Foreword

Dear Readers,

Welcome to this second edition of CPG’s online Magazine (COM) in 2018. I hope that all our friends and partners have had an equally positive and exciting start to 2018 as our team here at CPG.

This issue of COM begins with a brief report on an event CPG has organised with its partners in Thailand on Remembering the Holocaust at the end of January this year. We also held a seminar on Law Enforcement and the Role of Scholars on the occasion of the signing of an MoU with the Faculty of Law, Sultan Agung Islamic University, Indonesia, whose delegation of students and lecturers was headed by Dean Dr. Anis Masdurrohatun, S.H., M.Hum.

The subsequent section contains two articles pertaining to international relations and geopolitics in Asia: one piece on the strategic implications of China’s Road and Belt initiative by Major General (ret) Ashok K Hukku, former Chief Military Intelligence Advisor in the Cabinet Secretariat at New Delhi, India, as well as an account on the history of US Taiwan policy by CPG Senior Program Officer and Researcher Jan Kliem.

COM 2, 2018 concludes with our regular announcements on selected past and future events, scholarship opportunities and job market section related to CPG’s scope of work.

I wish all our readers and all who were involved in CPG’s work over the past couple of months well and do hope you enjoy this issue of COM.

Best regards,

Henning Glaser
Director
German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG), Faculty of Law, Thammasat University

Table of Contents

CPG Events January to February 2018.................................4

Seminar “Remembering Holocaust” ........................................5
Seminar “Law Enforcement and the Role of Scholars”......................6

Articles ..................................................................................7

One Belt one Road and its Strategic Implications
Major General (ret) Ashok K Hukku...............................................8
US – Taiwan – PRC Relations: A brief history of US policy towards Taiwan
Jan Kliem ........................................................................17

Announcements ....................................................................23

Events ..................................................................................24
Scholarship opportunities ..............................................................28

CPG Job Market ..................................................................31

Impessum ............................................................................37
Seminar “Remembering Holocaust”
31 January 2018, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University

On January 31, 2018 the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) hosted a seminar under the title: “Remembering Holocaust” at the Faculty of Law of Thammasat University Bangkok. As speakers, CPG was pleased to welcome Felix Pülm, German Department, Silpakorn University, Benjamin Ivry, The Thammasat University Libraries and Daniel Polomski, Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University.

The first speaker, Felix Pülm, gave a detailed presentation on the topic “Memory Culture on World War II and the Holocaust in Germany – Turning Points and Current Challenges.” He was followed by Benjamin Ivry with a presentation “Reading Holocaust Literature in Asia”. He presented an array of literature on the Holocaust and pointed out which ones were available at the Thammasat library. The last speaker of the day was Daniel. He talked about “Refusal Or (Re-) Construction: The Current Status Of Collective Remembrance Among Urban Cambodian Youth”. Daniel noted some of the difficulties between generations in interpreting and understanding the legacy of the Cambodian genocide between 1975 and 1979, during which an estimated 1.5 to 3 million Cambodians died or were killed by the Khmer Rouge regime.

After an engaging discussion with the audience, CPG Director Henning Glaser concluded a very successful and interesting seminar with his closing remarks.
Seminar “Law Enforcement and the Role of Scholars”
27 February 2018, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University

On February 27, 2018 the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) hosted a seminar under the title: “Law Enforcement in Thailand and the Role of Scholars” at the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, Bangkok. The seminar provided an opportunity to the group of students and lecturers from the Faculty of Law, Sultan Agung Islamic University, Indonesia to obtain knowledge of law enforcement in Thailand and the role scholars can play. The speakers for this event were Vichien Tansirikongkhon, Asst. Prof. Pol. Capt. Dr., Faculty of Political Science and Law, Burapha University, Krisanaphong Poothakool, Asst. Prof. Pol. Lt. Col. Dr., Faculty of Police Science, Royal Police Cadet Academy and Chairman, Criminology, and Justice Administration Program, College of Government, Rangsit University and CPG director Henning Glaser, who also concluded the seminar after an extensive Q&A session with the audience.
One Belt one Road and its Strategic Implications
Major General (ret) Ashok K Hukku, former Chief Military Intelligence Advisor in the Cabinet Secretariat at New Delhi, India

On 1st Oct 1949 the People’s Republic of China was officially established. “Chinese people have stood up” declared Mao Zedong. Following Mao came Deng Xiaoping and the first glimpse into China’s future strategy became evident when the CCP announced “The fundamental task of the party is to build China into a modern, powerful and socialist country by the end of the 20th century”. China’s national aims and objectives, it’s foreign and defence policies are aimed to achieve that end state. These policies continue along the same lines even today well into the 21st century.

With a GDP around $8.227 Trillion and a growth rate around 7%, it is the world’s second biggest economy. Focussing its sights on well defined objectives and impelled by a powerful economic upsurge, China continues to build the second most formidable military in the world, and follow an aggressive foreign policy. An integral part of its over all strategy is the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. To appreciate the implications of this initiative, it is necessary to review China’s strategic thought based upon which the initiative is being launched.

I. Strategic Thought
Chinese leaders have decided to create a militarily and economically powerful and united country that will be able to transform the existing world’s power structure into a bipolar one. One pole of which will be China. National security interests encompassing interstate relations, global power balance, bold economic initiatives and internal stability have become the primary determinant of national strategy. Conventional ideology has been given a back seat, the only exception being centralized political control.

II. Military Doctrine
Initially Chinese military doctrine was based on the concept of mass armies fighting a war of attrition on homeland China. It subsequently shifted from a policy of “strategic counter attack” to “strategic projection operations”. This shift merits attention as in the decades to come the reach of Chinese military power will extend globally and in outer space. This could open up new possibilities in the domain of interstate affiliations and power structures.

III. Strategic Priorities
Based on its military and economic strength China has formulated its strategic priorities that could have the potential to re-shape the power balance which has existed since the end of the Second World War. Some of these priorities are:
(a) China sees 21st century as a strategic window of opportunity to become a global power.
(b) It intends to change the present unipolar structure to a multi polar one.
(c) Globalization and opening up of China.
(d) Internal cohesion and economic development are necessary to maintain national security in China.

IV. Regional domination
To achieve its main objectives China has decided to follow a combination of aggressive diplomacy and a well defined power projection strategy by undertaking the following measures:
(a) Keep sufficient control over four non Han buffer states of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. If these regions are kept under control by China, it would ensure security from threats that could develop from Russia in the North, and India in the SW.
(b) Ensure that the Sea Lanes of Communication are secure and fully under its control. Towards this end it has been taking action for domination of the South China Sea and island territories.
(c) China views India as its only regional rival, so it keeps her under military and diplomatic pressure by continued development of infrastructure, air and missile bases in Tibet; surrounding India by the string of pearls policy and building strategic collaboration with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. It also ensures slow movement in the resolution of border problems with India.

V. Pakistan, Afghanistan
On China’s SW flank lies the highly unstable region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its relations with Pakistan continue to enjoy the highest priority and are driven by a strong strategic calculus. That calculus arises from its perceived need for a second front to keep India preoccupied.

In China’s strategic calculation, its ability to prevent a military conflict with India depends on a strong Chinese military capability in Tibet and a strong Pakistani military capability in the nuclear and conventional fields on India’s western front.

In Afghanistan it looks forward to great economic possibilities but is wary of extremists influence spreading into Xingjian. Consequently China is keen to see peace and stability in Afghanistan so that its ambitious OBOR project can be successful.

VI. OBOR plans
On the basis of its strategic thought and national priorities, China has come up with the idea of OBOR, reminiscent of the ancient Silk Road along which trade and cultural exchange with central Asia and the Indian subcontinent was undertaken.
Historically Xi’an was the starting point of the ancient Silk Road. It is now being revived through the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). The SREB, along with the proposed Maritime Silk Road (MSR) connecting ports of various countries in China’s extended neighbourhood, are collectively termed as the OBOR initiative.

According to Chinese expectations the proposed OBOR initiatives could impact 4.4 billion people and within a decade generate trade above 2.5 trillion USD. These ambitious plans, launched by Xi in 2014 to connect China with its neighbours in Asia and beyond, involve more than 60 countries. China plans to finance OBOR projects through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the $40 billion Silk Road Fund.

Chinese president Xi Jinping has made the program the main pillar of his foreign policy and the force multiplier of his domestic economic strategy. In March2016, China’s top economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), released a new action plan outlining key details of the OBOR initiative.

Initially described as a network of regional infrastructure projects along a trade route, this latest release indicates that the scope of OBOR initiative has continued to expand and will now include promotion of enhanced policy coordination across the Asian continent, financial integration, trade liberalization, and people-to-people connectivity.

China’s efforts to implement this initiative will have an important effect on the region’s economic architecture, patterns of regional trade, investment and infrastructure development.

If the initiative succeeds as per the plans, then it will have strategic implications for China, the United States, and other major powers including India and regional countries.

A vision document jointly prepared by a composite team from the Ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), released a new action plan outlining key details of the OBOR initiative.

Initially described as a network of regional infrastructure projects along a trade route, this latest release indicates that the scope of OBOR initiative has continued to expand and will now include promotion of enhanced policy coordination across the Asian continent, financial integration, trade liberalization, and people-to-people connectivity.

IV. The Parallel Belt

In order to further enhance trilateral trade facilitation, the three parties decided to look into the parallel belt. A vision document jointly prepared by a composite team from the Ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) revealed the geographic parameters of OBOR. It will have two components:

a) Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) will be established along the Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific coast to the Baltic Sea.

b) Maritime Silk Road (MSR) will comprise ports & coastal infrastructure from China, South Asia, East Africa all the way to Northern Mediterranean region.

The “belt and road” running through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa are expected to connect East Asia economies and European economies.

The most vital strategic implication of the OBOR initiative backed by an extensive China-led funding of infrastructure is: it could shift the centre of geo-economic power towards Eurasia and have direct impact on the US strategy of “Rebalancing”.

Specifically the OBOR focuses on bringing together China, Asia, Russia and Europe and hopes to extend on to the Baltics. It will link China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia. It will also connect China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. By this process China hopes to gain access to immense natural resources in Central Asia.

The Central Asian States have a huge reservoir of natural gas and oil. With the US-Russia stand off continuing, Moscow is looking forward to new customers in the East and specifically at China, which happens to be an energy hungry nation. So are all regional countries for that matter. Towards that end OBOR holds promise for many stakeholders in many ways.

Afghanistan is blessed with untapped mineral deposits of gold, lithium, and hydrocarbons worth around $1 Trillion. That is enough attraction for continued involvement with Afghanistan by western and regional countries and China.

Kazakhstan is known as the “Buckle” of OBOR initiative. It is the largest land locked country in the world. Surrounded by Russia and China it has huge oil and mineral deposits. It is also the gateway to the Caspian Sea and Europe.

The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and Corridor Investment Programs, multilateral institutions and development banks have funneled billions of dollars in loans and grants to fund an international corridor that will connect China to Western Europe.

This, along with other international infrastructure initiatives, is a part of China’s economic strategy to utilize its excess industrial capacity and workers. Along these routes will move Chinese exports to the west, while energy imports will move eastwards to China.

The details released so far indicate that the Belt part of the OBOR will be a planned network of overland road and rail routes, oil and natural gas pipelines, and other infrastructure projects that will stretch from Xi’an in central China, through Central Asia, and ultimately reach as far as Moscow, Rotterdam, and Venice.

The “Road” is actually the maritime part of the initiative encompassing port and other coastal infrastructure projects that dot the map from South and Southeast Asia to East Africa and the northern Mediterranean Sea.

The new Belt and Road plan jointly released by the NDRC and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, highlights that the scope of the initiative will extend well beyond infrastructure construction. The program will also include efforts to promote greater financial integration and use of the Renminbi by other countries, create an “Information Silk Road” linking regional information and communications technology networks, and lower barriers to cross-border trade and investment in the region.

New regional financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Silk Road Fund (NSRF), are designed in part to complement and support the OBOR initiative.

VII. The Parallel Belt

On 9 July 2015, Xi Jinping held his second summit with Russia and Mongolia. Both President Vladimir Putin and President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj of Mongolia participated in the meeting in Ufa, Russia.

The meeting resulted in formal approval of the Mid-term Roadmap for the Development of Trilateral Co-operation between China, Russia and Mongolia. It was also agreed that the Planning Outline of China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor Co-operation is to be formulated to align the SREB with the Eurasia Economic Union and the Steppe Road Initiative.

In order to further enhance trilateral trade facilitation, the three parties decided to look into the possibility of setting up a co-operative mechanism for their respective economic and trade departments. It was
also agreed that efforts will be made to improve co-operation between industrial associations and chambers of commerce in the three countries.

Further, it was decided that consideration will be given to advancing customs co-operation, exploring the possibility of establishing a joint company for China-Russia-Mongolia rail transport and logistics, strengthening co-operation in the technological sector, and promoting investment in infrastructure projects.

This would be the Parallel Belt to the OBOR, reinforcing the strength of the latter.

VIII. The Chinese Angle

It is well known that China is currently experiencing economic slowdown. To give its economy a boost, it needs to improve connectivity between under developed southern and western provinces, its rich coast line, as also the countries along its periphery. The OBOR project can help to achieve these objectives.

The system of ports, railways and roads which have either been completed or are under construction or being proposed will enable China to diversify the routes by which it can secure the transport of oil and gas and other essential goods needed to sustain its economy. This will enhance China’s energy and economic security and mitigate the risks attendant to transporting fuel and goods through unstable, unsecured or unfriendly sea lanes of communication that could be interdicted in a conflict scenario.

In recent years China has also started to use regional financial institutions as a counter to USA’s similar initiatives. China backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2013 to assist regional countries in infrastructure development and support the OBOR initiative, is an example of China’s efforts towards that end. The financial initiatives of these institutions could impact on America’s “rebalance to Asia” policy.

China’s initiatives linked to OBOR have the potential to change the entire global power structure by producing new dynamics in interstate relations and military alliances.

IX. OBOR and Indian Security Concerns

Both OBOR and AIIB are China’s bold new ventures and Beijing wants India to participate in them. However, Indian response is guided by a complex set of factors centering on its security concerns that are influenced by geo-political compulsions.

The main problem is an unresolved border dispute with China. To keep the issue alive, Chinese troops frequently carry out incursions across the Line of Actual Control which demarcates the Indian and Chinese held territories.

Another matter of concern for India is the military and political backing that Pakistan receives from China. The situation is further aggravated by the continued development of civilian and military infrastructure in Tibet and in Pakistan occupied Kashmir by China, giving it enormous capability to carry out a military build up against India. OBOR infrastructures will act as force multipliers for China and Pakistan against India.

While China claims that OBOR is essentially an economic and trade oriented project, its obvious military dimensions cannot be ignored by India under the existing circumstances.

Indian hesitation in embracing the China-led OBOR is increased by the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which will become an integral part of OBOR. China has declared a 46 Billion USD support to Pakistan for the CPEC project.

The CPEC is expected to connect Kashgar in China’s restive province of Xinjiang with the Gwadar port in the volatile Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It will pass through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan. India claims these territories but they are occupied by Pakistan.

In the Gilgit Baltistan segment the CPEC project includes a major expansion of the Karakoram Highway, establishment of industrial parks in special economic zones, construction of hydropower projects, railway lines and roads.

The project also entails building hydropower projects and highways in Pakistan occupied Kashmir which assumes an interstate political dimension. Consequently India has raised objections to Chinese projects in this region.

The Karakoram Highway (KKH) connects the Gilgit–Baltistan region of Pakistan to the ancient Silk Road. It runs approximately 1,300 km from Kashgar in the Xinjiang region of China to Abbottabad in Pakistan. China and Pakistan are planning to link the Karakoram Highway to the southern port of Gwadar in Balochistan through the Chinese aided Gwadar Dalbadin railway line which extends to Rawalpindi. Eventually all these projects are expected to become apart of the OBOR initiative.

As China continues to be a very sensitive region, construction of infrastructures that have a strategic bearing on Indian security are viewed with grave concern by the Indian government. Therefore India has to be very cautious in its approach to OBOR and allied projects.

Indian concerns with the China Pakistan military ties are exacerbated by growing presence and influence of China in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. OBOR, with its network of China sponsored infrastructure projects in and around Indian neighbourhood amplify Indian anxieties.

India has repeatedly drawn China’s attention to these issues. But China remains seemingly indifferent to Indian apprehensions. China has emphasised that its involvement in PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan is for economic reasons, and should not be seen as supportive of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue.

China further professes that socio-economic development is the key to resolving regional security problems. In fact, the consensus in China seems to be that the root cause of terrorism in Pakistan is poverty and unemployment, and that infrastructure development will stabilize the country. Therefore, OBOR and CPEC are projects that will bring stability to the region, claims China.

While this may be true to a limited extent, it is certainly not the magic solution to resolve terrorism problems that have been the scourge of the region. In fact, Chinese projects and labourers in Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have faced violent attacks by Xinjiang origin militants.

Similar security problems could surface in Pakistan as far as OBOR is concerned. Extremist organizations like the TTP are likely to leave no stone unturned to inflict damage on the CPEC. In Baluchistan groups that are fighting against the Pakistan State will do the same. It is not surprising therefore that Pakistan army has announced the creation of a division sized force exclusively for guarding the CPEC infrastructures throughout the country. This force may find its task difficult and
quite unmanageable.

As far as India is concerned, it too wants better connectivity with Afghanistan, the rest of Central Asia and beyond, and also with Myanmar and South East Asia eastwards. Both regions suffer from disrupted connectivity due to rampant insurgencies. Undoubtedly OBOR will help in improving regional connectivity and socio economic conditions.

Traditionally India enjoys goodwill in South Asia, West Asia and South East Asia. Under the circumstances an India China partnership will benefit both countries. It will add an impetus to the implementation of China’s OBOR initiative. China is aware of this fact. Therefore it looks forward to Indian support for the OBOR initiative, but is not dependent on it.

X. Strategic Implications of OBOR

India, the US, Japan and Russia are concerned by the possible geopolitical impact of OBOR even though China has tried to allay their apprehensions. There is no doubt that OBOR could lead to greater Chinese influence in Central Asia and beyond.

Viewed from the context of String of Pearls policy of China, Indian concerns go beyond the economic impact of OBOR. They extend to strategic implications of unprecedented Sino Pak military collaboration in a conflict scenario.

From the Indian point of view participation in the OBOR project would also require a major change in its political stand on Kashmir. If India acquiesces to the construction of OBOR through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, it could be seen as a massive climb down from its stated position. This will not be acceptable to any political party in India.

OBOR therefore become a contentious issue for India. On the one hand it raises the possibility of an increased military threat, while on the other hand it promises economic benefits that could transform the entire region dramatically. India has to play its part with great care and maturity.

As far as Russia is concerned it has always viewed Central Asia as its southern backyard. Chinese influence in that region is a matter of concern for it. However, recent developments as a result of NATO expansion and sanctions have restricted Russian economic growth. This has helped to bring Russia and China closer together, including on the issue of OBOR.

If the OBOR initiative achieves its economic goals it could make China the dominating economic power. Backed by its military strength and technological advancement, in the decades ahead China could be placed on the threshold of becoming the leading global super power. This would be a tremendous set back for the strategic superiority exclusively enjoyed by the US. The dominant role played by NATO could also come under severe stress triggering a discussion in the Alliance and with in Europe on the relevance of NATO and indeed on the need for towing the US foreign policy line.

XI. Conclusion

Undoubtedly OBOR is an initiative that could change the face of Asia. It can help countries recover from poverty and under developed conditions by bring about socio- economic prosperity.

According to some experts, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will be a reality with more and more countries joining the bandwagon. If India remains isolated, it can lose a great opportunity for socio economic progress. This could prove to be a strategic set back. Instead, if it decides to cooperate, it can work out a plan beneficial for all.

At the same time India cannot rush to embrace the OBOR initiative overlooking its military dimension. That remains the stumbling block. Ultimately India will have to think out its response one way or the other; it cannot for ever remain on the fence.

With the US economy yet to recover fully from the global economic crisis, Russia struggling from sanctions and European Union weakened with its inherent economic and political issues, China is set to fill the global power vacuum. OBOR initiative could be the key to Chinese ambitions.

On the other hand China has to be more reassuring of its intentions globally. It must move ahead on the resolution of the border problems with India. China has to resolve problems in South China Sea more amicably. So far it has it has not done so.

Epilogue

In the year 2017 the issues related to the Chinese project of One Belt One Road and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) were complicated by several developments even though China and Pakistan continued to move the project forward.

The first serious development came about when PLA began to construct a road in a disputed region on the border of Bhutan. The alignment of the proposed road was also directed towards a very sensitive point in India. The road, if built, would bring within the artillery range of Chinese guns a narrow stretch of land in Indian territory which connects eastern India with its western part. In other words China could pose a severe threat of interdiction from the proposed road head.

Incidentally the region through which the road was being constructed is barren and at an altitude of 11000 ft. There are no towns or villages which the road could connect. Chinese activity left little doubt in the minds of Indian officials that the road would pose a strategic threat to India.

It is also important to note that Bhutan has an agreement with India which places the responsibility for its security on the latter. The area is also under dispute, and by an earlier agreement China and Bhutan were to maintain status quo on the issue. Now China was arbitrarily changing status quo.

Consequently, in consultation with the government of Bhutan the Indian army stepped in and physically prevented the road construction. Though no firing incident took place, the two armies remained in a tense face off situation for three months. Chinese media and official commentary derided and threatened India with a view to make it step back. From the Indian side there was calculated calm but no stepping back. Ultimately by end August both sides agreed mutually withdraw, the face off thus ended. However, Indian position on the issue remained unchanged.
Among a number of reasons why China initiated the road construction in a disputed area, was its intention to provoke Indian reaction hoping to highlight Indian inability to take any meaningful action against China. This was to be Chinese display of displeasure about India’s objections to the OBOR and CPEC project. However, the entire exercise failed to go the way China had wanted. India’s position on the OBOR and CPEC remain unchanged.

The second development interestingly took place in Pakistan and related to the objectives of the OBOR and CPEC projects. While the Chinese government had been harping on the benefits of trade and development that OBOR and CPEC would bring to the region, particularly to Pakistan, there remained an element of secrecy about the projects which slowly began to emerge.

A Pakistan daily Dawn, revealed some parts of the master plan of OBOR/CPEC that were generally not known. For instance agriculture was one of the biggest priority of CPEC which would enable the entry of Chinese enterprises into Pakistan with the agricultural production finding its way back to China. The absence of these details in the web site of OBOR/CPEC raised suspicion in Pakistan. The Dawn wrote “This suggests that a policy framework is being built, under the guise of a ‘national food security policy’, that, in reality, is designed to lay the groundwork to advance the agriculture-related priorities of Chinese enterprises, as the master plan document revealed in the Dawn report clearly stated.”

Similarly in the financial sector China is trying to promote Yuan for payment purposes.

China also visualizes that OBOR will promote cultural exchanges.

These examples are being processed behind the scenes between the two governments, it is not known if there are other proposals that have not been made public. Consequent to the disclosure by the Pakistani news paper, doubts have arisen as to what are the hidden objectives of China under the banner of OBOR/CPEC. Would it one day so dominate that Pakistan is reduced to a status of a Chinese colony deeply indebted by the supply of billions of Dollars and a strangle hold on its economy. Pakistani citizens have begun to think on these lines. A gigantic and ambitious project like OBOR cannot succeed on the basis of secret provisions and hidden objectives.

On the other hand the strategic threat faced by these projects and the recent developments in Sino Pakistani relations do not inspire confidence in India.

With the new political dispensation in the US shying away from its commitments in South East Asia, a power vacuum has been created in the entire region. China is striving hard to step into this space thus leading to a drastic change in the strategic environment of Asia. This could result in new alignments and changed power equations.

These developments have only served to harden the Indian objections to OBOR and CPEC project. The project itself has huge security obstacles in its path, its success cannot be guaranteed unless those hurdles are overcome. Where the ambitious Chinese project will ultimately lead the region only time will tell.

US – Taiwan – PRC Relations: A brief history of US policy towards Taiwan

Jan Kliem, Senior Program Officer and Researcher; German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)

I. Introduction

After a period of relative calm, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has over the past years reclaimed much of the undesirable “spotlight” it had in International Relations during the last Taiwan-Straits crisis in the mid 1990s. Tensions have risen again, not least since the People’s Republic of China’s President Xi Jinping has stated that the unification of Taiwan and mainland China under Beijing’s government is a prerequisite to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” at the congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017. Taiwan, of course, is also governed by President Tsai Ing-wen who has not fully endorsed the 1992 consensus and marks a break to the previous government’s policies which were friendlier and by and large more accommodating to the PRC. The essay below looks at how the United States fits into the picture of cross-strait relations and more specifically, gives some background on how its current foreign policy towards Taiwan has developed.

II. Two wars and the first and second communiqué

The Taiwan conundrum, here defined as Taiwan’s ambiguous status somewhere between a (de-facto) sovereign nation state and a renegade province and the three different narratives on Taiwan from a US, PRC and ROC perspective, are a consequence of two wars; one that was ongoing and one that was started shortly after the end of the Second World War (WWII).

The first was the civil war in China, fought between the nationalist government of the Republic of China, the Kuomintang (KMT) under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the communist forces, led by Mao Zedong. Mao would later claim an incomplete victory over the nationalist forces and establish the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland in 1949. The victory was incomplete in that the beaten KMT forces under Chiang’s leadership, who had already been severely weakened due to shouldering most of the military actions against the imperial Japanese forces, fled the mainland to set up what was supposed to be a temporary government on Taiwan, less than 150 kilometres off the continent’s south-eastern coast. Taipei was declared the provisional capital of the Republic of China in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek’s firm believe that the KMT would re-group and eventually re-unify with the mainland under KMT leadership, was met by a similar vision by Mao Zedong across the Taiwan Strait, who also believed in a re-unified Chinese nation. In his vision however, unification was to happen under his leadership of the entire Chinese nation and the final and unequivocal defeat of the KMT. Arguably, Mao was closer to achieving his vision, but the second of the two wars referred to above changed the realities on the ground and laid the foundation of the situation in the Taiwan Straits today.

In June 1950 neighbouring North Korea under Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea with the support of the unofficial military arm of the PRC, the “People’s Volunteer Army”. From the perspective of the US, the move was a clear challenge to its strategy of “containing” communism and it feared, in accordance with the...
evolving domino theory, that communism would spread. The move caused US President Truman to deploy the United States 7th fleet to Asia and have it sail right between the communist forces on the Chinese mainland and Chiang’s nationalists in Taiwan. The might of the US 7th fleet and US resolve to use it 1, had altered the balance of power in the strait to an extent that it no longer seemed possible for the PRC to take Taiwan by force. The US policy of containing communism to the Chinese mainland had offered Chiang Kai-shek a lifeline and an opportunity to remain in control of Taiwan. Fundamental parts of the status-quo in which the US guaranteed no war would occur in the strait were established.

In addition to the military power, the US extended to Taiwan and the strait, the US continued to recognise Chiang’s government as the sole representation of the Chinese nation, the Republic of China, and engaged in normal diplomatic relations until 1979.

Once again, it was the iron cast of the Cold War and the dominating narrative of the fight against communism that changed the facts related to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Despite the Sino-Soviet split and careful rapprochement between the PRC and the US, it was not until the 1970s that a new era of US policy towards the PRC, and as a consequence to Taiwan, developed. The new principle relationship was fundamentally based on the framework of the post WWII “One-China Policy”, which has its very foundation in the first US-PRC joint communiqué, the “Shanghai Communiqué” of 1972.

In this, US President Richard Nixon who travelled to the PRC on invitation of then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, declared that

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”

The US position is of course different from the People’s Republic of China’s interpretation of one-China, called the one-China principle. The PRC interpretation of one-China upholds that there is but one China in the world, that the government in Beijing is the sole representative of it, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. While the US one-China policy acknowledges that it is maintained that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, it does not subscribe to this assumption. Furthermore, the US did not have the choice of having diplomatic relations with both, Beijing and Taipei, as neither would accept the formal recognition of both by the US or any other country. Arguably, from a US perspective, this would have been the most desirable option.

Pressured into balancing the rise of the Soviet Union in Asia, the communiqué looked like the beginning of the end of US policy of balancing out the asymmetries in the military capabilities on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Even more so, the second communiqué of early 1979, following US President Carter’s decision of December 1978 to formally shift diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, so from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China, arguably looked like Taiwan would from now on have to fend for itself. The normalisation, as it became known, required both sides to compromise on certain issues. The demand side of the PRC included for instance the abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, as well as a removal of all US troops from Taiwan and the end of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. While the US agreed to this, its own demands, such as unofficial American presence in Taiwan after normalisation, the continuation of American commercial, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan, or selected defensive arms sales to Taiwan after normalisation, signalled that it was not in the US interest to entirely abandon Taiwan, but not all demands found their way into the final draft. 3 The President’s statement on the communiqué 4, as well as the re-endorsement of the key points of the Shanghai communiqué, made clear that the US had an interest in the peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. However, critics were quick to point out that the communiqué did not include a PRC commitment to rule out the use of force against Taiwan or a US commitment to the security of Taiwan.

Following this agreement, just four months into 1979, the Carter administration signed the Taiwan Relations Act into law, which was followed by the third communiqué and the “six assurances” 5 in 1982 under the Reagan administration.

III. Taiwan Relations Act; Third communiqué and six assurances

The passing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979 was both a clear effort by the US Congress to assert itself in matters of US – Taiwan relations, as much as providing a “legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrin[ing] the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability.” 6

President Carter’s decision to sever ties with the ROC in favour of the PRC was not popular with either the American public, or Capitol Hill. Surveys conducted by news outlets such as ABC News and the New York Times-/CBS at the time, confirmed this for the public as much as congressional surveys did for the US congress. 6

In the light of the negative perception of the President’s ‘executive’ foreign policy, the TRA can be seen as the legislature intervening into foreign policy and “essentially maintain[ing] the substance of relations between the

United States and the ROC. The manner in which the second communiqué was negotiated, the fact that the formal normalisation was only announced to leaders of the congress hours before its official announcement and during congressional recess, and the ‘weak’ contents of the communiqué on the defence commitments to Taiwan, gave a sense of urgency to passing the TRA. Since the formal endorsement of the one-China policy has upended all hope of having diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC, to which both Chinese parties were still opposed, the TRA, the third communiqué and the six assurances provided a way to uphold the essence of the official relations without calling it that.

To clarify immediate legal-status consequences, President Carter had issued a memorandum stating that “[e]xisting international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force and shall be performed and enforced by departments and their agencies beginning January 1, 1979 in accordance with their terms.”

The TRA itself then included legal clarity to the same effect, stating that: “[w]henever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan.”

The TRA furthermore addresses crucial US policy questions, e.g. US policy (1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan and to establish the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which is to a large extent an embassy in all but name and hence, of vital importance; (2) to continue the sale of arms of defensive character to Taiwan; (3) to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan; and (4) to oppose any non-peaceful effort to resolve the Taiwan question, including boycotts and embargoes, and declare those efforts a grave concern to the US.

In essence, the TRA serves as a strong commitment of the US to the future of Taiwan by regulating the maintenance of unofficial ties and stating US interest in the peacefulness of cross-strait relations, while backing-up its pledges with concrete actions such as the continued sale of defensive arms and officially tying the prevention of use of force against Taiwan to its interests. Whilst it does not go as far as requiring the US to defend Taiwan or to sell arms to it in a legal sense, it struck the balance right so that it would not be vetoed by the White House and still shows enough teeth to deter the PRC from coercive action regarding re-unification.

Under the subsequent Reagan administration, the last of the three communiqués was issued in August 1982 after about ten months of negotiations. In addition to reassuring the continued commitments to the principles laid out in the previous communiqués, and a stated “understanding” on US behalf that the PRC is striving for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question, the difficult question of US arms sales was raised again. This was of particular importance after the PRC had reacted negatively to the TRA and its provisions regarding the continued sale of weapons to Taiwan, alleging the act violates the normalisation communiqué.

In the communiqué, the US stated that it did not seek a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that those sales would neither qualitatively nor quantitatively exceed the level of those arms supplied since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, and that it intends to reduce its arms-sales to Taiwan gradually over time. The US did not agree to adding a specific cut-off date for arms sales.

Throughout the negotiations, the US made sure that the relevant authorities in Taiwan were kept informed on the progress in order to alleviate concerns that Taiwan could be ‘dropped’ and a US commitment to the island’s security could end. Even before the communiqué was formally announced in August 1982, the US, via the AIT, made six assurances to Taiwan. These assurances were that the US:

- had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China;
- had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the Republic of China;
- would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China;
- would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
- had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
- would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

In sum, with regards to Taiwan, the three communiqués, the TRA and the six assurances built the foundation of US-PRC relations. Today’s US one-China policy is informed by these foundations and has therefore developed from its initial use in its particular reference to Taiwan. Without officially saying that it will, the PRC has never renounced the possibility of using force against Taiwan, whereas the US has always maintained that it has an interest in a peaceful solution to cross-strait issues. The TRA and the six assurances in particular at least imply that the US would defend Taiwan in case of military action against it by the PRC. But the US does not support Taiwanese independence. As far as the US is concerned, the issue over Taiwan’s status remains unsettled. An important addition to complex US-PRC relations with regards to Taiwan was made by US President Clinton in 2000, when he added that cross-strait issues “must” be resolved peacefully and “with the assent of the people of Taiwan”. This gives credit to and accounts for the people of Taiwan whose nation has developed into a vibrant democracy, with a watershed moment only four years prior to Clinton’s speech, when Taiwan had its first direct presidential election based on universal suffrage and a multi-party system. Only nine days after the speech, Taiwan would experience its first ever power transition with the election win of Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian, who remained President until 2008.

---

7 Ibid: p.25
8 In Section 2, the TRA states that as “The President- having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary- to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.”
9 Chang (1986): p.41
10 Presidential Memorandum of December 30, 1978, Relations with the People on Taiwan, cited in Li (1979): p.134
11 Taiwan Relations Act (1979): Section 4, 2.1.
12 See Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
13 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué (1982)
14 Bill Clinton Speech on China Trade Bill, 9.3.00, https://www.iatp.org/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm, accessed: 17/02/2018
According to Richard Bush, an acclaimed Taiwan expert and former chairman of the AIT, however, this small but vital progress was reversed after the Clinton years as the administration of President George W. Bush changed the words to the assent of the people on both sides of the strait, suggesting a curious equity of the possibility of the people on either side of the strait to register their assent, which for obvious reasons weakens the statement considerably.\footnote{See Bush (2017)}

**Sources:**
Past Events January and February 2018

From 1 to 2 January 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation held the “Singapore 40th International Conference on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at The Great Hotel Paya Lebar 33 Jalan Afifi, Singapore 409180. Further information is available at http://academicfora.com/bessh-singapore-january-1-2-2018/.

From 8 to 9 January 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organized the 20th International Conference on Company Law and Corporate Governance at the Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2018/01/singapore/ICCLG.

From 8 to 9 January 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosted the “CCLG 2018: 20th International Conference on Company Law and Corporate Governance” at the Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2018/01/singapore/ICCLG.

From 9 January 2018, the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute held the Regional Outlook Forum 2018 on “Trends, Uncertainties and Opportunities” at the Island Ballroom, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.isneas.edu.sg/events.

From 11 to 12 January 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation organized the “Bangkok 57th International Conference” emphasizing on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. For more information, please go to http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-january-11-12-2018/.

From 18 to 19 January 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosted the “ICAETES 2018: 20th International Conference on Advanced Energy Technologies and Solid Waste Management” at Amari Watergate Bangkok, 847 Petchburi Road, Bangkok, Thailand. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2018/01/bangkok/ICAETESWM.

From 18 to 19 January 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosted the “ICAETSD 2018: 20th International Conference on Advanced Energy Technologies for Sustainable Development” at Amari Watergate Bangkok, 847 Petchburi Road, Bangkok, Thailand. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2018/01/bangkok/ICAETSD.

From 18 to 19 January 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation organized the “Bangkok 58th International Conference on Advanced Energy Technologies and Environmental Sustainability” at the Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road, Singapore. For more information please go to https://www.waset.org/conference/2018/01/bangkok/ICCEDF.

From 22 to 23 January 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosted the “Bangkok 58th International Conference” emphasizing on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. For more information, please go to http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-january-22-23-2018/.

From 23 to 24 January 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation organized the “Bali 30th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference was held at Street of sunset road no 88 Seminyak Bali, Indonesia. Further information is available at http://academicfora.com/bessh-bali-indonesia-january-23-24-2018/.

From 1 to 2 February 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation held the “Singapore 41st International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at The Great Hotel Paya Lebar 33 Jalan Afifi, Singapore 409180. Further information is available at http://academicfora.com/bessh-singapore-february-1-2-2018/.

From 12 to 13 February 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosted the “Bangkok 59th International Conference” emphasizing on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference was held at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. For more information, please go to http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-february-12-13-2018/.

From 19 to 20 February 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation held the “Manila 17th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at Hotel H2O Manila, Luneta, Manila, Philippines. Further details can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-manila-philippines-february-19-20-2018/.

From 22 to 23 February 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosted the “Bangkok 60th International Conference” emphasizing on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference took place at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. For more information, please go to http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-february-22-23-2018/.
From 23 to 24 February 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation organized the “Bali 31st International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at the Mercure Bali Harvestland Kuta Bali, Indonesia. Further information is available at http://academicfora.com/bessh-bali-indonesia-march-23-24-2018/.

From 19 to 20 March 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation holds the “Manila 18th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Hotel H2O Manila, Philippines. More information can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-manila-philippines-march-19-20-2018/.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Bangkok 62nd International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. Further details can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-march-22-23-2018/.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosts the “ICBCF 2018: 20th International Conference on Behavioural Corporate Finance” at the Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road, Singapore 169075. For more information please go to https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICBCF.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosts the “ICBIAKM 2018: 20th International Conference on Business Intelligence, Analytics, and Knowledge Management” at the Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road Singapore 169075. For more information please go to https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICBIAKM.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosts the “ICDEEB 2018: 20th International Conference on Digital Economy and E-Business” at Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road Singapore 169075. For more information please go to https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICDEEB.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organizes the “ICGES 2018: 20th International Conference on Globalization and Economic Security” at Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road Singapore 169075. For more information please go to https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICGES.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology hosts the “ICGGCE 2018: 20th International Conference on Green Growth and Circular Economy” at Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road Singapore 169075. Further details are available at https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICGGCE.

From 22 to 23 March 2018, the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology organizes the “ICDPL 2018: 20th International Conference on Death Penalty and Law” at Holiday Inn Singapore Atrium, 317 Outram Road Singapore 169075. Further details can be found at https://waset.org/conference/2018/03/singapore/ICDPL.

From 23 to 24 March 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Bali 32nd International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Mercure Bali Harvestland Kuta Bali, Indonesia. For more information please go to http://academicfora.com/bessh-bali-indonesia-march-23-24-2018/.

From 2 to 3 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Singapore 43rd International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will take place at Aqueen Hotel Paya Lebar 33 Jalan Affifi, Singapore. Further information can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-singapore-april-02-03-2018/.

From 11 to 12 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Bangkok 63rd International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. Further details can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-april-11-12-2018/.

From 17 to 18 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation holds the “Kuala Lumpur 40th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will take place at The Federal Kuala Lumpur 35 Jalan Bukit Bintang, 55100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. More information can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-april-17-18-2018/.

From 19 to 20 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Manila 19th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Hotel H2O Manila, Philippines. Further information can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-manila-philippines-april-19-20-2018/.

From 23 to 24 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation organizes the “Bali 33rd International
From 23 to 24 April 2018, the Asia Europe Foundation hosts the “Bangkok 64th International Conference” on Business, Economics, Social Science and Humanities. The conference will be held at Novotel Hotel Bangkok Ploenchit Sukhumvit, Thailand. Further details can be found at http://academicfora.com/bessh-bangkok-thailand-april-23-24-2018/.

Scholarships opportunities

The “ETH Zurich Postdoctoral Fellowship Program” is a scholarship addressed at incoming postdoctoral researchers at ETH Zurich. The aim of the program is to foster excellent young researchers who have already demonstrated their abilities in the early stages of their professional careers. Applications have to be made jointly by the candidate and their host who must be an ETH Zurich Professor and who will act as a mentor of the fellow. For more information please go to https://www.ethz.ch/en/research/research-promotion/eth-internal-programmes/eth-fellowships.html. Deadline is on 1 March 2018.

The ERCIM (European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics) offers fellowships for PhD holders from all over the world. The scholars are hosted in leading European Research Institutes. For more details please go to https://fellowship.ercim.eu/. Deadline is on 30 April 2018.

The World Academy of Sciences Research Grants Programme in Basic Sciences (Groups) aims to provide funds to high-level promising research projects in Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics and Physics carried out by research units in the S&T-lagging countries (S&TLC) identified by TWAS. More information can be found at https://twas.org/opportunity. Deadline is on 11 May 2018.

The World Academy of Sciences Research Grants Programme in Basic Sciences (Individuals) aims to provide funds to high-level promising research projects in Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics and Physics carried out by individuals in the S&T-lagging countries (S&TLC) identified by TWAS. More information can be found at https://twas.org/opportunity. Deadline is on 11 May 2018.

The World Academy of Sciences COMSTECH Joint Research Grants aims to provide funds to high-level and promising research projects carried out by young individual scientists in OIC countries. More information can be found at https://twas.org/opportunity. Deadline is on 11 May 2018.

The Research and Innovation Staff Exchange provides funds to promote an international and cross-sector collaboration through exchanging research and innovation staff. For more information please go to https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal. Deadline is on 21 March 2018.

The ASEAN Master Scholarship is aimed at supporting students from ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) who intend to study at the University of Nottingham. You will be eligible to apply if you are classed as an overseas student for fee purposes and hold an offer to start a full-time master’s degree programme (excluding MRes) at Nottingham in September 2018, any subject area. More information can be found at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/studywithus. Deadline is on 18 May 2018.

Rotary Peace Fellowship allows up to 100 individuals from around the world to receive fully funded academic fellowships to pursue a Professional Development Certificate Program or Master’s Degree Program related to peace and conflict resolution and prevention at one of the participating peace centers around the world (USA, Japan, UK, Australia, Sweden, and Thailand). For more information: https://my.rotary.org/de/peace-fellowship-application. Deadline is on 31 May 2018.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Scholarship is aimed at supporting students from Africa, Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe that intend to study in Germany in any subject area. The students must demonstrate excellent school or academic merit and must be committed to the values of social democracy. More information can be found at https://www.daad.de/deutschland. Deadline depends on the type of application.

The Kennisontwikkelings programma Netherlands Fellowship Programmes (OKP NFP) provides fellowships for highly motivated professionals who are interested at participating in a Dutch University. The professionals must be in a position to introduce the newly acquired skills and knowledge into their employing organisation. The applicants must find a suitable university and submit your application via the Dutch institution offering the course. For more information: https://www.nuffic.nl/en/files/documents. Deadlines vary depending on the Dutch university.
CPG JOB MARKET
**CPG Job-Market**

As a service, CPG provides a regularly updated overview of currently open job offers in fields and from institutions related to CPG’s focal areas of work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Vacant position</th>
<th>Department, Office, Location</th>
<th>Closing Date</th>
<th>Information available at:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Project Manager (Labour Standards in the Global Supply Chains)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>2 March 2018</td>
<td><a href="https://erecruit.iolo/">https://erecruit.iolo/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Programme Specialist (Thai national)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>9 March 2018</td>
<td><a href="https://jobs.partneragencies.net">https://jobs.partneragencies.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vegetable Center</td>
<td>Regional Director – East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>15 March 2018</td>
<td><a href="http://avrdc.org/">http://avrdc.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)</td>
<td>Research Fellow - Urban Sustainability</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>23 March 2018</td>
<td><a href="https://www.sei-international.org/working-for-sei/3869">https://www.sei-international.org/working-for-sei/3869</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>National Consultant – Event Manager</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>15 April 2018</td>
<td><a href="https://jobs.undp.org">https://jobs.undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agence Française de Développement (AFD)</td>
<td>Chargé.e de projet</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://afd.profils.org/">http://afd.profils.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Regional Advocacy Advisor- Asia</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://chp.tbe.taleo.net/">http://chp.tbe.taleo.net/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for People and Forests (RECOFTC)</td>
<td>Accounts Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://drive.google.com">https://drive.google.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Fund International</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://childfund-hr.silkroad.com">https://childfund-hr.silkroad.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Fund International</td>
<td>Regional Finance Analyst</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://childfund-hr.silkroad.com/">https://childfund-hr.silkroad.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth Rights International</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.earthrights.org/careers/regional-director">https://www.earthrights.org/careers/regional-director</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Health International 360</td>
<td>Billing Analyst</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/">https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Health International 360</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/">https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Health International 360</td>
<td>Senior Budget Officer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/">https://fhi.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Science and Technology Forum</td>
<td>Vice President/Director (Program Development)</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://globalstf.org/career/">https://globalstf.org/career/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Air Transport Association</td>
<td>Area Manager</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://careers.peopleclick.com/">https://careers.peopleclick.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Aftercare Manager</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Communications &amp; Media Specialist (Thai national)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Field Worker (Myanmar speaking)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Field Worker (Khmer speaking)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Finance assistant (Thai national)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Human Resources Assistant (Thai national)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Police Liaison (Thai national)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/">https://www.ijm.org/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Security Coordinator</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ijm.org/careers/security-">https://www.ijm.org/careers/security-</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Justice Mission (IJM)</td>
<td>Social Worker (Khmer speaking)</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td>coordinator-bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://rescue.csod.com">https://rescue.csod.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Advocacy and Campaign Lead</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118338411">https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118338411</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Consultant: Review of Oxfam in Asia Knowledge and</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118431999">https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118431999</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Evaluation and Learning (PMEL) Specialist</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118332700">https://unjobs.org/vacancies/1515118332700</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Regional Programme Finance Manager</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://unjobs.org/vacancies/">https://unjobs.org/vacancies/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Chief of Party (COP)</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://pactworld.force.com/careers/">http://pactworld.force.com/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP)</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://pactworld.force.com/careers/">http://pactworld.force.com/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Start Up Communications and Outreach Consultant</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://pactworld.force.com/careers/">http://pactworld.force.com/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Strategic Planning and Program Management Advisor</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://pactworld.force.com/careers/">http://pactworld.force.com/careers/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raks Thai Foundation</td>
<td>Project Manager – Hug Khao Project</td>
<td>Bangkok and Ubon</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="http://th.thaingo.go">http://th.thaingo.go</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTI International</td>
<td>Chief of Party, Wildlife Asia</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://rtiint.referrals.selectminds.com">https://rtiint.referrals.selectminds.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Gender specialist</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/chp02/ats/careers">https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/chp02/ats/careers</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>IDIQ Manager, Asia Learning and M&amp;E Support Project</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/">https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>Team Leader – Blockchain expert</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/">https://chp.tbe.taleo.net/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Business Analyst</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/566278">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/566278</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Lead Software Developer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/839895">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/839895</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Business Development Manager/Director</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/600574">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/600574</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Senior Software Developer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/827893">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/827893</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Senior Technical Recruiter</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/1024319">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/1024319</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Software Developer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/566267">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/566267</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>User Experience Designer</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/594119">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/594119</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThoughtWorks</td>
<td>Quality Analyst</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/567464">https://www.thoughtworks.com/jobs/567464</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winrock International</td>
<td>Senior AFOLU (Agriculture/Forestry/Other Land Use) Advisor</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.appone.com/MainInfoReq.asp?R_ID=1538326">https://www.appone.com/MainInfoReq.asp?R_ID=1538326</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winrock International</td>
<td>Senior Finance Advisor</td>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>Until Filled</td>
<td><a href="https://www.appone.com/MainInfoReq.asp?R_ID=1538315">https://www.appone.com/MainInfoReq.asp?R_ID=1538315</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>