COM 4, our latest edition of CPG’s online magazine. As always, it contains interesting articles and interviews, research material, our regular announcement section and an extensive career part with a job market and scholarship opportunities.

This issue looks back at CPG events of May and June which included an expert talk on constitutional politics under Thailand’s 2017 Constitution at the Residence of the German Ambassador in late May and another international seminar on the ongoing disputes in the South and East China Sea with renowned experts and scholars from Australia, Japan, and Thailand. Following this seminar, COM 4 provides a platform for former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet James E. Fenell and CPG Senior Research Associate Kerry K. Gershaneck to share an article depicting their opinion on likely future scenarios surrounding the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. Staying with the topic, Dr. Li Nan, visiting Senior Research Fellow at East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, is elaborating on China’s maritime strategy and the southern theatre command.

The two interviews of this issue are both related to human rights. Moden Yi, from APLE Cambodia who is fighting against the sexual exploitation of Children shares some insights of his important work. Second, Zaman (Sam) Zia-Zarifi the newly appointed General Secretary of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) talked to us about mounting pressure on the international legal framework of human rights.

As research material, COM 4 provides a translation of the recently promulgated NCPO order 33/2560, which was released in reaction to the unforeseen effects of the “Royal Decree on Recruitment of Foreigners” that was promulgated in late June, causing many foreign workers to leave Thailand in fear of harsh penalties for violations. The translation was provided by Nathanaicha Aneksomboonphon, from the Office of the Council of State.

Our lifestyle section features another rewarding destination for a Bangkok day trip to Ko Kret in the Chao Praya River, not too far from CPG’s offices at Thammasat University.

Taking the opportunity to thank everyone who has supported CPG’s work over the past couple of months, I hope you find this issue interesting and invite you to share feedback on this issue and get in touch with us if you are interested in our work.

Henning Glaser
Director, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG),
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University

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Lecture series “Resistance in Thailand during the Second World War”


On 20 April 2017, 31 May 2017 and 9 June 2017, Dr. Warawit Kanithasen, Senior Research Fellow at the German Southeast-Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG), gave a lecture on the “Resistance in Thailand during the Second World War” at the two universities of Passau and Frankfurt a.M. and at the Rautenstrauch-Joest-Museum Cologne in Germany. During his lecture, Dr. Warawit spoke of the immediate formation of an armed resistance group in Siam under Pridi Banomyong (1900-1983) after Japanese forces had arrived in 1941 and the Thai government surrendered. The resistance group of about 80,000 people fought and supported the allies in the fight against the Japanese until the end of the war in 1945. Pridi himself was later honoured by the United States for the role he has played during the war.

Expert talk “Constitutional Politics under the 2017 Constitution: Peculiarities & Prospects”

30 May 2017, Residence of the German Ambassador, Bangkok

On 30 May 2017, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and CPG hosted the expert talk “Constitutional Politics under the 2017 Constitution: Peculiarities & Prospects” in the Residence of the German Ambassador. H.E. Ambassador Peter Prügel opened the event, highlighting Germany’s support for Thailand and its efforts to return to democracy. Assist. Prof. Dr. Prajak Kongkirati, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, then presented important aspects of the current constitutional framework and the distribution of powers in contemporary Thailand. Mr. Henning Glaser, CPG Director, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, followed with a presentation on current challenges and historic patterns in Thai constitutional politics.
elaborating the key relations between the various power-holders in the country. The two presentations were followed by an extensive Q&A session.

The expert talk then moved on towards a panel discussion covering topics such as the situation of political parties, the framework for elections, power struggles, press freedom and access to information, as well as the human rights situation in general and in the South of Thailand, in particular. The panelists were Assoc. Prof. Dr. At-takrit Patchimnan, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Mr. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Nikkei Asian Review, and Mr. Imesh Pokharel, Southeast Asian Regional Office, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The panel was moderated by Dr. Lasse Schuldt and Mr. Jan Kliem, both CPG. After the panel discussion, the audience seized the opportunity to ask questions and to engage with the panelists.

At the end of this highly successful event, CPG also took the opportunity to thank and wish farewell to Sonja Gebauer, whose tenure as political counsellor at the German Embassy has ended. Sonja is returning to Berlin in July.

**International Seminar “A Hotbed for Crises: Increasing Stakes and Growing Tensions in the South China Sea”**

14 June 2017, Thammasat University (Tha Prachan), Faculty of Law, Bangkok

On 14 June 2017, together with the Hanns-Seidel Foundation, CPG once more organised an international seminar at Thammasat University (Tha Prachan), Faculty of Law in Bangkok on the ongoing disputes in the South and East China Sea. Under the title “A Hotbed for Crises: Increasing Stakes and Growing Tensions in the South China Sea” the seminar addressed the question of the prospects for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific in the light of the particular issues pertaining to claims and behaviours of the stakeholders in these troubled waters. The event brought together a respectable audience, including defence attachés and counsellors from a number of embassies and international organisations and five speakers from the United States, France, Singapore, Japan and Thailand to discuss the most pressing issues in both the South and East China Sea. The highly experienced and distinguished speakers we were able to invite to speak at this event were Dr. Kevin Downey, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Dr. Li Nan, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bansho Koichiro, Advisor to National Security Council of Japan, Former Commander Southwest Army, Ground Self Defense Force Japan, Dr. Jean Jonathan Bogais, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Sydney, Australia and H.E. Kasit Piromya, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current NRSA member. The speakers presented their views on the current situation in the South and East China Sea before the audience had the opportunity to listen to and engage with the experts in a moderated
The presentations laid out detailed depictions of the situation on the ground which is constantly developing in the South and East China Sea and delved into assessments of China’s motivations and possibly greater strategy underpinning their at times aggressive behaviour in its surrounding waters. The seminar also managed to shed light on the Japanese perspective as well as trigger a discussion on how the region ought to react to changing realities in the region’s most vital maritime sphere. All presentations and the extended panel discussion later on made the conference a highly participatory, informative and successful event. It was not only beneficial to lay out the ‘hard’ facts but also to elaborate on just how difficult it is to interpret what is happening given the rising stakes and varied interests involved in this hotbed for crises.

Workshop “Conflict Resolution and Connectivity – A Socio/Technological Experiment”

On 15 June 2017, CPG invited Dr. Jean Jonathan Bogais, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Sydney to Thammasat University (Tha Prachan) in Bangkok to conduct a workshop on his ongoing project titled “Conflict Resolution and Connectivity – A Socio/Technological Experiment”. Dr. Bogais, who has been developing this programme for several years, gave an in-depth introduction into the theoretical framework underlying his experiments. It consists of understanding each situation his model is applied to as a complex system comprised of a large network of interrelated factors. Once such a complex system has been developed, it allows analysts not only to understand a situation as a whole, but also to predict certain outcomes and find ways to exercise influence in order to avoid or encourage specific developments and outcomes. Another added benefit, according to Dr. Bogais, is understanding how exactly factors are connected to one another, for an intervention which influences one factor will always have an effect on the rest of the network.

In addition to these theoretical foundations, he alluded to a number of practical situations where his system can be applied. So far, Dr. Bogais has secured both funding and the support of relevant actors in order to practically apply his experiment in a number of cases. He would now like to see his project grow further and the number of experiments rise.

CPG Spring Academy 2017

From 26 June to 07 July 2017, sixteen Asian law students, young law lecturers and legal professionals participated in CPG’s Spring Academy 2017, arranged by Goethe University Frankfurt. During their stay in Germany, they took part in an extensive academic program. Eighteen English-language lectures with a special focus on German and European public and civil law were given by renowned law professors. Furthermore, insights into the German federal multilevel governance were provided in connection with a visit to the State Parliament of Hessen in Wiesbaden. In addition to the lectures, a cultural program was organized, which included exploring historical Frankfurt and a visit to the European Central Bank, as well as a day-trip to the small town of Heidelberg and its beautiful castle.
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White Warships, Little Blue Men, and Looming Conflict in the East China Sea - China’s “Short, Sharp War” For The Senkakus

By James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck

James E. Fanell is a Government Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations (N2/N39) for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He specializes in Indo-Asia Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on the Chinese navy and its operations.

Kerry K. Gershaneck is a Senior Research Associate with CPG at Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law, the Distinguished Visiting Professor at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, a Senior Associate with Pacific Forum CSIS, and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their organisational affiliations.

In a recent article entitled “Lessons Learned from Senkaku War Games”, a Japanese newspaper reported on a March 2017 “war game” designed to help American, Japanese, and Chinese “gamers” (including former senior government officials) deal with two separate escalating crises regarding the disputed Senkaku islands.

Oddly, each scenario was premised on Japanese actions initiating the crises: a seemingly inept pacifist democracy, Japan, forced an aggrieved (albeit hyper-nationalist, expansionist, and totalitarian) China react to protect its national sovereignty.

Ignored by the war game designers is the harsh fact that it is the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)—and not Japan—that has the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to create the most serious Senkaku-related crisis: “a short, sharp war” to wrest the islands from Japan for China.

As troubling as its ironic premises, the “war game” highlighted serious miscommunications and policy misunderstandings between the U.S. and Japanese officials that would have fatally undermined a united response in a real crisis. Despite an alliance spanning nearly 60 years, the American and Japanese gamers reportedly admitted they still did not understand the other country’s political concerns or security objectives.

Worse still, the exercise highlighted a penchant for the U.S. team to pressure the Japan team to relent to PRC threats and interests. A Japanese participant is quoted as stating: “We learned the United States is more worried about avoiding a conflict with China than it is about Japan’s position on the possession of the Senkaku Islands.”

In other words, from the Japanese perspective, the default American position was appeasement of PRC “core interests” at the expense of Japan’s sovereignty and security interests. The Japanese perception was reinforced when the U.S. team reportedly cheered

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When it successfully pressured the Japanese team to back off its pre-planned response to the crisis of deploying additional Coast Guard cutters!

The purpose of this article is to examine what the PRC is planning to do regarding the Senkakus—a Chinese attack—and to make recommendations that will better prepare U.S., Japan, and other affected countries to successfully respond to this inevitable confrontation.

Specifically, this paper will address how China’s military campaign to take the Senkaku Islands would likely unfold, to include China’s campaign objectives; the military and para-military forces it will employ and how the PRC is preparing those forces; how it might counter U.S. intervention; how it would occupy and control the islands. Of particular interest, this article offers timelines for executing the attack. In addition, the paper provides eight specific recommendations to deal with the increasingly threatening situation.

The Origins of “A Short, Sharp War”

The idea that China is actively planning to conduct a “short, sharp war” to seize the Senkaku Islands was originally revealed by PLA Navy Rear Admiral Yin Zhou on Beijing Television in January 2013. The actions of the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard have subsequently validated Admiral Yin’s revelations.

RADM Yin takes his cues from the highest level: President Xi Jinping openly promotes China’s maritime ambitions—and its campaign of coercive maritime expansion—as an essential part of his “China Dream”.

To support these ambitions, the PLA has dramatically increased its military capability, lethality, and readiness for combat. Last summer, the PLA Navy proudly publicized a practice run in the East China Sea, calling it a “sudden cruel war.” The verbage is a minor variation of RADM Yin’s term “short, sharp war”.

It is important to note that the concept of “short, sharp war” is nothing new to the PRC’s rulers. It is important to note that the concept of “short, sharp war” is nothing new to the PRC’s rulers. It is also worth noting the PRC was willing to sustain massive casualties and economic hardship in order to win what it hoped would be “short, sharp wars”.

China would prefer to never fire a single shot to fulfill President Xi’s direction “to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” However, if China’s leaders perceive that the non-kinetic forms of their Comprehensive National Power will not produce the results they desire, they will employ the military option against the Senkaku sometime during what is described as the “Decade of Concern”; from 2020 to 2030, whereby the PRC intends to solidify all their outstanding territorial claims.

The Senkakus—A Timeline from Japanese Administrative “Control” to a Chinese “Core Interest”

While no Chinese government official has yet publicly declared the Senkaku Islands (“Diaoyu Islands” in Chinese) as a “core interest”, all available evidence indicates that China believes the Senkaku Islands are an inherent part of their territory. To Beijing, the islands are no different than Taiwan and the South China Sea—PRC rulers assert they have been part of China since ancient times.

Nevertheless, the PRC’s strategic interest in the Senkakus is rather recent despite official proclamations that they have been an inherent part of China since “ancient times.” Following the end of World War II, the Senkaku Islands were under the control of the United States, as stipulated in Articles 3 and 4B of the 1950 Treaty of San Francisco. Control of the islands was then relinquished by the United States and given to Japan in 1971, as stipulated in the two nations’ “Okinawa Agreement.” Since that time the Japanese government has maintained administrative control over the islands.

Subsequent to a United Nation’s report suggesting the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan might be extremely rich in oil reserves, China’s Foreign Ministry in December 1971 made their first formal claim to the Senkaku Islands. While China publicly “set aside” its differences with Japan over its sovereignty claims after World War II, that did not change Beijing’s belief that the “Diaoyou” islands are China’s sovereign territory. Beijing’s belief was made clear in the following passage from their 2012 “White Paper” on this topic:

“Diaoyu Dao [island] has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times, and China has indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. As China and Japan were normalizing relations and concluding the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in the 1970s, the then leaders of the two countries, acting in the larger interest of China-Japan relations, reached [an] important understanding and consensus on "leaving the issue of Diaoyou Dao to be resolved later."”

For the next nearly 40 years, China’s leaders followed Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum of “Bide time, conceal capabilities, but do some things.” China’s leaders largely refrained from aggressively and publicly expressing their claims of sovereignty over...
The leader of the Leading Group that orchestrated the seizure was at that time not well known in the West—a man named Xi Jinping. Xi had been selected by the Chinese Communist Party to become China’s next president the following year. This event made him a national hero just when he most needed the political legitimacy.

The acquiescence of the U.S., the Philippines, and others turned out to be a significant turning point—a real pivot—for President Xi and his vision to “re-store” China’s territorial claims. Xi’s strategy included destruction of the system of alliances that had long contained China’s expansionism. While in the West the Scarborough seizure was downplayed by the Obama administration and treated as a minor fisheries dispute, Chinese scholars recognized the significance of Xi’s template for motivating U.S. alliances by undercutting confidence in the agreements, calling it the “Scarborough Model.”

Then in September 2012, President Xi led the dramatic escalation in political tension surrounding the Senkaku Islands by leveraging the Japanese government’s six-month advance notification to China of its decision to convert its lease on the islands to ownership on 11 September. Japan’s action was entirely administrative—an internal paperwork drill—but it elicited an immediate and furious response from China. China’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Li Baodong, condemned Japan’s actions and stated the “Chinese government and people will never waiver in their will and determination to uphold China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

At the top of this hierarchy of Chinese military doctrine are the three concepts of “Active Defense”, “Local War under Conditions of Informatization” and “People’s War.” All three have some relation to how the PLA would conduct an operation against the Senkaku Islands.

A Mao-era operational concept, the PLA asserts that Active Defense is a “policy of strategic defense and (China) will only strike militarily after it has already been struck.” But that notion has given way to the concept of “gaining the initiative by striking the first blow” (xian fa zhi ren)—the absolute requirement to seize the initiative in the opening phase of a war. Noteworthy also is that the policy of Active Defense includes the stipulation “that such a defensive strategic posture is only viable if mated with an offensive operational posture.”

Moreover, the first strike that triggers a Chinese military response need not be military; actions in the political and strategic realm may also justify a Chinese military reaction. In the context of the Senkaku Islands, this is especially important given Japanese government use of its coast guard to provide the first layer of administrative control over the island. For instance, Beijing could use something as innocuous as a change in Japan Coast Guard force posture or even the language Japan uses when patrolling the islands as a justification for initiating an Active Defense military operation.

Official PLA doctrine since 1993, Local War under Conditions of Informatization asserts that future warfare will be conducted within local geography, primarily along China’s periphery, and will be limited in scope and duration. Under this doctrine, the PLA expects to act decisively and be victorious, especially when its forces are aided by modern, lethal weapons and are connected by robust, redundant...
and reliable command and control systems. Situational awareness is a key priority for operating under this doctrine, and the PLA will utilize a densely layered intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network to provide its agile force the capability for high-tempo power projection operations. In this case, that aim is to take the Senkakus and place them under China’s physical control.

Finally, when discussing the macro levels of Chinese military doctrine as it relates to a Senkaku Islands campaign, the concept of People’s War is “one in which the people actively support the military during times of warfare; this active support can be logistical, political, or operational.”

Under this doctrine, the PLA has designated the Chinese population and local governments as being vital resources, especially during a “Local War” scenario like taking the Senkaku Islands. Ultimately, under the doctrine of People’s War, the PLA believes “the local population can be decisive even in a local, high-technology war.”

Specifically, the “local population” will be the principal maritime element of any People’s War against the Senkaku Islands. This will be in the form of the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM) and China’s civil/military fishing fleets, the largest fishing fleets in the world. The U.S. Navy War College’s China Maritime Studies provides evidence that “China’s PAFMM is an armed mass organization primarily comprising mariners working in the civilian economy who are trained and can be mobilized to defend and advance China’s maritime territorial claims, protect “maritime rights and interests,” and support the PLA Navy (PLAN) in wartime.”

Ostensibly civilians but in reality trained and armed military assault forces, the PAFMM “Little Blue Men” can be likened to the Russian “Little Green Men” used to attack and capture large swaths of the Ukraine in recent years. These Little Blue Men will be supported by “White Warships”—China’s Coast Guard—which will be discussed in greater detail below.

Given the growing presence of Chinese sea forces around the Senkaku Islands over the past five years, it is obvious that China not only believes the islands are its sovereign territory, but are actively preparing a “short, sharp war” military campaign using the PAFMM as the vanguard to take back the islands.

Senkaku Island Campaign Scenarios

Much of the evidence regarding China’s actions around the Senkaku Islands remains classified by the U.S. and other governments. Still, there are indicators in unclassified press reporting that provide clear insight into the operational elements of a Chinese military campaign to forcibly take the islands.

Given China’s doctrine and the observed actions of its military and para-military forces over the past five years, there are two major scenarios for its “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands, as follows:

1) Maritime Law Enforcement Scenario
2) PLA-led Assault Scenario (Exercise or Taiwan Attack Based)

Under each scenario, the goal of the PRC would be to physically occupy the Senkaku Islands and maintain permanent control over them. To varying degrees, each scenario would have significant overlap in terms of forces used to seize the islands. The main difference is primarily how the attack will be initiated.

1) Maritime Law Enforcement Scenario

First among these scenarios deals with what is known collectively as China’s “Maritime Law Enforcement Forces” (MLEF). Originally known as the “Five Dragons”, China’s National People’s Congress in March 2013 passed legislation to create an “entirely new maritime law enforcement entity”, to be called China Coast Guard Bureau (zhongguo haijingju).

As it did during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident, China has dispatched an increasing number of MLEF ships to the Senkaku Islands. The mission of the MLEF in the Senkaku is to demonstrate resolve and to apply increasing pressure to the Japanese Coast Guard, which has patrolled the islands on a daily basis for years.

According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs reporting, from the period 2008 to September, 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels rarely conducted intrusions into the 12-nautical mile (nm) territorial limit of the Senkaku Islands. There was only one intrusion in 2008 and one in 2011. Following Japan’s September 2012 announcement of nationalization of the islands, China’s maritime law enforcement vessels dramatically increased their intrusions into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters. In the final three months of 2012, Chinese intrusions increased to 23 times, with over 68 Chinese Coast Guard ships (an average of three ships per intrusion) entering the 12nm limit and directly challenging Japan’s sovereignty of the islands.

But Chinese Coast Guard intrusions into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters are just the tip of the iceberg in China’s response.

For instance, when the Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels were not conducting intrusions into the 12nm territorial limit, they would remain in the general area of the islands (within 30nm) and would frequently conduct intrusions into the islands’ 24nm contiguous zone. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the contiguous zone is “the area where coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, and punish infringement of those laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.”

As at Scarborough Shoal, Beijing’s strategy has been to visibly ratchet up the pressure on Tokyo by increasing the presence of its MLEFs in and around the Senkaku Islands. Its strategy is also to demonstrate gradually increased Chinese civil administration over the islands, a key component of its maritime sovereignty expansion campaign.
In the first year (September 2012 to October 2013) Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels conducted 52 intrusions into the Senkakus’ territorial waters. Then from 2013 through 2016, these intrusions normalized to an average of 34 times per year, or two to three times per month.34 The pressure continued to build when, in December 2015, Japan reported that for the first time an armed Chinese Coast Guard cutter, Haijing 31239 (formerly a PLA Navy Jiangwei I-class frigate) entered the contiguous zone on 22 December and then the territorial waters on the 26th.35,36

China’s probing of Japan’s defense of the islands came in many forms. For instance, as the Chinese Coast Guard began its presence around the islands, it became obvious that their craft were deficient for the task of continuous presence due to the small size of their patrol boats. Generally smaller than 1,000 tons, these vessels had a limited ability to remain on station near the islands, especially during bad weather and in higher sea states (usually above sea state 3-4). This all began to change in 2014 when Chinese MLEF vessels patrolling the Senkaku Island began to increase in size.37 For instance, in August of 2014 at least one frigate-sized 3,000-ton Chinese MLEF vessel deployed to the Senkaku Islands and by February of 2015 there were reports of the first intrusion by three MLEF vessels greater than 3,000-tons.37

Size matters in confrontations at sea, especially in contests between coast guard vessels. As China has sought more of its neighbors’ maritime sovereignty, it has built ever-larger coast guard ships. These are intended to enable its civil maritime forces to carry out China’s campaign more aggressively by having the biggest ship on scene. They also allow them to conduct operations at increasing distances from China’s coastline. As such, China has demonstrated its commitment to have the largest coast guard vessels in the Asia Pacific region. In 2014, China commissioned the largest coast guard cutter in the world, at 12,000 tons, the Zhongguo Haijing 2901. This cutter first went to sea for the first time in May 2015 and is subordinate to the East China Sea area of responsibility.38 A second ship of the class, CCG3901, was completed and made ready for operations in January 2016.39

The Communist Party’s People’s Daily made the purpose of these ships crystal-clear, stating they were designed to have “the power to smash into a vessel weighing more than 20,000 tons and will not cause any damage to itself when confronting a vessel weighing under 9,000 tons. It can also destroy a 5,000-ton ship and sink it to the sea floor.”40

Note carefully the combat assault mission of these Chinese Coast Guard ships: they are, quite simply, “White Warships”!

While most other nations emphasize their maritime law enforcement agencies’ ability to support safety at sea, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations with an emphasis on saving lives and helping those in distress at sea, China has taken a different approach. China instead boasts their large Coast Guard vessels as being designed not to save lives at sea: China publicly admits their large cutters are designed to sink coast guard ships and fishing boats.

This “ram and sink” Chinese Coast Guard mission provides a unique insight into the PRC’s potential operational plan to take the Senkaku Islands by force. While the size and scope of operations of China’s MLEF are important factors in being able to support a “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands, so is the proximity of operational forces. Beijing quickly realized that any plan to use the MLEF as a proxy force in operations against the Senkaku Islands would be constrained by the distances of existing Chinese MLEF bases to the islands.

Consequently, in June of 2015, the first reports emerged of China Coast Guard building a new base near the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, much closer to the Senkaku Islands.41 The plans, as posted to the city website (which have since been deleted) indicated the base is being designed to “occupy about 500,000 sq. meters and will have a pier around 1.2 km long with a facility where six vessels—including large vessels with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons—can moor, a hangar for airplanes and helicopters, and a large training facility.42 Interestingly, and no doubt related, were China’s plans for construction of another new base, this time for PLA Navy on the island of Nanji near the new coast guard base at Wenzhou.43 Nanji Island is 60nm closer to the Senkaku Islands than are the military bases of Japan and the United States located on Okinawa. These islands are reported to already have “an advanced radar system in place and a heliport for use by carrier-based helicopters.”44 It is also expected to have a runway that would diminish flight time to the Senkaku Islands, as well as increase available on-station time by either Chinese Coast Guard or PLA air forces.

Another interesting element that can be derived from these reports is the emphasis China places on the integration of MLE and PLA forces. When it comes to the Senkakus, China’s leaders recognized that a closer proximity for its civil and military forces was absolutely necessary in order to meet the demands of a “short, sharp war” to take the islands.

The Chinese would start the war the same way they started their seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines, by progressively leaning in on the feature with fishermen, and MLE forces “protecting” them. They’d increase their presence in fine increments—coming closer, anchoring, taking resources, landing on the islands, building on the islands—until the Japanese had one of two choices: either surrender their territory to the encroachment as the Philippines did at Scarborough Reef when we declined to operationally support them, or take some defensive enforcement action.

That defensive action, no matter how slight and non-confrontational, would be magnified in Beijing’s propaganda and exploited as the excuse for China’s rapid escalation to destruction of the Japa...
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Particularly noteworthy was the fact that a large number of Chinese ships and law enforcement vessels into the territorial water limit of the islands. This was in order to stop the Chinese Coast Guard from their patrol stations.

An event from August 2016 was likely a rehearsal of how China may take the islands. Around mid-day on the 5th of August 2016, some 200-300 Chinese fishing boats swarmed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands of Kuba and Uotsuri, accompanied by one Chinese MLEF vessel. By the 9th of August up to 15 Chinese MLEF vessels had first entered the contiguous zone and then drove on into the 12nm territorial water limit of the islands. This was the first time China had ever put that many fishing ships and law enforcement vessels into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands. This surge of MLEF ships was a dramatic and significant increase compared to the average number of three (3) MLEF vessels that had deployed into the contiguous zone since 2012.56

Equally important is the reality that if the PLA can take Taiwan, then it can also take the Senkaku Islands.

It isn’t hard to recognize the multiple overlapping military requirements for both scenarios, especially for the smaller Senkaku Islands. The military capabilities required to take Taiwan apply to a scenario like the Senkaku Islands; in fact, China is more likely to use them against the Senkakus because of the smaller scope and shorter campaign the PLA anticipates to be necessary to achieve victory.

Likewise, a case can be made that the Senkakus could also be a prerequisite for the acquisition and assimilation of Taiwan.

Since taking office, President Xi has restructured the PLA in China’s seven military regions into five theater commands. He has also “subordinated the ground force to an army service headquarters, raised the stature and role of the strategic missile force, and established a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities.”46

Furthermore by early 2016, President Xi had re-organized and streamlined the senior echelons of the PLA by discarding “the PLA’s four traditional general departments in favor of 15 new CMC functional departments.”46 And to put a capstone on this transformation, President Xi announced the Central Military Commission (CMC) would now be in charge of the “overall administration of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, militia, and reserves” with the new theater commands (sometimes referred to as “joint war zones”) to focus on combat preparedness. Meanwhile the various services would be responsible for the development of what in the U.S. are called the “Title 10 authorities” to man, train, and equip the force.50

A closer examination of each of the forces is necessary to appreciate their rapidly expanding capabilities:

The PLA Navy

The PLA is benefitting from Xi’s military transformation: it is the largest military modernization effort since the end of World War II. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is the prime beneficiary. Its build-up from 2000 to 2015 far exceeds the build-up in any other nation’s Navy in the post-World War II era, save for the U.S. Navy during the Reagan years of the 1980s.

The reason is simple: in order for China’s leaders to achieve their vision of a “rejuvenated” and “re-stored” China, they needed a fleet that can expand China’s “interior lines” out into the maritime domain. That goal will be largely met by 2020.

Concurrent with the PLAN modernization has been the changing pattern of PLA Navy operations. Instead of continuing as a coastal water Navy force steaming within 50nm of China’s coastline, today the Chinese Navy has pushed out into the blue water of the Pacific Ocean and beyond. (See Figures 2 & 3)

An examination of PLA Navy “blue water operations” over the past fifteen years reveals “China’s ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically advanced and flexible force”. This evolving naval force will provide Beijing the capability to successfully conduct a military campaign to take the Senkaku Islands.51

This transformation has required a new force structure, one that has increased both the number and type of naval platforms. With respect to far seas operations, the Office of Naval Intelligence 2015 report, “The PLA Navy – New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century” stated that “during the past de-
cade, requirements for diversified missions and far seas operations have stimulated an operational shift and have catalyzed the acquisition of multi-mission platforms”. These multi-mission platforms are perfectly suited for naval combat against Japan naval forces tasked to defend the Senkaku Islands. Not only does the present-day PLA Navy present a significant threat to Japan, but it now also threatens the U.S. Navy.

In Holmes and Yoshihara’s recently published monograph “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life of Surface Fleets”, they assert the PLA Navy is “particularly well-suited to seize islands.” They say the PLAN assault forces will be led by surface combatant strike groups comprised of its premier combatant, the Type 052D Luyang III-class guided missile destroyers, the Type 054C Luyang II-class guided missile destroyers, the Type 054A Jiangkai III-class guided missile frigates, and the Soviet-built Sovenmenny-class destroyers.

Not only could these surface action strike groups provide withering naval gun fire support for an amphibious landing force with their superior (range, speed, and survivability) anti-ship cruise missile inventory, but these combatants would provide a sea-based air defense that would constrain or even preclude U.S. or Japanese air operations near an amphibious operation. Given China’s superior number of advanced surface combatants “it is far from clear that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy”, especially in a Senkaku Islands campaign where naval warfare will determine mission success. In addition to PRC MLEF and PAFMM ships, PLA Navy forces have also increased their operations in and around the Senkaku Islands since 2012. Prior to 2012, PLA Navy warships generally patrolled on the west side of the “Median Line”. Since 2012 there has also been an increase in the number of Chinese warships operating for sustained periods of time east of the “Median Line”. This trend culminated on 19 June 2016 when the Japanese destroyer Setogiri confirmed a PLAN Jiangkai I-class frigate had entered the Contiguous Zone of the Senkaku Island of Kuba.

The challenge for the defending force of Japanese and U.S. warships operating within the First Island Chain is compounded by China’s ability to bring firepower of all three of their fleets into the sea area around the Senkaku Islands. In addition, naval fires will also come from a densely populated submarine forces armed with supersonic, sea-skimming, 290nm range YJ-18 ASCMs, as well as air-delivered ASCMs from PLA Air Forces.

With these surface, subsurface, and air forces at hand in the East China Sea the PLA Navy has the capability to conduct a “short, sharp war” to take the Senkaku Islands.

**PLA Navy Amphibious Forces**

Perhaps the most important aspect to any successful Chinese Senkaku Islands campaign involves the art of physically moving forces ashore.

China continues to build and train its naval and amphibious forces in the art of expeditionary warfare, a skill set easily applied to a Senkaku Islands campaign. Most recently in the South China Sea, two amphibious dock landing ships, three air-cushion landing craft, and two ship-borne helicopters conducted beach landing exercises. This type of training is ubiquitous across the East and South China Sea and is the most tangible evidence of the PLA’s intention of being prepared to conduct such a mission.

One facet of President Xi’s transformation of the PLA includes a dramatic expansion of the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC) to 100,000 strong personnel—a tenfold increase of its Marine Corps of just a few years ago. According to the South China Morning Post, “two special warfare brigades had already been incorporated into the PLAMC, raising the forces’ complement of soldiers to 20,000.” While the reporting indicates that some of these new PLAMC forces will be dispatched to far-flung installations like in Gwadar, Pakistan or the new PLA Navy base in Djibouti, there is little doubt that the growth of PLAMC personnel is necessary to achieve its maritime territorial ambitions.

To provide the amphibious lift needed for this vastly expanded Marine Corps, China is producing an increasing number of high-end, large amphibious warships, and is intent on building many more over the near term. For instance, according to the Office of Naval Intelligence as of 2015, the PLA Navy has 56 amphibious warships, ranging from a few WW-II era landing ships to the four of the large, modern Yuzhao-class Type 071 amphibious transport docks (LPD), which provide a considerably greater and more flexible capability than the older landing ships.” The Yuzhao is perfectly fitted for a Senkaku Islands campaign as it “can carry up to four of the new air cushion landing craft”, as well as “four or more helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops.”

Not content with the Yuzhao, China has announced it “has started building a new generation of large amphibious assault vessels that will strengthen the navy as it plays a more dominant role in projecting the nation’s power overseas.” PLA Navy Commander, Vice-Admiral Shen Jinlong, reportedly visited the Hudong Zhonghua Shipbuilding Company in Shanghai where the new ship, identified as the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (LHD), is reportedly under construction.

The Type 075 is much larger than any other amphibious warship previously built for the PLA Navy, and is uniquely suited to a Senkaku Islands campaign. It can carry a large number of attack and transport (up to 30 helicopters) and has the ability to launch six helicopters simultaneously. For a PRc Marine assault force, this is critically important because at present the closest PLA airfield from which the PLA could launch attacking helicopters against the Senkaku Islands is well over 180nm away. The Type 075 will provide the critical element for the PLA to be able to project “boots on the ground” on the Senkaku Islands.

By the early 2020s, the PLA Navy and Marine Corps will be well resourced and ready to fight when called

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52 The PLA Navy,” ONI, pp. 10-11.
54 Ibid. p. 277.
56 Situations in East/South China Seas, West Pacific Ocean & Sea of Japan”, briefing from Japan’s Ministry of Defense, February 2017, slide 5.
60 Ibid. p. 18.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
upon by President Xi to take the Senkaku Islands.

**PLA Air Forces**

The importance of PLA air forces in a Senkaku Islands scenario became clear on 23 November 2013, when the PRC abruptly declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. "Despite this unilateral action being denounced by senior U.S. Defense and State Department officials, as “a provocative act and a serious step in the wrong direction”, China has not backed down. 65 Not deterred by history or international norms, the PRC government and media propaganda statements declared the ADIZ gave China the right to take “emergency measures” against non-compliant aircraft in international airspace, even aircraft that were not vectored at the Chinese mainland. 66 While the ADIZ was portrayed to be about protecting China’s mainland, it could equally be a valuable tool in any Chinese Active Defense stratagem to take the Senkaku Islands.

Since the ADIZ declaration, PLA air forces have increased the scope and scale of flights in and around the Senkaku Islands. In December 2012, a China Maritime Surveillance aircraft entered the Senkaku Islands territorial airspace, the first time in 50 years for such an event to happen. 67 This event ushered in an era of expanded PLA air force activities in the East China Sea where fighter, airborne warning and control, signal and electronic intelligence aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have expanded their air operations further and further southeast towards the Senkaku Islands. 68 Accordingly, Japanese increased reactions to Chinese aircraft from approximately 300 events in 2012 to nearly 700 in 2016. 69

In addition, PLA air forces began an aggressive transition from being an exclusively territorial air defense force to one that is now more active and comfortable over the open seas than at any time in its history. For instance, in 2013, PLA air forces began flights into the Western Pacific Ocean via the Miyakd Straits, and have since averaged between five and six events per year with multiple aircraft. 70 The aircraft types conducting flights near the Senkaku Islands include bomber, fighter, refueling, electronic intelligence, and airborne early warning aircraft, all attesting to the comprehensive nature of how China would employ air power to help secure and maintain their control over the Senkaku Islands.

Adding complexity to the air domain, the PLA Air Force conducted “its first-ever exercise over the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel” in late March 2015. 71 Despite PLA Air Force public assertions that these drills were routine and not targeted against “any particular country, regions or targets”, there is little doubt PLA air forces entering the Philippine Sea via the Bashi Channel or the Miyakd Straits provide the PLA considerable operational and tactical flexibility in any Senkaku Island attack campaign. 72

Upping the ante, the PLA Air Force announced in mid-September 2016 that it would conduct “regular” exercises flying past the First Island Chain. 73 True to its word, PLA air forces have conducted routine flights through the Miyakd Straits and Bashi Channel with the most recent big event occurring on 3 March as China sent 13 aircraft through the Miyakd Straits. 74 According to the Japanese Ministry of defense this was “the largest number of foreign planes Japan has scrambled jets for since such data first became available in 2003.” 75

In response, in February, Japan’s Defense Ministry announced their Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF) “doubled the number of fighter jets it scrambles when responding to airspace checks by foreign planes.” 76 According to the latest reports by the Japanese, the number of JASDF scrambles launched between April 2016 and January 2017 had already surpassed “the annual record of 944 set in fiscal 1984, when the Cold War was in full swing and airplanes from the former Soviet Union were active.” 77

Noteworthy has been the increasing proximity of Chinese aircraft towards the Senkaku Islands. According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, China has increased the number of PLA air forces that fly south of the 27 degrees north latitude, an unspoken demarcation line and something Japan has considered a “defensive border line.” 78 JASDF tactical objectives are designed to keep Chinese planes from flying within a minimum protective air umbrella of approximately 60nm from the Senkaku Islands. Given the dramatic increase in provocative PLA air force activity and Japanese responses to them in the East China and Philippine Sea, the likelihood for an explosive event has risen greatly. This is especially true since Tokyo and Beijing do not have a “hot line” communication network “that can be used by their militaries to avoid accidental aerial or maritime clashes.” 79 Beijing may use such as explosive incident as an excuse to move on the Senkaku Islands.

China could easily begin that “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands by exploiting and surprising local air commanders. Specifically, the PLA air forces could launch a large number of fighters and other aircraft towards Okinawa via the Miyakd Straits and up through the Bashi Channel with the goal of diverting, diffusing, and degrading JASDF efforts to get to the airspace over the Senkaku Islands. On these islands, an assault by the main invasion force, either airborne from helicopters or seaborne, would be conducted concurrently.

And this combined arms diversionary and main assault would all take place under the cover of one of the most sophisticated missile and rocket forces on the planet.

**PLA Rocket Forces**

In terms of kinetic fires for all three scenarios, per the Chinese military doctrine of “Joint Fire Strike Campaign”, Beijing would likely use its extensive ballistic and cruise missile arsenals from both the PLA Rocket Force and PLLAF/PLANAF/PLAN, to disrupt rear area operations along the Ryukyu Islands. More importantly, Japan and the U.S. should

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65 Assistant Secretary of State Danny Russel’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 3 February, 2014.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., slide 6.
72 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. It should be noted that the 944 scrambles reported in 1984 reflect all JASDF scramble events across Japan’s mainland, it could equally be a valuable tool in any Chinese Active Defense stratagem to take the Senkaku Islands.
78 Ibid.
Reforms to the PLA Informatization Department began in 2015 and are expected to be complete by 2020 when lines of responsibility are further delineated with the newly-created Strategic Support Force. The SSF’s mission is reportedly focused on “strategic-level information support” for “space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare”. One of its main missions will be strategic denial of the electro-magnetic spectrum.

The SSF is a critical enabler for joint operations through this mission of strategic-level information support. The SSF has also assumed responsibilities for strategic information warfare. Although usually discussed in the context of a Taiwan contingency, China’s cyber forces would play a critical role in any “counter-intervention” strategy against both U.S. and Japan in a Senkaku conflict. The two organizations responsible for this, 3PLA and 4PLA, are both subordinated to the SSF.

China has invested heavily in counter-satellite electronic warfare capabilities to force a “no satellite, no fight” environment for the United States. The SSF has consolidated the management and control over space-based ISR assets—and it may also have non-kinetic ASATs, such as directed energy weapons.

**SSF and “The Fight for Public Opinion”**

The Fight for Public Opinion will be the PRC’s “second battlefield”, and thus rates special attention.

Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes the role of psychological operations, legal warfare, and public opinion warfare to subdue an enemy ahead of conflict or ensure victory if conflict breaks out. The operationalization of psops with cyber is key to this strategy.

China has also taken very real steps to empower its psychological warfare forces, most notably the “three warfares” base or 311 base, located in Fuzhou. This base has been brought under the SSF and is integrated with China’s cyber forces.

Prior to initiating its offensive, China will begin worldwide psychological operations and public opinion warfare as part of a concerted Political Warfare campaign. Chinese front organizations and other sympathizers, along with both Chinese and other-nation mass information channels such as the internet, television, and radio, will be used.

The focus of these influence operations will be to support China’s position and demonize the U.S. and Japan. Internally, this campaign will be important in mobilizing mass support for the “righteous” action, while externally the campaign will attempt to gain support for China’s position. This Political Warfare campaign will continue through the island operation, and after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation.

**SSF Impact**

Ultimately the purpose of these SSF organizations is to ensure the sanctity of national and theater level command and control as well as enhance the warfighting effectiveness of each of the individual services. In the confines of a “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands these “invisible” forces will provide precise situational awareness, target identification of opposing forces, network defenses, and real-time command and control that will enable the PLA to take and hold the Senkaku Islands. They will also work to subvert, demoralize, and confuse the U.S. and Japanese national leadership and operational forces.

An example of these efforts was revealed in 2014 when PLA established a permanent joint operations command center (JOC) responsible for integrating the operations of its army, navy and air forces. It was the first time such a JOC had been established and is seen as being able to “boost the unified operations of Chinese capabilities on land, sea, air and in dealing with strategic missile operations.” When combined with President Xi’s other PLA reforms, it seems clear that China’s ability to command and control all of its forces and disrupt opposing forces in a “short, sharp war” scenario against the Senkakus is well-established and practiced.

**How the PLA Exercise Scenario Will Play Out**

Since 2014, the PLA has conducted several large-scale exercises that could very well be rehearsals for a Senkaku Islands campaign. Of greater concern, these exercises could also be intended as a deception campaign, designed to lure U.S. and Japanese audiences into complacency, so that when the actual “short, sharp” Senkaku Islands campaign commences, it is mistaken for “just another exercise.”

Whether it is the Mission Action (Shiming Xingdong), Joint Action (Lianhe Xingdong), Strike (Kuayue), or even the Firepower (Huoli) series, the PLA is actively training its forces “to improve joint integrated operational capabilities by collecting data to support training and doctrinal development and then implement lessons learned from training as...
The PLA conducts its exercises under close to “actual combat conditions” as possible for supporting research and development for future training and operational methods, but also as means to overcome lack of combat experience.86

During these exercises, the PLA focuses on skill sets including command and control, logistics, civil-military integration, joint campaign planning, long-range firepower and precision strike, deployment of special operational forces, reconnaissance, information warfare, electronic warfare, long-range mobility, and reconnaissance operations to name a few.87

Timeline to Attack: The Coming Decade of Concern

Given the Communist Party’s desire for so-called “restoration” of territory, the obvious question is: How long will the PRC wait to celebrate the achievement of their goal of national rejuvenation and restoration?

Some, like respected China expert Mike Pillsbury, assert that China desires to celebrate the complete restoration by the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China—in 2049. Given that assumption is correct, the next logical question is: What will happen if Beijing is unable to achieve complete restoration via non-violent means?

Simply put: If Japan and/or Taiwan resist, how long will the PRC wait to celebrate the achievement of their goal of national rejuvenation and restoration?

The answer to the last is “not too long”. It will act as early as the year 2020 and no later than 2030. Call this period the “Decade of Concern”. China has very likely calculated a timeline for when they could use military force at the latest possible moment and still be able to conduct a grand ceremony commemorating their national restoration in 2049. (See Figure 4) The template for calculating that date is the time period from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Olympics.

China’s rulers remember well that in 1989, the international community largely condemned Beijing’s actions of brutal slaughtering its own citizens at Tiananmen Square. Yet, just 19 years later the world’s leaders eagerly flocked to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Remember the scene on August 8, 2008 at the Bird’s Nest stadium?

There were tens of thousands of people in the seats watching one of the most impressively orchestrated Olympic opening ceremonies in history. There at the top of the stadium, in a cool, air-conditioned skybox were the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, looking down over the masses of humanity. At the center was President Hu Jintao, wearing his black Chairman Mao suit.

President Hu was cool, calm, and collected. And what did he see down in those seats, in the 95-degree temperature and 95% humidity?

The President of the United States, with big sweat stains under his armpits. That president later went on to describe the event as being “spectacular and successful”.90

What was the strategic message from this event?

It reinforced a belief among China’s leadership that the West has a short-attention span regarding issues such as crimes against humanity as reflected in the Tiananmen Square massacre.

In short, Beijing believes the West can be counted on to forget even the most barbarous actions after a roughly 20-year time span.

Given that logic, then the latest Beijing could use military force to physically restore their perceived territory would be around 2030. This would then allow for 20 years of “peace” before Beijing would conduct a grand ceremony to memorialize the “second 100”—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.

Which leads to the question of when is the earliest China could use military power?

Given the current environment and readiness of the PLA, it literally could start at any time. However, a more precise answer is 2020.

As referenced earlier, intelligence analysis strongly indicates the PLA has, over the past decade, been given the strategic task of being able to take Taiwan by force before 2020. If the PLA is able to take Taiwan by force in 2020, then it stands to reason that a “less-er included” task to seize the Senkaku Islands would also be something the PLA could achieve.

So, the “Decade of Concern” begins in 2020, when there will be mounting pressure within China to use military force in order to achieve the “China Dream” of national restoration by 2049. The chorus for the use of force will grow each year and will crescendo in the late 2020s, and possibly end in a violent clash to seize Taiwan and the Senkakus...or any other area Beijing deems to be a “core interest”.

Recommendations to Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat Chinese Aggression

Given China’s strategic intention to restore its so-called territorial integrity, its modernization and transformation of the PLA, and its commitment to a pre-determined timeline prompt this final question: What can be done to dissuade, deter, or in the worst case defeat a Chinese “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands?

Below are eight recommendations that fall into three categories: 1) those the United States must take on its own and 2) those Japan must take, and 3) those both countries must pursue jointly.

First, and foremost, the Trump Administration must fundamentally transform the U.S. national security “culture” of how the U.S. deals with China: it must move from a culture of “accommodation and appeasement” to one that acknowledges that China is the biggest threat to our national security interest.

--Given the dire nature of not just the Senkaku Island situation, but all the other diplomatic, financial, economic, legal and human rights points of friction that have emerged since U.S.-PRC relations were established in 1979, America must now deal with the PRC from a position of strength. The U.S. must assert its core interests just as the PRC relentlessly does, if not more so.

--The administration should declare that U.S.-China relations have entered a new period. Trump need not explicitly reject “new type of great power relationship” asserted by President Xi, but should implicitly reject it by affirming that the United States’
relationship with all countries, both great and small, is based on U.S. core interests in respect for international law, Westphalian rights, and negotiated dispute resolution without coercion, with resort to third parties when bilateral negotiations fail. To this end, the United States government should explicitly support the July 12th, 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitrations, and explicitly reject all claims that conflict with it.

Regarding the Senkaku Islands, this means the U.S. will not simply say that the Senkaku Islands are covered under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. must say we will actively and aggressively reinforce the U.S. commitment to use military force against China should it ever attempt to conduct a “short, sharp war” or occupation by military or non-traditional forces.

Second, the Trump Administration must actively and routinely re-assert U.S. naval operations in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. There should be no more walking on egg shells, worrying about whether or not routine actions in the Indo-Asia Pacific region are “provoking” China. Beijing has deftly turned that fear into a tool to manipulate the U.S. As an example, the U.S. Pacific Fleet should resume routine operations in the East China Sea, returning to pre-2000 levels where U.S. Navy warships routinely operated west of the Median Line, as well as in the Yellow Sea.

Third, while seemingly unrelated, the Trump Administration should explore recalibrating the United States China Policy. Regardless of whether we call it by Beijing’s title of “One China Policy” or something else, the US should be openly exploring new policy options if for no other reason than to remind Beijing that threats to Japan will have far ranging and significant consequences.

--For instance, the notion that U.S. warships cannot make the occasional port call in Taiwan needs to be honestly examined, discussed with our friends in Taiwan, and if deemed appropriate then executed without fanfare or advance notification. The message to China should be that freedom of navigation and free access to ports is a core interest of the United States and that the U.S. is not going to be constrained by Beijing’s threats.

--Closely related to this topic, the U.S. must end the practice of “unconstrained engagement” with China by the Department of Defense. Specifically, the U.S. should suspend China’s invitation to the “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) exercises until Beijing alters its threatening behavior, economic sanctions, hate campaigns, and rhetoric against our allies Japan and the Republic of Korea. RIMPAC should be returned to its origins as an exercise by which the free nations of the world practice the combat skills to deter lawless expansionism of dictatorships, rather than the naval social event. It is simply astonishing that periodically we did not invite a treaty ally because its form of democracy did not meet our standards (think Thailand), yet we invite the Chinese and graciously host them even as they simultaneously aggress our allies and others.

Fourth, President Trump and Congress must work together to adequately fund the Department of Defense’s return to a strategy which accommodates two major regional contingency operations, as it did during the Cold War. U.S. forces must be fully funding for the unique military requirements for fighting and defeating any PRC attempt to take the Senkakus, as well as for another major attack against the US or our allies and interests.

--In this regard, America needs to return to being a truly global maritime power. America’s elected officials carelessly neglected this vital aspect of America’s national power during the past two-plus decades of emphasis on the Southwest Asia (US Central Command) area of responsibility. While the U.S. Navy can dispatch ships around the globe, today, the U.S. Navy is not adequately sized or outfitted to meet U.S. national security requirements in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. Even worse, it is certainly debatable whether or not the U.S. could stop a Chinese “short, sharp war” against the Senkaku Islands. The PLA Navy likely will have over 500 ships and submarines by 2030. In order to provide a credible deterrent force and to fight and win wars at sea, the U.S. Navy must get bigger—a lot bigger than the current plan for 350 ships.

Fifth, the Trump Administration should proclaim its commitment to a forward deployed presence, especially for our naval forces, and then it should follow these words with concrete, tangible actions. Not only are these necessary to bolster the flagging confidence of U.S. allies, it will also send a clear and unambiguous statement to China. In addition to the current forward deployed force structure, new options can also range from home-porting a second U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Guam to home-porting ballistic missile defense systems (like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system) in Japan.

Sixth, and closely aligned, the U.S. should conduct a robust and public information campaign to accurately portray China’s campaign to expand its maritime sovereignty at the expense of its neighbors and our allies, and to counter Chinese propaganda and political warfare designed to neutralize resistance to its aggression.

--While the introduction of the P-8 aircraft and the soon-to-be-deployed Triton Unmanned Aerial Vehicle have improved U.S. Department of Defense collection capabilities in the Indo-Asia Pacific region, overall the U.S. has displayed a conspicuous lack of will to publicly report the PRC’s actions in the maritime domain. For instance, during the recent deployment of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning, U.S. PACOM did not provide unclassified pictures of China’s inaugural carrier flight operations in the open ocean, even though reconnaissance flights had most probably been conducted.

--There is a tremendous amount of scholarly documentation regarding China’s military pursuits, led by experts in think tanks and academia, but even this research is grossly inadequate for truly understanding China’s military. Although this information shortfall cannot be faulted due to the secret nature of many of the movements of Chinese naval, coast guard, and militia forces across the vastness of the world’s oceans, we do have institutions whose primary mission is to observe such activities and to compile databases regarding these activities.

--It is a responsibility of the U.S. Navy to know the answers to these secrets, to track ships, submarines and aircraft at sea. U.S. Navy intelligence has the capability and capacity to provide the kinds of primary source material that the academic and think-tank community needs to better and effectively comprehend China’s nautical ambitions. Sharing sanitized and declassified information “would not only improve the quality of scholarship and elevate the public debate, it would also go a long way to help frustrate China’s current—and, to date, unanswered—strategy of quiet, coercive-expansion”, especially as it relates to China’s tightening noose.


92 Ibid.
around the Senkaku Islands.93

--The sharing of facts about Chinese activities at sea is not just good for democracy, but it is also smart diplomacy. “Making such information widely available would help counter spurious Chinese narratives of American actions as being the root cause of instability in the Western Pacific. Both outcomes are in our national interest.”74

According to U.S. doctrine, a campaign’s “Phase Zero, Shaping Operations”, are intended to shape the public perception environment, which should also drive what an adversary military can and cannot do. By allowing China to operate clandestinely in the South and East China Seas, the U.S. is foregoing an important opportunity of increasing its own soft power while degrading China’s soft power. By providing such damaging information to the public, the USN will better inform the public and provide U.S. leadership with bargaining leverage over China.

Seventh, Japan should physically occupy the Senkaku Islands. Some will suggest that by adopting such a strategy Japan would cross a “red line” and thus force China to act militarily. However, given China’s methodological approach to military campaign planning, it is more likely that Beijing will reconsider the military correlation of forces as well as the international implications for launching an attack against occupied islands.

--Practically speaking, Japan should construct permanent facilities like a weather station, lighthouses, heliports, and a harbor across the Senkakus, as well as station personnel on the islands. The effect of Japan’s methodological approach to military campaign planning, it is more likely that Beijing would reconsider the military correlation of forces as well as the international implications for launching an attack against occupied islands.

--For instance, U.S. Pacific warships could conduct “over-the-horizon” patrols of the Senkaku Islands with their counterparts from JMSDF and JCG. Likewise, American fighter aircraft from the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps could be integrated with their counterparts from the JASDF when scrambling against Chinese probes of Japan’s ADIZ and the areas around the Senkaku Islands.

--Perhaps most important, U.S. Marines and the amphibious-trained Japanese Ground Self Defense Force Southwest Army should conduct amphibious assault training exercises together in the Senkaku to demonstrate that if the islands were occupied by Chinese forces, the combined U.S. and Japan forces have the capability and will to retake the islands with “boots on the ground and bayonets”.

--By offering this joint operational support, the U.S. would not only be helping to relieve the stress that their Japanese counterparts are experiencing, but it would be a significant enhancement in the interoperability between both forces. Finally, it would send another clear and unambiguous signal to China that if they were foolish enough to attempt such an attack, they would be facing an extremely integrated, competent and committed fighting force.

Conclusion

In conclusion, PRC action against the Senkaku Islands is just a matter of time. An incident precipitating such action could occur at any time, especially with the vastly increased nearly daily PRC provocations in the vicinity of the islands, but more likely as we begin the “Decade of Concern”. From 2020-2030, it will become increasingly likely that China could launch a “short, sharp war” to take the Senkaku Islands and put Japan’s Nansei Shoto region under missile and air assault. Japan, the United States must take proactive steps to now ensure its response does not reflect the arrogance and ineptitude of the March 2017 “Senkakus Wargame” previously described:

For the sake of long-term peace, stability, and freedom in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, the Japan and the U.S. must develop the credible capability to dissuade, deter, and defeat the PRC’s increasingly threatening behavior and a seemingly inevitable attack to take the Senkakus.

The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime Strategy

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In January 2017, a long-anticipated reshuffle of the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) took place. The PLAN and its three fleets each received new commanders. Less noticed, but more significant, was the replacement of General Wang Jiaocheng with Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, former commander of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, as commander of the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Global Times, January 22; Global Times, January 22). This is the first time in PLA history that a naval officer has been appointed to command the multi-service forces of one of its regional combatant headquarters (China Brief, March 31). Most importantly, his appointment is indicative of the shift in China’s military posture from continental defense to maritime security, and the importance of the Southern Theater as a predominantly maritime arena for PLA operations (China Brief, July 22, 2016).

Evolving Maritime Strategy

A major rationale for appointing a naval officer to command the PLA’s Southern Theater has to do with the evolution of China’s maritime strategy. From the late 1960s to mid-1980s, the PLA was required to prepare for an “early, total, and nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion from the North (China Brief, May 15). In this continental defense-centered military strategy, the role of the PLAN, with its limited capabilities, was relegated to supporting


94 Ibid.
a land-based war through coastal defense operations to slow down a Soviet invasion.

In 1985, as China’s relations with the Soviet Union began to improve, Deng Xiaoping tasked the PLA with making the “strategic transition” from preparing for a major war against Soviet invasion to preparing for a “local war” over contingencies on the China’s borders. As a result, the notion of “near-coast defense” was replaced by a “near-seas active defense” strategy. Rather than primarily supporting land operations, the PLAN is required by the new strategy to build itself into a “strategic service” that can operate independently and effectively in its own maritime space, the three seas near China, namely, the South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. [1]

Since the early 2000s, China’s maritime strategy has integrated the concept of “far seas protection” (“远海防卫”) that requires the PLAN to develop capabilities that can safeguard the security of expanding Chinese interests overseas, including “security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lanes, overseas Chinese investment, and overseas Chinese citizens and legal entities.” While “near-seas active defense” and “far-seas protection” underlie the expansion of China’s naval capabilities, near-seas security is considered the priority in the near term largely because of their proximity and centrality to the physical security of China. [2]

The reorganization of the PLAN that began in late 2015 is largely an attempt to change the army-centric nature of the PLA, the result of the dominance of a military strategy centered on continental defense. The changes accommodate the expanding PLA naval and air capabilities to provide security to China’s newly defined maritime domain and interests, particularly in the near seas. A PLA Army (PLAA) headquarters, for instance, was established to take over the responsibility of running army units from the PLA’s regional combatant headquarters, so that the latter can become genuinely joint by integrating more officers from the non-army services. [3]

Unlike the abolished military region (MR) system which was dominated by army officers, the commanding officers of the three newly established PLA theaters with a maritime strategic orientation (the Southern, Eastern and Northern Theaters), are more balanced in service backgrounds, with PLAA, PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) each occupying one third of these positions. As the pool for selecting future PLA senior officers becomes more mixed in service backgrounds, so will the senior officer corps of the PLA, to the extent that positions for theater chiefs may be held by non-army service officers. [4] The appointment of Yuan to command the Southern Theater has cemented this trend.

**Why the Southern Theater Command?**

A major objective of reorganizing the PLA regional combatant headquarters from seven MRs to five theater commands is to reduce the overlap of missions among these headquarters. With this reorganization, “safeguarding sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea has become the most important mission that the Southern Theater shoulders” (People’s Daily, February 28, 2016).

There are several major reasons why the Southern Theater became the first PLA regional combatant headquarters with a naval officer appointed to be its commander. Frist, the South China Sea straddles the vital sea lanes that connect East Asia with the Indian Ocean, on which major East Asian economies, including China’s, depend heavily on shipping energy, raw materials, and traded products. The security and control of these sea lanes are not only indispensable for the normal functioning of these economies in times of peace, but also of great importance to “gaining initiative” in times of crisis and war. [5] Although the Yellow and East China Seas constitute the maritime operational space of the PLA’s Northern and Eastern Theaters respectively and have important sea lanes, they are not comparable to those of the South China Sea in strategic vitality.

Second, Chinese analysts also regard the South China Sea as the ideal site to deploy China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In comparison with the land-based nuclear deterrent, its sea-based counterpart is believed to be more credible because it is more concealed and more likely to survive the first nuclear strike. The deeper these “boomers” dive in the ocean within their safe limit, the more concealed they are against the opponent’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

The average depth of the Yellow Sea is only 40 meters—too shallow to conceal China’s SSBNs. The average depth of the East China Sea is 350 meters, and it can be as deep as 2,000 meters near the Okinawa Trough. Such a depth is quite appropriate for SSBN deployment. The numerous shore-based air and naval bases of the PLAN’s Eastern Theater can also offer protection for SSBNs. However, the Yellow Sea’s proximity to Japanese and U.S. bases and their effective ASW capabilities make the area unsuitable for SSBN patrols. These capabilities, for instance, can diminish the credibility of China’s SSBNs by keeping them exposed and vulnerable. In comparison, the average depth of the South China Sea is 1,200 meters. The countries that form the first island chain are relatively weak and do not possess highly capable ASW platforms against Chinese submarines. In comparison with the Yellow and East China Seas, South China Sea is clearly a more secure site to deploy China’s sea-based, retaliatory nuclear capabilities (The Paper, July 21, 2016).

Chinese analysts also believe that South China Sea is deep, wide and open enough to accommodate PLAN’s heavy surface warships. Besides its relative depth, South China Sea encompasses an area of around 3.56 million square kilometers. The sea is also quite open to transit into and out of the Western Pacific because the countries that constitute the first island chain lack effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and naval blockade capabilities over the transit straits. [6] In comparison, the Yellow and East China Seas are much smaller in scope, covering 380,000 square kilometers and 770,000 square kilometers respectively. These seas are generally narrow and partially enclosed. The transit straits to the Western Pacific, for instance, are closely monitored by the robust ISR capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in peace time and can be effectively blocked by JMSDF in times of crisis and war.

New thinking in the PLA about how to conduct operations may also shed light on why the PLAN regards South China Sea as an ideal site for its operations. PLA operations, for instance, are now guided by the new concept of “information system-based system of systems operations”, which highlights the integration of various service forces into a PLA “system of systems” capable of multi-spatial and variable distance deployment and presence. [7] Latterly networked and enhanced by a common information system or C4ISR architecture, this operations system should achieve battlefield transparency-based “information superiority,” which allows for synchronized, parallel operations by multi-service forces, thus enabling “battlefield initiative” against the opponent. [8]

Reflected in the maritime domain, this concept may explain the PLA’s ambitious effort to develop its maritime operations system of systems by constructing and deploying a large number of major sur-
face ships, including aircraft carriers. PLA analysts believe that a carrier-based battle group is an ideal maritime operations system of systems. With escorts such as guided missile destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines, this system of systems is capable of air operations, surface strikes, submarine and ASW warfare, and anti-missile defense, and electronic and cyber warfare. If well integrated by a common information system, all individual weapons platforms together can not only constitute operational synergy against the opponent but also offer support and protection to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities. [9]

An isolated surface ship or submarine, for instance, may be vulnerable to air, missile and submarine attacks. However, if integrated into a carrier-based system of systems, this vulnerability may be reduced. An aircraft carrier, for instance, provides air capabilities that can compete for air superiority and provide air cover for surface operations. These air capabilities can also be deployed against the opponent’s air ASW capabilities, thus protecting one’s own submarine operations. Moreover, a carrier’s air ASW capabilities can be deployed against the opponent’s submarines, thus providing protection for one’s own surface ships and submarines. In the meantime, the surface and subsurface escorts of the battle group can work to reduce the vulnerability of the carrier itself. The deep, wide and open South China Sea is an ideal operational space for its expanding surface fleet. An isolated surface ship or submarine may be vulnerable to air attacks, but an aircraft carrier can provide air cover, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the carrier itself.

Major Challenges

Appointing a naval officer to command the Southern Theater has also presented major challenges. The appointment is currently based on the institutional lens of the PLA, which regards South China Sea as a maritime arena of strategic and military competition for “gaining control and initiative,” particularly in the worst case scenarios of crisis and war. Such a narrow institutional lens may be a major driver for activities such as the building of artificial islands in Spratlys and constructing and upgrading of facilities in Spratlys and Paracels. These activities have already caused alarm among China’s maritime neighbors in Southeast Asia and triggered U.S. countermeasures such as freedom of navigation operations. The increased tension clearly contradicts China’s foreign policy goal of creating a benign external environment for the continued development of China’s economy. Mitigating the narrow institutional perspective of the military by strengthening civilian control of foreign policy has apparently become a major challenge for China’s leadership.

Finally, the dominance of a theater command by naval officers is unprecedented in PLA history (the Paper, March 27). In addition to ADM Yuan, other senior theater commands from the navy include South Sea Fleet Commander Wang Hai who also serves as deputy commander of the Theater, and Rear Admiral Dong Jun, deputy commander who possibly acts as chief of staff of the Southern Theater Command. This may cause discontent among PLAAF and PLAA officers, and heighten inter-service rivalry. There is, therefore, a need to integrate these services into the primary missions of the Theater Command to alleviate the prospect of such a rivalry.

PLAAF has already been conducting long-range patrols of Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal with H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighter-bombers, air-refueling tankers and early-warning and reconnaissance aircraft (Xinhuanet, August 6, 2016). However, integrating PLAA into primary missions of the Southern Theater may be more difficult. Southern Theater Army headquarters is located in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi province, indicating that the theater’s army forces are primarily deployed to handle contingencies on the land borders with Vietnam and Burma. [11] At the strategic level, this deployment can generate pressure or diversion from the land flank if China’s dispute with Vietnam over reefs in the South China Sea escalates. Integrating the theater army forces at the operational level may prove to be a major challenge for the Theater Command’s commanding officers.

Conclusion

Appointing a naval officer to command a theater in unprecedented in PLA history, further confirming the shift of China’s military posture from continental defense to maritime security. Moreover, ADM Yuan’s position as commander of the Southern Theater Command indicates the relative importance of South China Sea in the eyes of the PLA, particularly as a suitable bastion for its growing SSBN force and as an ideal operational space for its expanding surface fleet.

Notes


4. Ibid

5. Conversations with Chinese naval analysts in Beijing in August 2016

6. Ibid


8. See Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era.”


10. For Yuan’s nuclear submarine background, see citation of Yuan in “Chinese Nuclear Submarines Sets Sail from Here”, Xinhuanet, October 27, 2013.

11. For an exercise by Southern Theater’s army forces on Sino-Burmese border, see “PLA Conducts Live Fire Exercise on Sino-Burmese Border”, *Global Times*, March 29, 2017.

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Interview: Saman Zia-Zarifi, Regional Director of ICJ Asia & the Pacific, designated Secretary General of ICJ

Saman Zia-Zarifi, Regional Director Asia & Pacific at the ICJ, was born and raised in Tehran, Iran. He completed a BA from Cornell University in 1990 and a Juris Doctor from Cornell Law School in 1993, and later an LL.M. in Public International Law from New York University School of Law in 1997. Before his current position, he served as deputy director for Human Rights Watch’s Asia division from 2000 onwards, and as Amnesty International’s director for Asia and the Pacific from 2008 to 2012. Mr. Zarifi has recently been appointed to serve as ICJ’s next Secretary General, starting from April 2017.

ICJ, the International Commission of Jurists, works to promote and protect human rights through the rule of law. To achieve this, it aims to ensure the development and implementation of international human rights, secure the realization of all rights, safeguard the principle of separation of power, and guarantee the independence of the judiciary and legal profession.

**Key Interview Takeaways:**

- The international legal framework for human rights and rule of law is *under high pressure worldwide*. Trump, Duterte, and others are questioning and rejecting the very notion of rule of law as well as the necessity for human rights. A great challenge is arising for the human rights community, as well as the necessity for human rights. A great challenge is arising for the human rights community, as
- **Asian countries are especially resistant to the applicability of the international framework.** However, strong institutions of the rule of law foster much-needed sustainable economic growth and development
- **Southeast Asia is Asia’s biggest disappointment:** it should be doing a lot better in terms of international law and national development, and would strongly benefit from freer societies
- **Strengthening institutions of the rule of law, ensuring their independence, and developing robust regional institutions** should be key policy priorities for Southeast Asian countries
- Globalization has had some very beneficial effects, but also important drawbacks. Fortunately, those can be contained through strong institutions and an international framework that establishes strict accountability, serves justice, and fights impunity
- The international framework has caused great advances in human rights, but today’s rising skepticism could be attributed to the human rights community’s failure to successfully communicate its achievements

Q: Thank you for being here with us today, Mr. Zarifi. Could you start the interview by giving us a brief overview of your personal background? We are particularly interested in learning the reasons that awakened your interest in human rights and rule of law.

I was born and raised in Iran before the Islamic Revolution, in a family that was very politically active, and nearly always on the wrong side of the government. Unsurprisingly, many family members had to spend time in jail, or live in exile for several decades. During my childhood, Iran was ruled as a monarchy, organized around a government backed by the West, and a draconian and ruthless secret service trained mainly by the CIA. The Iranian secret service was notorious for its ruthlessness, and its indifference towards human rights. As a matter of fact, my own uncle was jailed at the time, his situation giving rise to a prominent international case, making him an Amnesty International prisoner of conscience. Similarly, he was also included in a study conducted by ICJ, on torture and unfair trials in Iran. Notwithstanding this international pressure, my uncle was eventually taken out of prison and executed, as was common with political opposition in those days. This left a very strong impression on me as a person, and I realized that I was living in a world replete with human rights abuses, characterized by strong limitations on political and civil freedoms. In reaction to this, I witnessed on the one hand domestic pressures from ordinary people to have their rights respected and justice served, and on the other hand efforts from international organizations and international law. Unfortunately, regardless of their moral and ethical significance, most of these efforts did not bear any immediate results. Very soon, my family and I had to live through the 1979 Revolution, of which we were very supportive because it held a promise of change and justice. Sadly, as is customary with revolutions, the country was taken over by the most radical political faction, and declared an Islamic Republic. Many people supportive of the revolution were left disappointed, and placed once again under heavy pressure and control. Demands for justice were basically perverted into justification for oppression.

My teenage years coincided with the war against Iraq, which began in 1980. It was essentially one of the last old-fashioned inter-state military conflicts, with two armies taking each other on head first. My family and I experienced nightly bombardments of Tehran, and constant shooting, which in retrospect must have been a traumatic experience. However, it was just a part of our lives at that point, and to be fair it was actually pretty exciting. My friends and I were able to identify every single plane that we saw. At that age, given the circumstances that characterized my daily life, I realized the importance of international standards not only for how governments should treat their own people, but also how they should behave when they are fighting. Many of my friends and family were drawn into the war, and subjected to clear violations of the laws of war by the Iraqis and their chemical weapons for instance, and also by the Iranian government and its human wave warfare tactics.

I left Iran for the USA when I was 15, and studied to become a lawyer. My upbringing left me very much aware of all the atrocities going on in the world, and therefore my feeling was that I, as a lawyer, had the responsibility to fight this. If I didn’t start fighting for it, who else would?
Q: Which global and regional contemporary challenges and trends do you believe most highlight the importance of organizations such as ICJ, and justify their efforts?

I believe that there are three global developments that affect our work in human rights, which I will discuss in descending order of historical magnitude. First and foremost, the post-World War II period is known for its development of an international human rights legal framework. The legal framework set into motion a wave of positive human rights developments that stretch all the way to the present day, but it is currently facing its greatest challenge since WWII. We must never forget what an extraordinary accomplishment this is. Governments agreeing to a common set of principles on how people should be treated, and committing to the notions of equality and prohibition of discrimination, represented a globally unprecedented step forward, which paved the way for today’s human rights environment. Organizations such as ICJ, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, which I have all worked with, were deeply involved in the development of the international framework.

The second development is the turn that took place in the last two decades, following the narrative of governments after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. In fact, terrorists’ use of attacks on civilians to goad state actors, and particularly the most powerful state (the US), into abandoning their own values, was very successful. The fact that the US declared a global war on terror, not terrorism, combined with its military and geopolitical responses, was in many ways exactly what the terrorists wanted. Terrorists, of which I saw many up close in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, clearly committed atrocities and violated the laws of war and human rights. The reason behind it though, is because they were seeking to provoke horrible retaliations, in order to create a narrative of equality, and generate some false legitimacy as to why they needed to resort to brutality. From this perspective, the terrorists’ strategy has been extremely successful. This second wide-scale wave of change in terms of human rights caused some sort of a career change for myself. At the time, I had been a corporate lawyer, then an academic, and I had just begun working with Human Rights Watch on issues of academic freedom and globalization. On September 11th, 2001, I was working in our Human Rights Watch office, located in the Empire State Building. It was an early morning and one of my colleagues suddenly ran into my office saying that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. Our office had a clear view on the WTC, and the day was very clear, beautiful in fact. At that point I saw one of the two towers on fire, and watched as the second plane hit the other tower. Obviously, it was not a random accident. During my hectic run home, the two towers fell, marking the most shocking and horrifying level of terrorist brutality in our modern world.

A few weeks after the attacks, my career track took a twist, and I was deployed to Pakistan on the Afghan border, after which I ended up spending quite some time in Afghanistan. At that time, the global war on terror turned to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places such as India, Southern Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. A lot of my work immediately after 9/11 focused on ensuring that the existing international legal framework for human rights would achieve two goals. Firstly, it needed to address and contain the abuses, atrocities, and savagery committed by the terrorists, of which there was absolutely no doubt when for instance experiencing what the Taliban had done in Afghanistan. However, there was strong doubt whether international law could handle these kinds of actors. In my opinion, the response to terrorism should have been to provide more justice and better law enforcement. Unfortunately, many governments’ response echoed the US’ decisions to not follow the law. Accordingly, international consensuses were abandoned in favor of a notion that state security should be protected at all costs — even at the cost of human rights. The most striking example was the abnegation of the international consensus on torture, replaced by governments’ new-found justification for torture, illegal retention, arbitrary arrests, and other violations. Quite infamously, this led to the creation of closed-door torture centers such as Guantanamo Bay.

Consequently, the second part of my work and of most of the human rights community, was focused on addressing abuses and atrocities perpetrated by terrorists, while at the same time fighting for the respect of international laws by making sure that governments themselves did not violate them. Personally, a lot of my work in that area consisted of monitoring what the US was doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. I was one of the first international observers (there were four of us) monitoring the first trial at Guantanamo, which I have to say was one of the most depressing moments from my experience as an American lawyer. The tribunal in Guantanamo really bore no resemblance to the rule of law, it was more of a parody, a perversion of American justice. Hence, the process was absolutely worthless in terms of providing justice or accountability, but very effective in terms of supporting the narrative of terrorists that their actions are justified.

The third and final wave that has important ramifications on human rights is the most recent wave of populism. People like Duterte in the Philippines and Trump in the US are clearly asserting that they will torture if they need to, despite international laws, because they want to catch “the bad guys”. This represents an unprecedented questioning and rejection of the very notion of rule of law and of the rule for human rights. At least after 9/11, there was still a hint of hypocrisy in what governments were doing, in the sense that they rhetorically assured people that they were following the laws, even though in practice it was different. The particularly alarming aspect of today’s situation is that it is not based on a real threat, but rather on pure fear mongering and cynical electoral calculus. For instance, in the Philippines, the government has provided no evidence that its drug war is actually fighting a real problem, or that the extent of brutality has any effect on the threats that allegedly justify it. This represents a new and important challenge for the international human rights movement, one for which we don’t have a response yet.
Q: What would you say have been ICJ’s biggest accomplishments, and the main challenges or difficulties that it has faced during your time as a regional director?

The ICJ was established in 1952, as one of the first big international human rights organizations. Its creation was coincident with the drive towards establishing an international human rights legal framework that characterized the post-WWII period. ICJ played an important role in this process, establishing international norms, the treaty language, and so on. Furthermore, the ICJ was also instrumental in the notion that these laws should actually be applied to concrete situations, by holding certain events to an international standard. This was very novel, as there was a strong notion that state sovereignty shielded any degree of international involvement or engagement. ICJ proudly embraces this heritage.

During my five years as a regional director for ICJ, I would say that the largest challenge has been to get Asian countries to accept the applicability of the international legal framework. There used to be bizarre claims that Asia was exempted from international human rights, justified by a notion of Asian values. However, these Asian values are a construct, used as an excuse by governments abusing their own people. This model has since made space for a more cynical calculation, which has been called the Chinese model, or the Singapore model. The idea is that Asian governments will provide economic development in exchange for a limitation on their population’s civil and political rights. That is a highly sub-optimal trade-off though, because other Asian countries that have done very well, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, provided strong economic growth alongside civil rights. Even though China’s economic development has been exceptional, it came after a process of liberalization and improvements in civil and political rights. In the end, this is exactly what the ICJ is doing: fighting governments who justify their oppression on the basis of economic development, or some cultural aspect.

Q: Do you think that countries’ economic development would be higher if they incorporated more civil and political rights? For instance, despite China’s impressive growth, do you believe that it could grow/have grown faster, had it incorporated more civil and political rights early on?

The establishment of strong institutions of the rule of law always helps to foster sustainable economic development. It is definitely possible for countries to experience unsustainable short-term economic growth, but to experience sustainable and long-term growth, they need strong and accountable institutions of the rule of law that minimize inequalities caused by short-term growth. Rule of law incorporates within it a notion of respect for human life, dignity, equality, and lack of discrimination, which are the pillars of the international human rights framework. Both intellectually and empirically, there is no doubt that governments that can provide those pillars will do better, in a more sustainable and equitable way.

Q: What are your views and thoughts on the current and likely future state of rule of law and human rights in Asia? Is there a wide degree of inter-country divergence? Which areas of human rights and rule of law do you think are the most worrisome?

Governments in Asia are doubting, in an unprecedented way, the very necessity of the rule of law, which constitutes a serious threat and challenge. For instance, President Duterte of the Philippines openly asserts “To hell with human rights”, saying that he would just kill people, forsaking any of the commitments that the Philippines has previously made. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen made it clear that he wouldn’t listen to what anybody has to say, which he has been doing more boldly in the last few months.

To separate out the Asian region a bit, Southeast Asia has seen substantial economic development, and if you take a 40 or 50-year view, also witnessed tremendous improvements in people’s lives. However, when looking back over the last 10 years, it’s clear that some human rights developments have actually plateaued or even been eroded in many countries. Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines for instance are countries that really slid. Places like Cambodia and Vietnam, where we had hoped to see far more development, are now frozen and perhaps even sliding as well. Because of what is happening in the world right now, and because of rhetorical statements from world powers like the US and now China and Russia, an environment is created where local authoritarian figures feel emboldened to disregard the international framework.

Other parts of Asia are more complicated. North-East Asia, with Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, is in a slightly different trajectory, and there haven’t been as worrisome developments. South Asia really struggles, and India is at the core of it. The Indian government has articulated some rhetoric that is problematic and discriminatory, but Indian civil society and Indian institutions have shown themselves to be quite robust. Sri Lanka and Nepal have shown themselves to have civil society and institutions, especially judiciaries that can fight back. Even in Pakistan and Bangladesh we still see a struggle – so there is hope.

The real disappointment in the region is Southeast Asia, because it should be doing a lot better in terms of both international law and national development. Countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, would strongly benefit from freer societies especially given the incredible emphasis on the digital world and modern forms of communication. These are by nature areas of economic activity that require openness and protection instead of more restrictions on freedom of expression. We need Southeast Asia to lead the way given its economic development, but it’s actually falling back on old strategies that suggest governments that are afraid of their populations, trying to control them instead of helping them grow and develop.
Q: Based on your assessment, what would you say are the main policy priorities in Asia to move in the right direction?

At a macro level of development, naturally my main priority is to strengthen institutions for the rule of law. Within Asian countries we see, if I may generalize, very weak rule of law and this has a clear economic impact in terms of both foreign investments and local economic development. By and large, Asian judiciaries are heavily constrained and under pressure from political authorities, which is a problem. Where Asia also lags is in the development of proper regional institutions. If you compare it with any other region in the world, Asia is really the glaring exception to the development of regional institutions that can handle both the economy and human rights - two aspects closely linked. Inter-ASEAN trade is clearly growing, and represents a source of development for the region and for the world, but ASEAN as an institution has done very little to address the predictable problems that would come with inter-ASEAN economic development. In short, people have no effective means of seeking cross-border accountability. Of course, outside of ASEAN South Asia has at best a rudimentary system, and the rest of Asia doesn’t really have anything. The development of those robust institutions is the most important policy commitment that governments in the region could and should make.

Q: In a world, and especially an Asian continent, increasingly shaped by capitalism and globalization, where do you see specific threats with regard to rule of law and more particularly, human rights? How does big business fit in the picture?

One of the central pillars of the ICJ’s work over the past few decades has been the notion that all rights are interconnected. I’ve talked a lot about civil and political rights but in fact a lot of the work done by the ICJ is on economic, social, and cultural rights. When we talk about globalization, there are many aspects which are in fact quite positive. A sizeable part of that is the development of an international legal framework for human rights. Globalization has also had a lot to do with many modern-day advances in terms of quality of life, drops in overall poverty, drops in maternal and infant mortality, and increases in education especially for girls. However, what globalization has also enabled, and what many people mean when complaining about globalization, is the ability of non-state actors to navigate the international framework to their own advantage without accountability. For instance, there are multinational corporations whose budget and influence dwarf that of nation states, and who pervert and/or influence national policies for their own benefit, purely for the profit of their shareholders.

There is clear empirical data on the rise in inequality, especially over the past thirty years, which really encapsulates the problems of globalization. We have seen the 1% who are reaping a much higher percentage of economic development benefits than the rest of the world. That is clearly unsustainable and a lot of the political populism that we are seeing around the world is driven by the public’s anger and resentment regarding that kind of inequality and unequal economic development. The most frustrating is that right now, the very same forces that benefited from globalization (the so-called 1%, or elites), have managed to turn that public anger against classic scapegoats: foreigners, immigrants, and the most marginalized. This is a classic deflection strategy. Whether it’s in Malaysia, the US, or Europe, people who say they are angry and fearful about immigrants clearly don’t seem to be taking into account the economic benefits that they bring, while also not challenging the perversion of justice and the weakness of institutions of the rule of law that let very powerful and wealthy corporations or individuals get away with corruption and the violation of national policies. That is why ICJ is working at a global level to develop an international agreement that would impose accountability on for-profit entities and corporations for the violation of human rights.

Clearly, individual nation states are no longer able to monitor these transnational entities and hold them accountable, which is why a global framework is needed. A regional framework for Asia, and ASEAN is also needed, as academics and civil society increasingly acknowledge that growing human rights abuses connected to cross-border investments by ASEAN entities need to be addressed. Right now though, there are no mechanisms to hold those entities to account, which is completely unsustainable, since it will cause both political and human rights problems.

Q: Do you believe ASEAN and its Human Rights Declaration have had a positive impact on the state of human rights in Asia? The Rohingya case, or the Philippines’ current war on drugs (with re-instatement of the death penalty) for example, tell a very different story. Do you believe a supranational institution such as ASEAN has the potential to shape the human rights and rule of law landscape of its member countries?

The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was a tremendously disappointing development. The hope was that such a regional system would be stronger than international mechanisms because there is greater proximity with each of the individual countries. The ten countries that make up ASEAN could have decided that because they have more in common, they should come up with a system that will do more to support human rights. Instead, what resulted was a declaration far below the existing international commitments that these individual governments had already made. Some hugely problematic provisions are formulated in the declaration, and especially its preamble statements, such as the suggestion that rights can be balanced against obligation. A few people assert that even this declaration is better than nothing, that it suggests there is at least some commitment to human rights in ASEAN. However, as a lawyer, I have to point out that from an intellectual point of view, that is not true. This declaration is actually worse than no declaration, because it seems to be an attempt to erode existing and applicable international standards, which were pretty clear. From a practical point of view, which might be even more important, the declaration has in no way led to rhetorical or actual improvements in terms of the respect, protection, and promotion of human rights in the ASEAN region. Most of the very serious human rights crises faced by ASEAN in the past few years have not even included a single reference to the human rights declaration. Whether it’s the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the more general immigration problems linked to the Rohingya, the fighting in Southern Thailand, or the current extra-judicial killings in the Philippines, it’s like the declaration is non-existent since no government has had any recourse to it. This represents a wasted opportunity, and it will take years before ASEAN
governments will finally agree on a better and more sensible declaration for human rights. The ICJ is attempting to smoothen and speed up this process.

Nevertheless, ASEAN has a clear potential to shape the human rights and rule of law landscape of its member countries. In fact, it’s the only player that can help positively address predictable human rights abuses that come with regional economic development. On the few occasions where ASEAN has acted, some countries have benefited, Myanmar being the prime example. Many more countries would benefit, especially ones that still face real problems in terms of armed conflict. However, it is not very clear whether ASEAN’s member states have fully committed to regional integration as in practice, ASEAN itself is built upon very weak institutions, with a very small secretariat. For instance, ASEAN’s inter-governmental Human Rights Commission has very little staff, of which only a small portion is properly trained, with a limited amount of proper human rights experts. However, ASEAN is the only regional institution with large potential, which explains why the ICJ is absolutely committed to working closely together with ASEAN until member states actually commit themselves to the regional institution.

The cynical part is that ASEAN member states and the secretariat itself continually claim that there is a certain consensus according to which ASEAN governments will not interfere with the sovereignty of other member states. Of course, that is absolute nonsense, since these governments interfere in each other’s sovereignty all the time when they have to. When haze from Indonesia comes across into Singapore, the Singaporean government not only complains very bitterly, but also imposes economic sanctions on companies that are involved. This is a very cynical, shortsighted, and ultimately counterproductive approach by ASEAN governments.

Q: As future secretary-general of ICJ, are there any projects that you look forward to getting started, or give priority to? How do you plan to leave your mark on the organization?

It’s a huge challenge and clearly an honor to be the next secretary general of the ICJ. Personally, it’s a really big deal for me since the ICJ was an organization that I grew up with, an organization of foreigners that were interested in Iranians and Iran, and wanted to help us fight against a very powerful and nasty government. Of course, I feel a very personal connection with the organization, so I am extremely happy to have been promoted secretary-general. I’m the first American and definitely the first Iranian-American to become secretary general, during a very interesting point in time. Indeed, at a strategic level, my main challenge as well as ICJ’s, is to respond to the threat imposed in part by the current US administration which rallies against the rule of law and human rights. This challenge is unprecedented, as the very notions of international rule of law and human rights are being questioned. ICJ and the international human rights community will need to fight back really hard.

For me, part of this will entail explaining that the international framework has actually resulted in many huge advances, that in many aspects respect for human rights and human rights laws have improved people’s lives. Every person should understand that the very real problems created by globalization require a global response, and that retreating into short-sighted myopic nationalism and jingoism will provoke the empowerment of all the worst parts of globalization, while destroying the very important benefits that have been brought by it (that is at a strategic level). There are also two additional operational projects that surround ICJ’s work. The first is to fight for global and regional commitment to the notion that sound rule of law is a key ingredient to sustainable development. Thankfully, the UN’s SDGs and specifically SDG 16 finally emphasize the importance for sustainable development of the rule of law and therefore the respect of human rights.

The second overarching theme in ICJ’s work is the global push for accountability, and the fight against impunity. The ICJ has spent the last 60-plus years developing international law to nurture the acceptance of accountability. If there is a violation, the people whose rights have been violated are entitled to a remedy and they’re entitled to justice. Perpetrators should be held to account in proper trials. Simply getting that acceptance on a global scale has been a major accomplishment, and now ICJ is in a stage of further effort in which it will hopefully also lead the way. Basically, if a major human rights violation takes place, for instance if there is an extra-judicial killing or an enforced disappearance, international law demands that the government(s) involved properly investigates and brings to account the perpetrators. However, usually governments will just say “oh we’re investigating it” and that will be the end of the story, without any actual investigation, any actual justice, or any accountability. Right now, a large part of what the ICJ is working on around the world, is the creation of some basic standards that capture global best practices, and the provision of training and assistance to interested governments about what a proper investigation and real accountability actually look like. Some of it is very prosaic, for instance if a government says it’s investigating an extra-judicial killing, they should be looking at closed-circuit TV recordings, phone calls between the victims, phone calls by the suspects, etc. These are tactics that have been developed in national courts, and are being increasingly used at international criminal tribunals. We also hope to foster such standards at the national and regional rule of law levels. Overall, my personal hope is to mount a more vocal and robust defense of the global rule of law to fight for its importance in terms of sustainable development, and to push for real accountability, and real justice.

Q: Looking back at your long-standing career in human rights and rule of law, would you say that today’s environment is in better or worse shape than when you started?

We’re living in a very interesting point in time when it comes to international human rights, because looking back at the beginning of the international legal framework, there have been massive improvements after WWII. We’ve mentioned improvements in terms of poverty, public health, standards for government con-
duct, and so on. Furthermore, for the first time in history, the Western hemisphere is characterized by a lack of armed conflict, both transboundary and internal. That is an astonishing development. Even in Asia where there have been serious conflicts, their intensity and violence has dropped. No large armies are fighting each other anymore, and that is a big step forward, achieved thanks to the global rule of law framework. Yet, despite all of this there is huge skepticism towards the value of international law and global rule of law. In my opinion, that is being driven by very cynical political calculations of people who in part want to weaken the rule of law for their own benefit – be it political or economic. Maybe the rising skepticism can also be explained by the failure of the international human rights community to clearly highlight its achievements. We tend to focus solely on disasters, of which there are a lot to talk about. We cannot stop talking about Syria, Yemen, North Korea, and Iraq, and don’t misunderstand me, we should not stop talking about them. But I believe sometimes we should also let people know that some real improvements are being made. As I take the position of secretary general for ICJ, I think it is becoming an urgent necessity to debate within the international human rights community about how we should best communicate with the world. I’m not sure that we are doing this in the most efficient way, as our reports tend to be long legal discussions. There’s a need for that, but there’s also need for other kinds of communication. Taking a step back, what we should be communicating to the people of the world in simple words, is the real value of international human rights.

Q: To wrap up our interview, what do you think it takes to build a successful career in the field of human rights and rule of law? Accordingly, what would be your top recommendations for young people?

The field of human rights has become much more professional than when I started. You can get a degree in human rights law now, and for students interested in human rights, this is very important. But it’s also important to point out that a degree in human rights does not necessarily give you the full picture. For instance, activists involved in the labor movement, environmental rights, land rights, and indigenous rights are also human rights defenders, even though they don’t per se have a human rights background or training. It's important to remember that human rights careers are not reserved for people lucky enough to afford a university degree. People interested in human rights should be able to engage in it and support it across a range of different methods. Of course, training in human rights is very important, which is why it's great to have specialized university degrees, but as important is expertise in a particular thematic or geographic area. At the end of the day, our work relies on a sound analysis of human rights problems, and sound recommendations on how to fix them. It’s not enough to just highlight the problems, we have to offer solutions. That is why you either need to be an expert in a particular field, public health or labor for instance, or you have to be an expert in a particular geographical area. And that expertise can come from the lived experience of civil society facing those human rights challenges, or from human rights activists who have properly listened to and learned from the rights-holders and can offer some technical expertise in support of their needs and demands.

In a nutshell, what it means is that you don’t necessarily need a degree in human rights to do human rights work. In fact, some of our best human rights professionals don’t come from such a background. If you’re not directly from an affected community, then when you’re starting, the most crucial thing is to go and meet those people whose rights are being violated. Human rights is not a place for office work, or clean hands. To get somewhere and become a useful human rights activist or professional, you should always focus on working as closely as you can with people whose rights you’re trying to protect. And that means going out into affected communities, going to the factories, going to the fisheries, working with sex workers, trans-genders, minorities. This is crucial not only for your personal development, but it’s also what employers are looking for. We see a lot of people these days coming out of university programs with a degree, but in-the-field experience is minimal. What we, as employers, really want to see is people who are 100% committed to this field, and who show that commitment by practically working in defense of human rights. Of course, there are millions of people around the world who support human rights by campaigning, or donating, or protesting, or simply caring enough to read and care about people facing a difficult time. But having a career in defense of human rights is more than just a profession or just doing what makes you feel good, it’s a life choice and you have to really live it.

This interview was conducted by Siri Luther, Project Assistant at CPG.
Interview with Moden Yi from Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE) Cambodia

Moden Yi has been working with APLE Cambodia for over ten years and has worked together with the CPG several times over the past years. He has great experience in combatting child pornography and does so inside a country where NGO work can be particularly difficult. After a recent CPG workshop he attended, we sat down with him for a short interview for our readership.

Q: Could you tell our readers something about the work you do with APLE and what areas you focus on?

My name is Moden Yi, known as Dan, and I am working for Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE) an organisation that primarily fights sexual child abuse online as well as offline. Our work focuses on providing crucial help and support to sexually abused children. In order to achieve this, our work is divided into four different programmes.

The first one is criminal justice development. With it, we help and assist the police force, for example with special training for everyone who is involved here. The second programme is the court support programme, which supports the victims in legal matters. We offer, for instance, free legal support. The third programme is a community engagement programme. In this programme, our purpose is to help the Cambodian society to deal with the topic of child protection. This programme itself is subdivided into three parts: awareness training, networking and online reporting. This means we are organising awareness-sessions and training courses to key stakeholders, local authorities, police officers and key community members. These are key figures who need basic knowledge about child protection which they then pass on to the community. For the networking part, we have our own team as well as volunteer informants. The volunteer informants give us information whenever they see something noticeable or hear about suspect cases. We have more than a hundred of these informants in Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Battambang. They are the eyes and ears of APLE. After we receive information, the criminal justice team will travel to the province in question, inform the police there and support them to investigate the case. For the internet reporting, we have an online reporting platform which you can contact when you find child exploitation materials online. If you send us the link, we use the international system “ICAM” to get the IP address and other information like who is the owner of the website or who is the uploader of the material. We will give the information to the respective law enforcement agency, but our main purpose is to take down the website or the material on the website. The final program is advocacy and research which is about developing new laws or amending existing laws to make them more effective.

Q: What changes have you seen in the last few years? Are numbers of cases increasing or decreasing? Are the offenders more careful? Do you notice a difference in Cambodian society?

I have seen a lot of changes over the last few years. APLE is working with the police and government since 2003 and personally, I started to work with APLE in 2006. Before my time at APLE I worked in different restaurants, hotels and guesthouses. There, I saw almost every day that tourists were going in and out with local children. We reported this to the owner of the business, because at this time, as working staff of the business, our hands were tied and we could not do anything else. However, the owners did not care, they just wanted to make money. They said: “That is their business, not my business. My business is to get the money from the customers, take care of them, it is fine.” Furthermore, the law enforcement was terrible. For example, the Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department did not even believe that child abuse was happening to male children. The hospitals conducted no medical examination for abused boys. Only after they started working with us, they realised the importance of protecting children and that we can help them.

Nowadays this is much improved. In addition to the police, we are working with more law enforcement as well as the Ministry of Interior. In 2007 for example, there was a case involving a Russian billionaire who abused more than 20 children. He bought motorbikes, cars, land and houses for the children to keep them quiet. It was with this huge case that particularly the police cooperation started to become really good.

Changes regarding the overall situation of child abuse in Cambodia are hard to gauge. Based on our database I can say the number of investigation cases is decreasing but we do not have an official survey which is why the numbers may be biased or incomplete. We simply do not know if the number of investigated cases is really decreasing because we are seeing less abuse, or the offenders moved into the shadows more or are using new techniques which makes them harder to identify and prosecute. For example, in Sihanoukville the number of cases is so small today, that we started to reduce our staff there.

Q: In Cambodia today, opposition lawmakers as well as activists are facing huge headwinds. Can you make any comments on this or whether or not this climate negatively affects your work?

I am not in a position to comment on the persecution of opposition lawmakers and activists in Cambodia. What I can say though, is one thing you have to know about Cambodia: the local authority still thinks that all NGOs are against the government. Therefore, they are very careful and apprehensive about it at times. For us however, we just want to protect the children.
The “Order of the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order 33/2560” of 4 July 2017 is a reaction to the unforeseen fall-out caused by the controversial June 23 “Royal Decree on Recruitment of Foreigner”. It grants a “grace period” of six months to both employers and employees to comply with the decree before they become subject to the harsh punishments it foresees. The English translation of Order 33/2560 below was provided by Natthanicha Aneksumboonphon, Krisdika Counsel, Professional Level, Office of the Council of State, under her own capacity.

ORDER OF THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PEACE AND ORDER
NO. 33/2560
RE: TEMPORARY MEASURES TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKING OF ALIENS

The promulgation of the Emergency Decree on Administration and Management of Working of Aliens B.E. 2560 is to allow the systematic administration and management and to overcome the obstacles of alien workers and establish labour, economic and social security of the country and, moreover, such Emergency Decree prescribes that employers and employees have duties to comply with the law and prescribes severe offences and penalties. The Government has no time to raise awareness and sufficient understanding to the public resulting in the public being alarmed and the household employers, SME business sector, and agricultural sector being affected. Therefore, in order to allow employers and employees including relevant competent officials to prepare and undertake in accordance with the law, for fairness and without an excessive effect on the economy and society by which the purposes of the administration and management of the working of aliens are maintained in accordance with the international standard whereby anti-trafficking in person measures are effectively maintained, it is necessary to have a temporary measure to overcome the obstacles in the administration and management of working of aliens under such Emergency Decree during the transitional period:

By virtue of section 265 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in conjunction with section 44 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim) B.E. 2557, the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order, with the approval of the National Council for Peace and Order, hereby issues the Order as follows:


Clause 2. Employers and aliens shall quickly undertake correct and complete acts in accordance with the Emergency Decree on Administration and Management of Working of Aliens B.E. 2560 and complete them before the 1st of January B.E. 2561 (2018). In this regard, it shall be in accordance with the rules, procedures and conditions as prescribed by the Minister of Labour.
In the case where it is necessary for an alien to travel out of the Kingdom to his or her origin country or return into the Kingdom for the purpose of undertaking an act correctly under paragraph one, such alien shall be exempted from any execution related to travelling into or out of the Kingdom under the law on immigration. In this regard, it shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures as temporarily prescribed by the Minister of Labour upon consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior and the Royal Thai Police.

Clause 3. No competent official or State official related to the execution of the law or this order shall abuse his or her position or act or fail to act under his or her position being prejudiced in favour of assets or other benefits in order to obtain assets or other benefits for himself or herself or other persons. In the case where it appears that an act of nonfeasance, negligence or omission of any competent official or State official has been committed, the Commander shall have the power to initiate a civil, criminal and administrative case against such competent official or State official expeditiously and strictly.

Clause 4. The Ministry of Labour shall complete to amend the law on the administration and management of working of aliens and submit it to the Council of Ministers within one hundred and twenty days as from the date this Order has come into force. This shall include the consideration of rules, procedures and conditions in the administration and management of working of aliens which are systematic and complied with the international standard for the purpose of anti-trafficking in persons and facilitation of the execution to the relevant persons in every sector and the Ministry of Labour shall submit, to the Prime Minister, a report of the performance result every month.

In considering the draft law under paragraph one and secondary laws issued under the Emergency Decree on Administration and Management of Working of Aliens B.E. 2560, the Ministry of Labour shall conduct public hearing of relevant persons and take those into consideration.

Clause 5. In the case where it is appropriate, the Prime Minister or Council of Ministers may propose to the National Council for Peace and Order to amend this Order.

Clause 6. This Order shall come into force from the 23rd of June B.E. 2560.

Given on the 4th of July B.E. 2560 (2017)

General Prayut Chan-O-Cha
Head of the National Council for Peace and Order
Bangkok’s own island – Ko Kret in the Chao Phraya River

Speaking about the “Kos”, or islands, in Thailand most people would imagine similar pictures: endless white beaches, crystal clear sea full of fish and tasty food and drinks directly on the beach. While this seems to be the ultimate definition of Thai islands – which is in fact not so far from reality in many cases – Ko Kret is probably the furthest you can get away from this typical Leonardo-DiCaprio-The-Beach-image.

It starts with the location: the surrounding water of Ko Kret does not contain any salt – it is located in the Chao Phraya River. This is why it is a perfect day trip from Bangkok as it is so close, although it already belongs to neighboring province Nonthaburi. Furthermore, it is a great opportunity to take a break from the traffic jams in Bangkok as there no cars on Ko Kret.

Although, getting around there is no problem at all – there is just one big ring road, or rather a ring path, which you can discover within three to four hours by walking. If you want to go a bit faster you can rent a bike for around 50 Baht or use a motorbike taxi. On your way you will come across several temples and small markets. In between those, you will feel like walking and exploring a distant, rural area in Thailand far away from the capital.

However, don’t forget to bring a big backpack for your shopping! Ko Kret is also called “pottery island” because the Mon minority living there is well known for their long-lasting handicraft pottery tradition – if you are looking for some souvenirs, which are really special and something completely different from all the night market products, you will find it here - at very reasonable prices! The same goes for food and drinks. And while you are there, make sure to try some traditional Mon style dishes.

How do you get there? The easiest way might be to book a day trip from one of the main tourist piers – but it will be much cheaper to do it on your own. If you want to go by yourself, the journey also starts at one of the piers taking the Chao Praya express boat to the very last pier, called Nonthaburi. Arriving there, make sure not to fall for the guides who will try to sell you a two hour boat tour for 600 Baht and they sometimes claim this is the only way to get to Ko Kret. Instead, take a taxi (going on taximeter should be no problem) to Pak Kred for around 100 Baht and don’t be surprised - it will take another 20 minutes and the driver will seem to go very far away from the river – it is not as close as it looks on most maps! He will also know where to drop you, if you tell them you want to go to “the island”. The last step is taking the ferry to Ko Kret for 2 Baht which is rather small and needs less than five minutes to get there. Lastly, don’t forget: Bring your sunscreen!
People

Jan Scheer is the new Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Economic Affairs at the German Embassy in Bangkok. We welcome him and his partner to Bangkok and wish them well! In his own words: Sawadee krap and Hello!

My name is Jan Scheer and I am the new Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Economic Affairs at the German Embassy in Bangkok. I have arrived in Bangkok together with my partner a couple of days ago. We have come from Berlin, where I have been working i.a. in the Human Resources Department and the Minister’s Office of the Federal Foreign Office. This is the first time that we’ll be living in Asia. Being avid scuba divers, we so far knew Thailand mostly below water, more than above water. We are overwhelmed by the warmth with which we have been welcomed here and by the atmosphere of this amazing city. I am very much looking forward to many exciting encounters and stimulating discussions with you. And I am looking forward to further expanding the many existing projects and initiatives as well as to initiating new ones.

We bid farewell to Dr. Peer Gebauer, outgoing Deputy Head of Mission at the German Embassy in Bangkok, is now returning to Berlin at the end of his tenure after three years in Thailand in which he successfully established and fostered diplomatic, business and friendship relations. We wish him all the best in his future post at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin and thank him for his great support of the work of CPG here in Bangkok. He stated: “It was a privilege and great pleasure to live and work in Thailand for these past three years. Germany and Thailand share a longstanding friendship and close partnership in many areas. We will especially remember the friendliness of the Thai people and the beauty of the country.”

Sonja Gebauer, outgoing Political Counsellor at the German Embassy in Bangkok is leaving Thailand and returning to Berlin. Sonja Gebauer has done outstanding work in Bangkok and has reached out to many actors in Thailand concerned with the constitutional and political process, such as the Constitutional Drafting Commission, Election Commission, the Parliament and many other state and non-state actors. CPG is delighted that it had the opportunity to work with her on many occasions and call her a friend and partner over the years. Farewell!

Bangkok welcomes H.E. Mr. Fernando Julio Antonio Quiros Campos the new Ambassador of the Republic of Peru to the Kingdom of Thailand.

Luc Stevens, UN Resident Coordinator since 2012 has ended his tenure in Bangkok after five years of service. His farewell event took place on the 6 June at the United Nations in Bangkok, including speakers H.E. Mr. Anutin Charnvirakul, Party Leader, Bhumjaithai Party, H.E. Mr.

ANNOUNCEMENTS
Abhisit Vejjiva, Party Leader, Democrat Party and H.E. Mr. Chaturon Chaisang, Party Executive, Phue Thai Party.

Prof. Dr. Worajet Pakeerut, Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University and CPG Supervisory Board member has been appointed to a full professorship at Thammasat’s Faculty of Law. Prof. Worajet has received his Magister Juris and Doctorate from Göttingen University in Germany. Among many publications Prof. Worajet published (in Thai): Administrative Law: General Principle (2011); Theories of the State and Principles of Public Law (2012); On Law and Ideology (2015).

Prof. Dr. Boonsri Mewongukote, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University has been awarded a CPG post-doc research scholarship to conduct research in Germany in May and June.

Dr. Warawit Kanithasen, Senior Research Fellow at CPG, has been awarded a CPG post-doc research scholarship to conduct research in Germany for May and June.

CPG Spring and Summer School Alumni Jintana Sakkulborirak has been selected for the YSEALI Academic Fellows Program and recently took part in a five-week institute in the United States.

Past Events

From 4 to 5 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICIRPL 2017: 19th International Conference on Intellectual Rights Protection Law” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/singapore/ICIRPL.

From 4 to 5 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICIPLDP 2017: 19th International Conference on Intellectual Property Law and Democratic Principles” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. More information is available at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/singapore/ICIPLDP.

From 4 to 5 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology held the “ICFJCLP 2017: 19th International Conference on Functions, Justifications of Criminal Law and Punishment” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. Details are found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/singapore/ICFJCLP.

From 5 to 6 May 2017, the Singapore 32nd International Conference was held on “Business, Economics, Social Science & Humanities- BESSH-2017” at the Hotel Grand Pacific, Singapore. Further information is to be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-singapore-may-05-06-2017/.

On 8 May 2017, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) hosted a lecture on “Making the Infrastructure Work – Information 4.0” at the Soi Goethe, Sathorn 1, Bangkok, Thailand. More information is available at https://www.daad.or.th/en/2017/04/03/making-the-infrastructure-work-information-4-0/.


On 15 May 2017, the German embassy of Thailand, the Ministry of Science and technology, the Ministry of Industry and the Federation of Thai industries in cooperation with others organized an event on “Industrie 4.0 in Thailand 4.0 - German-Thai Partnership for the Industry of Tomorrow” at the Dusit Thani Hotel, Bangkok. Details can be found at: http://www.industrie4thailand.com/.


From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICAJRE 2017: 19th International Conference on Administration of Justice and Reliable Evidence” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. More information can be found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICAJRE.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICAJE 2017: 19th International Conference on Administration of Justice and Law Enforcement” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Further information can be found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICAJE.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICAJL 2017: 19th International Conference on Administration of Justice and Law” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. More information is found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICAJL.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the “ICST 2017: 19th International Conference on Justice System and Transparency” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICST.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology arranged the “ICCSSPL 2017: 19th International Conference on Civil Society and Positive Law” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Further details are found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICCSSPL.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology arranged the “ICIRPL 2017: 19th International Conference on Administration of Justice and Evidence” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/05/kuala-lumpur/ICIRPL.

From 30 to 31 May 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology arranged the “ICJST 2017: 19th International Conference on Justice System and Transparency” at the Pacific Regency Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
On 8 June 2017, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Nakhon Sawan Administrative Court host a seminar on “Strengthening and Disseminating Knowledge about the Administrative Court, the Administrative Justice and Protection of People’s Rights in accordance with the New Constitution” at Chaophayathara Riverside Hotel, Chai Nat Province, Thailand. For more information please go to: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22755-1442-1-30.pdf?170601090702.

On 12 June 2017, the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute organized a seminar on the topic “Power Shift in Cambodia? - The Implications of the Commune Elections” at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. More details are found at https://www.iseadu.sg/events/upcoming-events/item/.

On 13 June 2017, the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute hosted a seminar on the topic “China’s ‘New Assertiveness’ and the Decline in East Asian Regionalism: Implications for ASEAN” at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. For more details please go to https://www.iseadu.sg/events/upcoming-events/item/.


From 12 to 14 June 2017, the ICTBEL organizes the “International Conference on Trade, Business, Economics and Law” at the University of Oxford, St Anne’s College, Oxford, United Kingdom. Details are available at http://www.flelearning.co.uk/a/fle-learning.co.uk/fle/ictbel.


On 20 June 2017, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Ubon Ratchathani Administrative Court host a seminar on “Strengthening and Disseminating Knowledge about the Administrative Court, the Administrative Justice and Protection of People’s Rights” at the Office of the Ubon Ratchathani District Primary Education Service Area 2, Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand. For more information please go to: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22755-1442-1-30.pdf?170601090702.

On 21 June 2017, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the regional administrative court host a seminar on “Strengthening and Disseminating Knowledge about the Administrative Court, the Administrative Justice and Protection of People’s Rights: Prevention and Remedy of the Administrative dispute” at the Grand Royal Plaza Hotel, Chachoengsao Province, Thailand. For more information please go to: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22757-1442-1-30.pdf?170601091830.

From 28 to 29 June 2017, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) will hold the International DIES-Conference “Female Leadership and Higher Education management in developing countries” at Hilton Hotel, Bonn, Germany. Details are available at https://www.daad.or.th/en/2017/03/13/international-dies-conference-on-gender-2017/.

On June 29 2017, the TOIndia Summer School on “Politics, Development and Social Change in Contemporary India” at the University of Turin, Turin, Italy. Further information can be found at http://www.to-asia.it/to-india/.

Upcoming Events

From 3 to 7 July 2017, the University of Turin will host the TOIndia Summer School on “Politics, Development and Social Change in Contemporary India” at the University of Turin, Turin, Italy. Further information can be found at http://www.to-asia.it/to-india/.

On 4 July 2017, the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) and the Hans Seidel Foundation will organize a seminar on “Local Self-Government in Thai-German Perspectives” at the Ariston Hotel, Bangkok. More information can be found at: http://www.cpg-online.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Agenda_LocalSelfGovernment_040717_new.pdf.

From 4 to 5 July 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will organize the “ICCLCCP 2017: 19th International Conference on Criminal Law, Crimes and Criminal Procedure” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/07/singapore/ICCLCCP.

From 4 to 5 July 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will organize the “ICHRSJ 2017: 19th International Conference on Human Rights, Security and Justice” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. For more information can be found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/07/singapore/ICHRSJ.

From 4 to 5 July 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will organize the “ICCS 2017: 19th International Conference on Chinese Studies” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. For more detailed information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/07/singapore/ICCS.

From 4 to 5 July 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will organize the “ICCRSCCP 2017: 19th International Conference on Critical Refugee Studies, Current and Common Problems” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. Further information can be found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/07/singapore/ICCRSCCP.

From 4 to 5 July 2017, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology will organize the “ICDH 2017: 19th International Conference on Critical Refugees, Security and Justice” at the Holiday Inn, Singapore. Further information can be found at https://www.waset.org/conference/2017/07/singapore/ICDH.
From 24 to 26 July 2017, the Indonesia Association of People with Disabilities will host the “Annual Training on Human Rights and Disabilities” in Jakarta, Indonesia. Further information is to be found at http://asef.org/projects/themes/governance/4190-annual-training-on-human-rights-and-disabilities.

From 24 to 26 July 2017, the AICLEF organizes the “3rd Academic International Conference on Law, Economics and Finance” at the University of Cambridge, Newnham College, Cambridge, United Kingdom. More information is to be found at http://www.flelearning.co.uk/a/flelearning.co.uk/fle/aiclef.

From 24 to 27 July, the Asia Europe Foundation and other institutions organize the annual Human Rights Training. It is hosted by Indonesia Association of People with Disabilities on “Human Rights and Persons with Disabilities” in Jakarta, Indonesia.

From 20 to 23 July 2017, the Regional Center for Social Change and Sustainable Development (RSCD) will organize the “Tenth International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 10)” with support from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Chiang Mai University (CMU) at the Chiang Mai International Exhibition and Convention Centre (CMECC) in Chiang Mai, Thailand. Details are available at https://eu.eventscloud.com/ehome/200170655/200390976/.

On 10 July 2017, the Office of the Administrative Courts of Thailand, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand and the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) will host a seminar on nationality law. More information can be found at: http://www.cpg-online.de/cpg-event/seminar-on-nationality-law/.

From 6 to 7 September 2017, the European Centre of Sustainable Development in collaboration with the CIT University will host the 5th International Conference on Sustainable Development on the topic “Creating a unified foundation for the Sustainable Development: research, practice and education” at Roma Eventi, Piazza della Pilotta 4, Rome, Italy. Details are found at http://www.ecsdev.org/index.php/conference.

Scholarships opportunities

The INTO International Foundation Scholarships at University of East Anglia is aimed at international students in the different fields. For the application the students must submit a completed scholarship application form and a 200-word personal statement. For more information: http://www.intostudy.com/en-uk/universities. Deadline is on 10 July 2017, 14 August 2017, 30 Oct 2017, and 27 Nov 2017.

The University of the People is a non-profit, tuition-free and accredited online university which is dedicated to open access to higher education to people all over the world. They offer associate and bachelor degree programs in the field of business administration, health science and computer science. The University does not charge students to take classes, nor any other study material. Processing fees are collected at the end of each course. Students who are unable to afford these fees, there are a variety of scholarship funds to cover all, or part, of the processing fees. Scholarships that are available are the Fondation Hoffmann Scholarship or the UoPeople General Scholarship. For more information please go to: http://www.uopeople.edu/. Deadline is on 13 July 2017 (for the term starting 7 September 2017).

The Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation provides scholarships to committed students, graduates and doctoral candidates. Applicants from any subject or nation are eligible for the scholarship. The scholars are able to complete a German higher-education qualification, earn a doctorate or acquire additional knowledge in their academic fields. Generally the scholarship can be awarded for up to three years depending on the circumstances and the academic achievements. For more information: https://www.daad.de/deutschland/stipendium/ or http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.14303/ (in German). Deadline is on 15 July 2017.

The Australian Government Research Training Program (AGRTP) Scholarship is aimed at supporting international students to undertake a research higher degree at Flinders University in Australia. The funding is available for up to three years for a Research Doctorate degree and up to two years for a Research Master’s degree. For the application, one has to make contact with an academic staff member in your relevant academic area who will supervise you if the application is successful. Additionally, you must include up to five of your publications with cover sheets and a research proposal of approximately 500 words in length. For more information: http://www.flinders.edu.au/scholarships-system/index. Deadline is on 11 August 2017.

The Adelaide Scholarships International is a scholarship for international students for any Master’s degree by Research or Doctoral Research Degree offered at the University of Adelaide. Applicants are required to have successfully completed at least the equivalent of an Australian First Class Honours degree. For more information: http://www.adelaide.edu.au/graduatecentre/. Deadline is on 31 August 2017.

The ETH Zurich Postdoctoral Fellowship Program supports incoming fellowships for postdoctoral researchers at the ETH Zurich. The program is intended to foster high-potential, young researchers who have already demonstrated excellence in terms of internationally competitive achievements in the early stages of their professional careers. Applications have to be made jointly by the candidate and their host who must be an ETH Zurich Professor and who will act as a mentor of the fellow. For more information: https://www.ethz.ch/en/research/research-promotion/eth-internal-programmes/eth-fellowships.html. Deadline is on 1 September 2017.

The ETH Zurich Postdoctoral Fellowship Program is aimed at supporting high-potential, young researchers who have already demonstrated excellence in terms of internationally competitive achievements in the early stages of their professional careers. Applications supports incoming fellowships for postdoctoral researchers at the ETH Zurich. The program is intended to foster high-potential, young researchers who have already demonstrated excellence in terms of internationally competitive achievements in the early stages of their professional careers. Applications have to be made jointly by the candidate and their host who must be an ETH Zurich Professor and who will act as a mentor of the fellow. For more information: https://www.ethz.ch/en/research/research-promotion/eth-internal-programmes/eth-fellowships.html. Deadline is on 1 September 2017.

The IMD MBA Future Leaders Scholarships supports students who intend to do a Master in Business Administration at the IMD Switzerland. Three scholarships are awarded each year at students from all over the world. Applicants have to submit their application and an essay on the topic: “It has been said that success in business requires flexibility to be responsive, but also commitment to a recognized set of values. Discuss using your personal and professional experience.” For more information: http://www.imd.org/mba/admissions/one-year-mba-program-financial-aid/. Deadline is on 30 September 2017.

European University Institute’s for departments of law, history and civilization, economics and politics and social sciences. Fellows will be invited to participate in departmental activities like seminars, workshops, and colloquia. Fellows have the chance to make contact with researchers sharing their academic interests, may be involved in the teaching and thesis supervision tasks of EUI professors, and associated with one of the research projects being carried out at the EUI. For more information: http://www.eui.eu/ServicesAndAdmin/AcademicService/Fellowships/FernandBraudelSeniorFellowships/Index.aspx. Deadlines are on 30 September 2017 and on 30 March 2018.

Agreen Skills+ is an international mobility program from France. The program is aimed at talented researchers, who are holding a PhD with less than 10 years of postdoctoral research experience. Research projects in the fields of agriculture, food, nutrition, environment, animal health and veterinary public health may be supported. For more information: https://www.agreenskills.eu/Applications/Eligibility-requirements. Deadline is on 13 October 2017.

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation Scholarship supports international students with a first academic degree who study at German higher-education institutions for a Master’s or a state examination degree. The funding is initially granted for one year but might be extended until the end of your studies. For more information: https://www.daad.de/deutschland or https://www.freiheit.org/auslaendische-studieren-de (in German). Deadline is on 31 October 2017.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Scholarship is aimed at supporting students from Africa, Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe that intend to study in Germany in any subject area. The students must demonstrate excellent school or academic merit and must be committed to the values of social democracy. More information can be found at https://www.daad.de/deutschland or http://www.fes.de/studienfoerderung (in German). Deadline depends on the type of application (http://www.fes.de/).

The Netherlands Fellowship Programmes provides fellowships for qualified Master studies, PhD studies, or short courses offered at participating Dutch Universities. You need to contact the Dutch higher education institution where you wish to go in order to find out whether it is NFP-qualified. People from the 51 NFP countries can apply. For more information: https://www.studyinholland.nl/scholarships/highlighted-scholarships/netherlands-fellowship-programmes. Deadline varies.
As a service, CPG provides a regularly updated overview of currently open job offers in fields and from institutions related to CPG’s focal areas of work.

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<td>Regional Portfolio Manager of the EIF Trust Fund</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
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<td>Makassar, Indonesia</td>
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<td>DAI</td>
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<td>Family Health International 360</td>
<td>Chief of Party, Control and Prevention of Tuberculosis</td>
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